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In recent years, social entrepreneurship has gained increased attention among 
entrepreneurship scholars. Social entrepreneurship is emerging as an increasingly common 
approach to meeting social and economic needs. While governments and nonprofit 
organizations have long organized to meet specific human societal ills, hybrid entities, i.e., 
Social Enterprises (SEs) have emerged combining elements of a for-profit focus on efficient use 
of economic resources with a nonprofit focus on social value creation (Austin, Stevenson, and 
Wei-Skillern, 2006). 
The growth of social entrepreneurship over the last decade has been impressive (Roberts 
and Woods, 2005). Also, “while SEA rates are dwarfed by TEA rates in factor- and efficiency-driven 
countries, they are a significant component of entrepreneurship in many innovation-driven countries 
(Bosma and Levie, 2010: 51).” As for any growing business, access to appropriate sources of 
finance is a key factor in an enterprise’s development. As reported by the Bank of England 
(2003) amongst others, SEs face difficulties in finding sources of funds and the inability to get 
finance might constitute the single biggest barrier to establishing a SE. One the one hand, 
demand and supply for debt finance is limited due to a cultural risk aversion associated with 
borrowing which pushes social entrepreneurs in opting for more risk-free and cheaper 
financing instruments such as grants. Also, as Harding (2007: 12) reports, “many [social 
enterprises] have tried to gain external finance and failure rates are highest for unsecured loans and 
government grants. The biggest single reason for failure is the unsuitability of the business for that 
source of finance.” On the other hand, there is little evidence of demand for, or supply of, 
traditional venture capital (VC) or business angel finance due to the difficulty of providing a 
financial return, ownership issues and the lack of a clear and well defined exit strategy. There is, 
however, evidence of demand among SEs for some form of “patient” finance, particularly at the 
start-up or expansion stages, which would enable them to become self-sustainable and, thus, 
growth to scale, maximizing their social impact. 
In an effort to respond to the financing needs of social entrepreneurs as well as the search 
for efficient solutions to compelling social problems, the philanthropic venture capital (PhVC) 
funding model has spurred. Names like Acumen Fund, Ashoka, New Schools Venture Fund in 
the US, and Impetus Trust, Oltre Venture, LGT Venture Philanthropy Fund have been able to 
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create economically viable SEs that have changed the social conditions of people they are 
serving. 
PhVC was presented as the implementation of VC funding strategies and techniques to 
the financing of SEs (Letts, Ryan, and Grossman, 1997). Rather than simply being a purveyor of 
charitable funds for deserving SEs, the PhVC investment model brings the discipline of the VC 
investment world to the social sector. More specifically, the VC model is based on a set of 
practices designed to increase the odds of success for start-up investees. On the investor side, 
these include heavy amount of due diligence to screen new investments, long-term financial 
commitment to overcome the problem of undercapitalization that cripples start-ups, as well as 
extensive advice and consulting on how to develop and manage the company. The intrinsic 
goal of the VC investment process is to build profitable companies from scratch, ultimately 
making large profits.  
The attempt to transfer knowledge, practices, and wisdom across the VC business and 
the social sectors galvanized both individuals, who made their fortunes thanks to VC financing, 
and social sector players, willing to make an impact. The PhVC approach and language has 
penetrated the territory of traditional philanthropy as well as the private sector; it has been the 
subject of growing media attention and the profile of its early practitioners has risen within the 
field. Most significantly, several of the largest foundations and venture capitalists (VCs) have 
begun to experiment with the language and practices of PhVC. As a result, in the period 1993-
2007 the annual growth rate of newly created PhVC funds reached 15 percent in the United 
States and of 22 percent in Europe, gaining increased attention in the professional and in the 
academic communities.  
The main assumption underlying the PhVC’s value proposition is that, just like in the 
business sector, size matters: funding growing organizations is a sign of success and relevance, 
and creating organizations that go to scale is a legitimate and worthy goal for philanthropic 
funders. The basic commitments are grounded in the belief that philanthropic funds need to be 
applied to important social problems and that funders must strive to maximize the social 
impact of their investment. PhVCs believe sustainability can be the link between growth and 
social impact maximization: only if SEs become self-financially sufficient, they can focus on 
their social mission. As such, social impact is implicitly created and maximized in the case the 
SE is able to grow, become self-sustainable and thereby survive in the long-term.  
The SEs backed by philanthropic venture capitalists (PhVCs) are assisted in their efforts 
to construct and execute strategic plans leading to substantial growth and broad social impact. 
The accomplishment of the PhVCs’ goal is based on two main pillars. First, long-term funding 
commitment is required to build the capacity of the SE to develop, become sustainable and, 
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therefore, grow. Second, the mere provision of capital is not enough for sustainability and 
growth: it must be accompanied by the provision of a high level of PhVCs’ strategic and 
management engagement to the backed SE, critical elements to lasting success.  
Notwithstanding, prior research has examined the investment behaviour of profit-
maximizing VC firms; scholars have thus called for research to understand the funding 
mechanisms of PhVCs (Austin et al., 2006). The funding decision rules of PhVCs are unique 
because of the dual organizational identities of the ventures that they assess. Albert and 
Whetten (1985) define organizational identity as the shared and collective sense of an 
organization and states it is typically singular in focus. In the case of SEs, the organizational 
identity is intrinsically dualistic because it borrows distinctive elements from both the social 
and commercial sector (Certo and Miller, 2008; Austin et al., 2006; Pharoah and Charities Aid 
Foundation, 2004). Thus, it is unclear whether PhVCs structure their investment process 
similarly or differently than traditional profit seeking VCs. Furthermore, since PhVCs are not 
only fund providers but also strategic advisors of the SEs they back, a key issue is 
understanding how, besides capital, they can assist SEs in their journey towards sustainability, 
growth, and ultimately social impact.  
Up to date, the present study is the first aiming at understanding the investment process 
adopted by PhVCs and at comparing it with the traditional VC one. As such, it has implications 
for both researchers and practitioners. First, this study contributes to the entrepreneurship and 
VC literatures, and answers to the call for additional research into the investment process of 
PhVCs (Austin et al., 2006). It aims to open up some avenues of exploration for PhVC theory 
development and practice by presenting an exploratory comparative analysis of the extent to 
which elements applicable to VC, which have been more extensively studied, are transferrable 
to the new PhVC investment model. The exploration opens new insights about PhVC and 
points to opportunities for further elaboration by researchers in all the phases of the investment 
process. 
Further, the competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies have 
become more globalized. Also, the current economic crisis has led investors to become more 
responsible towards the communities they work with, smoothing their pure profit-seeking 
behaviour and incorporating social responsibility in their strategies, in such a way that society 
and communities can benefit from having a more civic society. The analysis presented here thus 
practical implications for fund providers in that it describes the practices used by PhVCs in 
structuring investments aiming at maximizing the social value of investments. It also provides a 
guideline for fund seekers, i.e., social entrepreneurs as it specify what PhVCs focus on while 
backing SEs. 
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The dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter presents a discussion around 
the definition of the term “philanthropic venture capital”. Elaborating on the definition of the 
VC investment model which is based on the existence of severe asymmetric information issues 
between funders and fundees, a new definition of PhVCs is proposed. As a second step, three 
clusters of PhVCs are identified based on the legal incorporation of the SEs they back and on the 
outcome main objective PhVCs pursue. 
In the second chapter, a speculation around the theoretical framework of asymmetric 
information underlying the VC model is run. Based on this, the research question on the PhVC 
investment model is formulated and a set of propositions analyzing each phase of the 
investment process are presented. 
The third chapter follows with a discussion on the process adopted to identify the 
population of PhVCs and its description. Thereafter, the methodology used in the dissertation is 
presented and methodological issues related to it are analyzed.  
The fourth and fifth chapter present the results obtained from a set of pilot interviews 
conducted with leading European and US PhVCs and those based on a survey addressed to the 
entire population of PhVCs.  
Last, the dissertation concludes by reviewing and discussing the results and providing 
future directions for further research, contributions and conclusions.g added value to their portfolio 
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Following the diffusion of the PhVC investment approach, the aim of this chapter is 
twofold. First, to provide a new definition of PhVC elaborated based on the VC literature. As a 
matter of fact, the commonly used definition of PhVC the application of the VC strategies and 
techniques to traditional forms of philanthropic financing does not specify what PhVC refers to 
in terms of investment and of purpose of investment, this chapter aims at providing a more 
comprehensive definition of the term elaborating on the assumption of the applicability of the 
VC model. Second, taking into account the debates to be found in the social entrepreneurship 
literature, clusters of PhVC investors are identified.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, a debate on the current definition of the term 
PhVC is presented and a new one is formulated based on a review of the traditional VC 
investment model. Second, clusters of PhVCs are identified based on the type of SEs they back 
and the outcome of the investment.  
 
1.2. PHILANTHROPIC VENTURE CAPITAL: DEFINITION 
After the publishing of the seminal article by Letts et al. (1997), PhVC, also referred to as 
venture philanthropy, has spurred in the US and in Europe. PhVC is a new financing model 
available for social entrepreneurs that transfers the profit-maximizing VC investment model to 
foundations’ philanthropic financing. 
For years, foundations’ have played a key role in the process of giving back to society, 
being linked to the social sector in a pattern of reciprocal dependency (Hansmann, 1987). 
Starting from the assumption of market and government failures, foundations work to expand 
the scope of the social sector and to strengthen its functioning (Weisbrod, 1997), channelling 
philanthropic resources to projects/programs that aims at improving people’s life conditions. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that the goals of those programs receiving financing from 
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foundations, although valuable and praiseworthy, are barely aggregated up into a meaningful 
response to any of the major social problems. The reasons are manifold. 
First, foundations tend to be project-driven: they prefer to support a particular program 
or project which addresses a specific social problem. The field has not developed an approach 
that supports organizational capacity building which, according to Honadle and Howitt (1986), 
can be defined as the ability of the SE to survive and to successfully apply its skills and 
resources in order to pursue its goals and satisfy the stakeholders’ interest. Project-specific 
support does not give the organization the flexibility to use funds where the need is greatest, 
hampering the recipient’s ability to both develop long-term solutions to the long-term problems 
it seeks to address and sustain long-term growth (Larson, 2002; Letts et al., 1997). 
Second, project-driven support leads to undercapitalization as each program needs its 
own funding, making social entrepreneurs to continuously scramble for funds instead of 
focusing on the achievement of the organization’s social missions. Studies by Vidal (1992), Clay 
(1990), and Cohen, Neff, and Barad (1988) find that debt coverage and operating cost ratios on 
non-profit sponsored projects are rather low. Porter and Kramer (1999) show that US 
foundations donate only 5.5 percent of their assets to charities, which is slightly above the legal 
minimum requirement of 5 percent; the rest is invested in program-related-investments that 
create financial rather than social returns. The same study also claims that for each one hundred 
dollars directly donated to a charity, a social benefit of 250 percent of the lost tax revenue in the 
case of direct giving is obtained. At the same time, it gives a social benefit of only 14 percent of 
the tax revenue through donations to foundations. The likelihood of social entrepreneurs 
obtaining new resources and developing new social programs is thereby reduced. 
Third, foundations tend to support social projects that can be brought to scale, meaning 
that they are required to have good prospects of replication beyond the original recipient 
organization (Locke and Roberson, 1997). However, as Morino (2000) clearly states, although 
many organizations have succeeded in developing solutions to a particular social problem, their 
efforts have not been broadly disseminated, adopted or brought to scale. For most donors 
philanthropy is about deciding which organizations to support and how much money to give 
them. However, despite the dedication and efforts of those who work in the non-profit sector, 
the overwhelming majority of the 1.3 million US non-profits are extremely small: 90 percent of 
their annual budgets are under $500,000 and only 1 percent has budgets greater than $10 
million. 
Fourth, Walker (2004) shows that foundation’s allocation of donations is traditionally 
based on need rather than on performance. Besides, foundations pay little attention to thinking 
in strategic terms and measuring the grant recipients’ results (Porter and Kramer, 1999). For 
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funders, success is defined in terms of the size and number of grants awarded; for grantees, it is 
a function of how many grants one can secure and how large the operating budget can be. Thus, 
the emphasis is placed upon the act of the transaction with value being defined in terms of that 
transaction itself and not in terms of what long-term value is generated thanks to the 
transaction. By evaluating performance in such terms, outstanding results may not be 
necessarily rewarded, resulting in a lack of stimuli: “rarely excellent performance is rewarded with 
an increased flow of philanthropic capital” (Grossman, 1999: 3), leading to adverse selection issues: 
those SEs that are more in need of funds more likely will apply for foundations’ backing over 
those that use their resources more efficiently. 
Fourth, Billitteri (2000) argues that foundations do not do enough to help grantees in 
recruiting and training qualified staff members, in improving their computer and accounting 
systems, or in developing sophisticated tools to track the results of social-service programs. This 
creates an environment in which employees of SEs develop a risk-adverse behaviour, creating a 
vicious circle with foundations inclined to place many small rather than a few large bets. The 
aim becomes minimising downsides, which in turn results in limited scope for the upside, 
creating a vicious circle for many non-profit organizations, which do not receive the funds they 
need to develop and implement their programs.  
As a result, Letts et al. (1997) proposal of the applicability of the VC model to PhVC is 
motivated by the fact that foundations share similar challenges as those confronted by VCs: 
selecting the most worthy recipients of funding, relying on young organizations to implement 
new ideas, and being accountable to the third parties whose money they are donating. The 
adoption of the VC model, which contributed to the creation of vast fortunes during the 
dot.com boom by the provision of capital and strategic advice to start-up firms, could help 
philanthropists in implementing a creating value agenda (Porter and Kramer, 1999). As such, 
just as for-profit VCs screen and select new investments, foundations should identify the most 
socially productive grantees, channelling resources to them. The selection of the best grantees 
thus leads to more efficient advancement in the state of knowledge which will enable 
foundations to signal the social value they are creating. By educating and attracting other 
donors, it is possible to improve social returns on a larger pool of philanthropic funds. Finally, 
the performance of a non-profit can be magnified by moving the foundation from the role of a 
mere capital provider to the role of a fully engaged partner. “The value created in this way extends 
beyond the impact of one grant: it raises the social impact of the grantee in all that it does and, to the 
extent that grantees are willing to learn from one another, it can increase the effectiveness of other 
organizations as well” (Porter and Kramer, 1999: 124).  
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Following Letts et al. (1997)’s discussion, the embracement of the PhVC approach in the 
financing of social sector players was particularly marked with the dot.com boom of the late 
nineties, when it began to be discussed mainly in US professional philanthropic circles 
(Edelson, 2004; Morino and Shore, 2004; Gose, 2003; Ryan, 2001; Morino Institute, 2000; Tuan 
and Emerson, 2000; Emerson, Wachowicz, and Chun, 2000; Porter andKramer, 1999). Also, in an 
article by Greenfeld, Blackman, Fulton, Jackson, and McLaughlin (2000: 48) published in the 
Time magazine, the authors explain that “many of today’s tech millionaires and billionaires are 
applying to philanthropy the lessons they have learned as entrepreneurs. One solution has been the 
founding of philanthropic venture capital funds which use the same aggressive methods as VC firms, 
whose money typically comes with technological expertise and experience at running lean, efficient 
organizations. This new breed of philanthropist scrutinizes each charitable cause like a potential business 
investment, seeking maximum return in terms of social impact.” 
Nevertheless, three main critiques can be moved on to Letts et al. (1997)’s definition of 
PhVC. First, as it focuses just on one specific type of philanthropic financier, i.e., foundations, 
their definition might preclude other entities to be considered as PhVCs. This is quite limitative 
and inaccurate as entities other than foundations adopt VC practices and operate in the PhVC 
field. Second, it does not identify the PhVC’s value proposition which determines the object of 
the PhVC’s investment, making it difficult to understand which is the target organization 
supported by PhVCs. And, third, this lack of preciseness creates a gap for what concerns the 
consequences associated with deciding to invest in that particular type of organization.  
More recently, John (2006) has shifted the focus of the PhVC’s definition from the type of 
financier to the identification of the VC’s characteristics that are indeed applied to PhVC. Six 
key elements are thus identified: high engagement, multi-year support, determination of the 
most appropriate financing instrument, non-financial support, organizational capacity building, 
and performance measurement (John, 2006). Despite addressing the first critique, this definition 
does not appear to be able to respond to the second and third ones.  
In order to elaborate a more precise definition of PhVC addressing all the three critiques, 
first an overview of the definition of VC is conducted following the assumption underlying 
Letts et al. (1997). Second, the object of PhVC’s investment is identified; and third, a definition 
of PhVC will be proposed adjusting that of VC to take into account the object of PhVC’s 
investment and the environment where PhVCs operates. 
Based on the VC literature, VCs have evolved as a set of specialized firms that focus on 
financing the entrepreneurial firms characterized by a high level of uncertainty and information 
asymmetries. Alternative to bank financing, the VC approach typically supports firms with little 
or no track-record which are prevented from obtaining bank financing until their balance sheet 
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reflects substantial tangible assets that might be pledged as collateral. Gompers and Lerner 
(1999), Amit, Brander, and Zott (1998), Wright and Robbie (1996), and Gupta and Sapienza 
(1992) amongst others define VC as follows: 
Definition 1: Venture capital is an intermediated investment model focusing on the 
financing of ventures with the potential for high growth. Due the potential proclivity for 
asymmetric information between funders and fundees, the venture capital model provides 
financial and non-financial capital with the aim of maximizing the financial return on the 
investment. 
Figure 1.2.1 depicts the VC investment model. Investors in the VC fund, called limited 
partners, provide money to the fund itself which are invested in a pre-selected venture. Thanks 
to the financial and non-financial resources, namely advice and engagement, to the 
organization, this is supposed to become profitable (in the figure the possibility is indicated by 
dashed lines) and in some cases extremely profitable. At the exit stage, profits, if any, are 
redistributed to the limited partners.  

























 10  
 
Gompers and Lerner (2001) present the VC investment process as being composed of 
three different stages: 
1.1. Fundraising; 
1.2. Investing; 
1.3. Exiting.  
Within the investing phase Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) further identify four phases: 
1.2.a.  Deal origination; 
1.2.b.  Deal screening and evaluation; 
1.2.c.  Deal structuring; 
1.2.d.  Post-investment activities.  
Figure 1.2.2 depicts the Gompers and Lerner (2001) model integrated with Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984).  
















Source: Elaboration by the author. 
If moving now the focus of the discussion on the value proposition of PhVCs which 
consists of creating and maximizing social value. Whitman (2008), among others, provides the 
following definition of social value: “Values are beliefs about what is considered intrinsically 
important and serve as a guide for proper action […] social values describe what you’re trying to 
accomplish (Whitman, 2008: 419).” Being PhVC an investment model, social values are conveyed 
by investing in SEs; SEs are a particular type of organizations whose pivotal driver is the 
creation of social rather than economic value (Austin et al., 2006). Based on Mair and Martí 
(2006), SEs are initiatives that catalyze social transformation and/or addresses social needs. In 
SEs, the separation between social and economic value makes the creation of economic value a 
necessary but not sufficient condition of existence (for a more comprehensive discussion on this 
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issue cfr. chapter 1.3). A consequence arising from investing in SEs is the that by doing so, 
PhVCs need the ability to operate in the same environment as that surrounding their object of 
investment: being both PhVC’s and SEs’ the primary objective the creation of social value, this 
impacts PhVCs’ activity as it requires them to pursue social value as primary objective.  
Combining Definition 1 with Letts et al. (1997)’s definition, the PhVC’s object of 
investment, and the consequences associated with operating in a social environment, the 
following definition of PhVC is proposed:  
Definition 2: Philanthropic venture capital is the application of the venture capital 
investment model to the financing of social enterprises with a potential for a high social 
impact. Due the potential proclivity for asymmetric information between funders and 
fundees, the philanthropic venture capital investment model provides financial and non-
financial capital with the primary objective of maximizing the social impact of the 
investment.  
  
Figure 1.2.3 depicts the PhVC investment model. Investors in the PhVC fund provide 
capital to the fund itself which then will be reinvested in high-potential social impact SEs. 
Together with financial backing, the PhVCs provides SEs a series of non-financial services, 
namely advice and a high level of engagement in the management of the organization. These 
two aspects are assumed to be key factors towards sustainability, growth and social value 
creation. 
At the exit event, two types of return might be obtained. First, if the backed SEs has 
become sustainable and has been able to maximize its social impact, this will be transferred to 
society which will directly benefit form the SEs services and activity and indirectly investors. 
Second, the achievement of a level of self-sustainability by the SEs might enable the creation of 
some financial returns. However, two levels of analysis need to be considered at this point. The 
first level of analysis takes into account the legal form of the backed SE: if the SEs is a non-profit 
organization the non-distribution constraint presented by Hansmann (1980) applies. More 
specifically, the non-distribution constraint states that non-profit organizations are not barred 
from making a profit; on the contrary, they “are barred from re-distributing net earnings, if any, to 
individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees. (Hansmann, 
1980: 838)”: non-profit SEs must therefore reinvest within the organization any earnings created. 
On the contrary, if the SEs is a for-profit entity, then any generated profit can be redistributed to 
investors, namely PhVCs. At this point, the second level of analysis must be conducted taking 
into account the legal form of the PhVC fund. Again, PhVCs might be non-profit or for-profit. In 
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the case of a non-profit PhVC fund, financial returns created by backed SEs are redistributed 
within the fund itself; in the case of a for-profit PhVCs, they are instead given back to investors.  
Comparing Figure 1.2.3 with Figure 1.2.2 presented at the beginning of the chapter, it is 
easy to see that in the PhVC approach social impact is a means to improve society: society 
represents the target of PhVC, while profits are the target of VC.  
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1.3. CLUSTERING PHILANTHROPIC VENTURE CAPITALISTS BY 
OBJECT OF INVESTMENT 
The next step consists of understanding whether SEs undertaking different 
organizational forms, which according to the literature are associated to different organizational 
outcomes, are financed by different categories of PhVCs.  
Social entrepreneurship has its core foundation in the field of entrepreneurship and 
unites traditional views of opportunity exploitation with social objectives. However, despite 
number of studies have investigated under which conditions social entrepreneurship emerges 
and which are its peculiar characteristics, so far the definition remains quite fuzzy. The major 
issue consists of understanding the boundaries of traditional and social entrepreneurship. The 
shared term entrepreneurship implies common aspects: both traditional entrepreneurs and social 
entrepreneurs identify new opportunities in the environment and then seek resources to pursue 
them. Since Schumpeter and Opie (1934), traditional entrepreneurship has involved the 
identification, evaluation, and exploitation of breakthrough opportunities aiming at creating 
economic value and, consequently, personal or shareholder wealth. Entrepreneurs report not 
only pursuing personal wealth and profits, but also advancing the interests and welfare of their 
employees and customers as, for example, when employment is created and employees benefit 
from working for an economically viable organization. In traditional entrepreneurship, thus, the 
creation of economic value is seen as a synonymous of social value as the exploitation of 
business opportunities leading to economic profitability are per-se a source of social change. On 
the contrary, social entrepreneurship focuses on the identification of innovative approaches and 
opportunities to address basic, long-standing needs such as providing food, water, shelter, 
education, and medical services to those members of society who are in need, resulting in social 
change, social wealth, and social impact. As such, the quest for social impact implies social 
entrepreneurs making a distinction between economic and social values who then decide to 
focus their priorities on social ones. Furthermore, as reported by Harding (2007: 4) “any surplus 
or profit, is recycled for the benefits of the activity, rather than for shareholders or directors”. However, 
the “theoretical underpinnings [of social entrepreneurship] have not been adequately explored, and the 
need for contributions to theory and practice are pressing (Austin et al., 2006: 1).” 
Acknowledging the lack of a unique definition of social entrepreneurship, the aim of this 
piece of work goes beyond that and seeks instead to understand the organizational environment 
where social entrepreneurship can be found. Emerson and Twersky (1996) integrate the premise 
of frame-breaking and social innovation with an organizational perspective, identifying SEs as 
both non-profit and for-profit.  
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Non-profit social entrepreneurship represents the phenomenon of applying into non-
profit organizations business expertise, entrepreneurial and market-based skills as when non-
profit organizations that produce goods and services (also called “operating” non-profits) 
develop innovative approaches to earn income (Lasprogata and Cotton, 2003; Thompson, 2002; 
Grimm and Robert, 2000; Reis, 1999; Boschee, 1995). By bringing into the non-profit a for-profit 
mentality, the former have started to sell what they used to provide for free. Nevertheless, being 
non-profit SEs still private producers of public goods (Weisbrod, 1975) like traditional non-
profits, their primary role consists of supplying to society a set of products and/or services 
aiming at improving life conditions. Also, since being non-profits, they are subject to the non-
distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980) presented at the end of chapter 1.2. The assumption 
underlying this discussion thus is that market orientation and earned income/profits are a 
means that SEs can exploit to deliver more social value for the money they spend and for the 
services/products they provide. The application of business practices to non-profit 
organizations can increase their efficiency and thus have a higher social impact ceteris paribus 
(Zietlow, 2001; Sagawa and Segal, 2000; Dees, 1998; Warwick, 1997; Boschee, 1995; Drucker, 
1989).  
For-profit social entrepreneurship can happen as social-purpose commercial ventures 
(Dees and Anderson, 2003; Emerson and Twersky, 1996) blending social and economic motives 
in the way that Emerson and Twersky (1996) describe as double-bottom line; also, it can join 
social, economic, and environmental values as presented by (Elkington, 1994), namely triple-
bottom line. Typical examples of social-purpose commercial ventures are Café Direct and the 
Grameen Bank. One of the main critiques of for-profit SEs relates to the risks of conflict between 
pursuing profit and serving a social and/or environmental purpose. The issue is not new at all: 
centuries ago (Smith, 1776: 478) made the following observation about business people, “I have 
never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is affection, indeed, not 
very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.” 
Embedded in the contract failure theory, Hansmann (1980) also shows that non-profits enter the 
market precisely to mitigate the profit incentive and ensure that social value is not sacrificed or 
exploited for the non-profit producers. This is confirmed by Weisbrod (1998) who states 
“Nonprofits that pursue revenue in the same ways that private firms do are likely to emulate those firms, 
and by becoming more like them may undermine the fundamental justification for their own special social 
and economic role (Weisbrod, 1998: 9).”  
In a recent article by Townsend and Hart (2008) it is argued that the non-profit or for-
profit choice for social entrepreneurs is contingent upon the specific norms the entrepreneur 
perceives in the institutional environment related to resource acquisition, stakeholder 
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alignment, and legitimacy attainment. While received theory typically assumes social 
institutions reduce uncertainty for decision-makers (Dimaggio, 1997; Dimaggio and Powell, 
1983), for social entrepreneurs forming new ventures, conflicting institutional norms may 
actually increase the perceived ambiguity in the choice of organizational form. However, the 
outcome of for-profit SEs is the same as that characterizing non-profit SEs, i.e., the focus on 
social value. Given the choice of the for-profit structure for-profit SEs must also pay close 
attention to the creation of economic value (Dees and Anderson, 2003). Seelos and Mair (2005a, 
b) combine a social purpose with a for-profit mindset as an effective means to cater to largely 
unsatisfied social needs, especially as traditional social sector activities often are considered 
inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive (Dees, Economy, and Emerson, 2001). Also, Dees and 
Anderson (2003) claim that the profit motive, if properly channelled has the potential to 
encourage efficacy, efficiency and innovation.  
Table 1.3.1 illustrates the organizational forms of SEs, namely non-profit and for-profit, 
and their outcome focus, i.e., social, environmental, and economic. Whereas non-profit SEs may 
also pay attention to the creation of economic value in their social value creating activities, their 
primary role still consists of being private producers of public goods (Weisbrod, 1975). For non-
profits, social and environmental values (which can be considered as a specific type of social 
value) are alternative values: it can pursue social values without pursuing environmental and 
vice versa. No danger that environmental issues will be exploited for economic reasons because 
the non-distribution constraint “the [non-profit] organization’s legal commitment [requires it] to 
devote its entire earnings to the production of services (Hansmann, 1980: 844).  
 For-profit SEs, as just discussed, have a double- or triple-bottom line approach to the 
creation of value, with social and environmental values being the primary purpose of the 
organization. Note that in this case social and economic values are not alternative: the creation 
of environmental values combined with economic values does not make an organization a for-
profit SEs. Examples of this type are business operating in the green-tech sector whose mission 
is to obtain high economic return by the exploitation of environmental issues. Consequently, 
only if environmental values are integrated by social values, the organization can be considered 
a for-profit SE. 
Table 1.3.1: Social enterprises by organizational form and outcome focus. 
















Source: Elaboration by the author. 
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Following definition 2, and more specifically, the discussion on the object of PhVC’s 
investments, it is possible to identify clusters of PhVCs depending on the organizational forms 
of the backed SEs. In fact, the raison d’être of both PhVCs and SEs is creating and maximizing 
social impact and the investment in SEs is a means for PhVCs to pursue it. However, just like 
the classification of SEs presented in Table 1.3.1 includes both non-profit and for-profit SEs 
creating a range of social, financial and/or environmental values, the PhVCs community 
consists of an array of investors lying in the Investment Plane presented by Emerson (2000). At 
one extreme of Figure 1.3.1 there are those PhVCs whose financial contribution strictly seeks no 
financial returns and thus attempt to obtain and maximize the social and/or environmental 
return on investment. At the other extreme, lie those investors whose raison d’être is the 
maximization of financial value, i.e., traditional VCs, that cannot be categorized as PhVCs. In 
the middle, investors blending social, financial, and environmental returns can be found. The 
key issue in this case is that financial value is a means towards the attainment of social impact, 
not an end: social value creation is the goal to which financial and environmental return is 
subject to. 
Figure 1.3.1: The Investment Plane: a traditional perception of social and 
financial return on investment. 
 
Source: Emerson (2000:14). 
By combining the organizational form of SEs with the type of PhVCs, three distinct 
categories of PhVC’s investment models can be here thus identified: 
1. Pure highly-engaged philanthropy: within this category are those PhVCs that invest 
only in non-profits and, thus, seek a pure social return on their investment. The 
financial support might range from grant to equity, although this depends on the 
legal environment where PhVCs operate which is country specific. The 
organizational form of the PhVC fund is non-profit as is the case of the SEs they 
support and being subject to the non-distribution constraint, the economic value 
they create is reinvested in the fund itself; 
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2. Social venture capital: these PhVCs invest only in for-profit SEs and, thus, are for-
profit themselves. They have two to three thresholds: the creation and maximization 
of social return is accompanied by financial and/or environmental returns. Also, not 
being subject to the non-distribution constraint, economic value, in the form of 
profits, is delivered back to investors in the fund; 
3. Hybrid philanthropy: their portfolio includes both non-profit and for-profit SEs; their 
objective is, thus, mixed. On the one hand, the portion of the portfolio including 
non-profit has only the social threshold, while the portion including for-profit SEs 
will seek to blend social, financial, and/or environmental returns. The legal form 
that hybrid philanthropists undertake reflect the mixed composition of their 
portfolio: they can either be non-profit or for-profit and the decision will be based on 
the type of SEs that is mainly represented in the PhVCs’ portfolio. 
It is worth clarifying that, just like SEs are different from socially responsible businesses 
and purely profit-motivated firms operating in the social sector (Dees and Anderson, 2003), 
PhVCs are different from socially responsible investors and profit-motivated investors 
operating in the social sector. As socially responsible businesses achieve commercial success in 
ways that respect ethical values, people, communities, and the environment, socially 
responsible investors behave as prescribed by Irvine (1987) and their main objective is the 
creation of economic value. Also, purely profit-motivated firms operating in the social sector 
cannot be considered as SEs, entering the social sector in search for profits, such as green-tech 
companies. In the same way, those VCs entering in the social sector to increase profitability 
through diversification do not qualify as PhVCs. To this respect, one example is Kleiner Perkins, 
who is famous for their investments in companies like Amazon and Google, and who are 
boosting their involvement in green investments. In February 2006, the Prize for Green 
Innovation fund for $100 million was created specifically for green investing. In addition, the 
Nobel Prize winner Al Gore joined the firm in 2007 and the fund has also sponsored legislation 
to benefit investing in renewable energy sources. However, this new Kleiner Perkins fund 
cannot be categorized as a PhVC fund since, through the investment in green companies, its 
main objective is still the attainment of typical VC returns, ranging from 20 to 25 percent a year.  
 
1.4. CONCLUSIONS 
By reviewing the definition of PhVC proposed by Letts et al. (1997) as the application of 
the VC model to traditional forms of philanthropic financing, and transposing the VC definition 
to PhVC, a new and more precise definition of the term has been formulated. VC scholars have 
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proposed definitions of the VC model embedded into an asymmetric information theoretical 
framework. VCs are thus experts in mitigating the asymmetric information issues that 
characterize nascent ventures while seeking external financing. Elaborating on this, the PhVC 
investment model can be identified as an intermediated investment in SEs with a potential for a 
high social impact. However, since asymmetric information between funders and fundees 
exists, PhVCs provide capital and non-financial services to backed organizations with the aim of 
maximizing the social impact of the investment. 
The second part of the chapter focused on the identification of PhVCs clusters 
considering the organizational form of backed SEs and the associated outcome focus. Three 
clusters were thereby coined: pre highly-engaged philanthropists, social VCs, and hybrid 
philanthropists. To this respect, following the discussion, the discriminate questions that a 
PhVCs must positively answer in order to fully qualify as PhVCs are the following: 
Can the model presented in   
1. Figure 1.2.3 be applied? 
2. Is the primary objective of the PhVC fund the creation and maximization of 
social impact?  
3. If the policy of the PhVC fund is to invest in for-profit SEs and two investment 
options (A and B) are available and A is expected to create a higher social value 
than the alternative option B, while expecting to perform worse in terms of 
economic indicators. Would the PhVC fund invest in company A despite the 
worse economic performance?  
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The definition proposed by Letts et al. (1997) presents the PhVC investment model as the 
application of the practices characterizing the profit-seeking VC approach. Since the VC model 
has been presented as an investment approach that dues its competitive advantage to the ability 
to diminish asymmetric information between the VC investor and the investee firm, PhVC are 
defined as specialized investment firms that deal with the existence of asymmetric information 
while backing SEs.  
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to formulate the research question of the 
dissertation. Second, the analysis of the research question will lead to presenting a set of 
propositions.   
2.2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In order to formulate the research question to be investigated, the discussion around the 
definition of PhVC presented in chapter 1.2 is taken into account and analyzed. Based on Letts 
et al. (1997), the PhVC investment model consists of the application of the VC one as presented 
by Gompers and Lerner (2001) as well as Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) in the social sector. The 
assumption underlying that definition is that PhVC face the same theoretical issues as VCs and 
these are implicitly applied to the PhVC process as well, making each phase of the VC and 
PhVC investment models the same.  
For what concerns VC, scholars have argued that the most important issue characterizing 
VC’s activity is the significant level of information asymmetries between principal, i.e., the VCs, 
and agent, i.e., the entrepreneur (Amit et al., 1998; MacIntosh, 1994; Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 
1993; Sahlman, 1990) as “the entrepreneur’s ability to combine tangible and intangible assets in news 
ways and to deploy them to meet customer needs in a manner that could not be easily imitates […] may 
be known to the entrepreneur, but unknown to the VCs (Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1990: 1233).  
Building on a formal model of VC investment activity, Amit et al. (1998) show that VCs 
are principals who become skilled at selecting good projects in environments with hidden 
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information and are good at monitoring and advising agents who might otherwise be 
vulnerable to moral hazard problems. Thanks to their abilities in reducing informational 
asymmetries, VCs can solve the problems related to appropriability and reliability of the 
information provided by the venture in markets with imperfect information. This enables them 
to have a competitive advantage and, thus, to obtain superior returns.  
More particularly, asymmetric information arises from the separation of ownership and 
control as prescribed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This can take the form of “hidden 
information” or “hidden action.” In the first case, “hidden information” leads to adverse 
selection and typically takes place before the investments is realized. In this case, the 
agent/entrepreneur tends to have better knowledge about the venture being good or bad than 
does the principal/VCs that finances it. In order to increase the probability of obtaining VC 
financing, the agent/entrepreneur might be motivated to misrepresent the likelihood of success 
of the venture. Because of the principal/VCs’ bounded rationality, they might not be able to 
discern the quality of a company before the investment takes place. As a result, low quality 
entrepreneurial projects dominate the market and the market “selects” adversely, preventing 
potentially good-quality entrepreneurial projects from being funded (Chan, 1983; Yuk, 1983).  
In the case of “hidden action,” the VC investor might not be able to observe whether the 
entrepreneur is working hard to help the company grow or whether he is planning to “take the 
money and run,” leading to opportunistic behaviour, i.e., moral hazard which agency theory is 
based on (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory suggests that the greater the information 
advantage possessed by inside members, the greater the danger that they pursue self-interested 
outcomes which the principal will fail to detect. Furthermore, the greater the conflict, the 
greater the incentive to act opportunistically. This leads VCs in setting up contractual 
provisions aimed at minimizing the probability of opportunistic behaviour and conflict of 
interest on the side of the entrepreneur.  
In the case of social entrepreneurs, non-transparent or emerging formal markets like 
PhVC is, lead to adverse selection between the social entrepreneur and the PhVCs. As such, the 
need for funds might induce the social entrepreneur to misrepresent to the PhVCs the 
likelihood of social success of the SE. The same happens with traditional entrepreneurs. And as 
it happens with traditional VCs, PhVCs might not be able to estimate the effective social impact 
of the applying SEs.  
Concerning the post-investment phase, recently Van Slyke and Newman (2006) present 
the non-financial services provided by PhVCs as stewardship behaviour rather than a 
mechanism to protect the investment. With its roots in sociology and psychology, stewardship 
theory (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and 
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Donaldson, 1998; Fox and Hamilton, 1994) characterizes human beings as having higher-order 
needs for self-esteem, self-actualization, growth, achievement and affiliation. Stewardship 
theory is centred on service rather than on control and begins with the willingness to be 
accountable for some larger body than the self. It also suggests that managers make effective 
decisions to the extent that their interests are aligned with those of the firm. Effectiveness can be 
obtained through empowerment. This is in contrast to agency theory’s characterization of 
human beings as opportunistic, inherently untrustworthy, and focused on a narrow pursuit of 
financial gains. As a result, while adverse selection issues can characterize the pre-investment 
phase of both VC and PhVC, moral hazard could be less powerful in explaining the PhVC 
investment behaviour.  
Following the divergences both at a conceptual and operational level, the expectation 
arising from the discussion is that PhVCs should structure their investment model differently 
from VCs, meaning the latter cannot be the straight application of the former. Considering the 
environment is different, the output of the process is also different, and consequently, it could 
be the case that so is the process itself. The following research question is, thus, formulated: 
Research Question: How does the asymmetric information characterizing the venture 
capital investment model shape the philanthropic venture capital investment model? 
The aim of this research is thereby to investigate how asymmetric information shapes the 
PhVC investment model. Taking into account the key issue of the object of investment, the 
current research is interested in analyzing those phases of the investment model that involve 
the creation of a relationship between the fund and the investee company. If taking into account 
the Gompers and Lerner (2001) model as depicted in Figure 1.2.2, the discussion implies a focus 
on the investing and harvesting phases of the investment process as the fundraising phase sees the 
VCs and the LPs as players, not the SE. Figure 2.2.1 depicts the steps investigated in this piece of 
work. 
Figure 2.2.1: Phases of the investment process under investigation. 
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In the following chapters a set of hypotheses on the investing and exiting phase of PhVC 
investment is presented, based on the practices adopted by VCs. 
 
2.3. PROPOSITIONS: INVESTING 
2.3.1. Deal Origination 
Before the investment takes place, VCs focus their attention in avoiding the selection of 
lemons. Elaborating on information literature, Chan (1983) emphasizes the role of VCs in 
mitigating the adverse selection problem in the market for entrepreneurial capital and shows 
that adverse selection derives from the absence of any informed VCs: firms are priced at their 
average quality instead of their true value. However, the presence of informed VC investors 
alleviates this issue, increasing the informational efficiency of market and redistributing wealth 
from the owners of bad firms to those of good ones.  
Considering that entrepreneurial actions are unobserved by VCs, Chan (1983) argues that 
the risk for adverse selection can be minimized through a search strategy of deals, which 
enables VCs to learn about the quality of the entrepreneurs and of their venture. Amit, Muller, 
and Cockburn (1999) consider the role of different mechanisms for matching entrepreneurs and 
VCs in mitigating adverse-selection problems: entrepreneurs may passively “shop around” or 
VCs may actively seek attractive investment opportunities. The same findings are obtained by 
earlier studies on VC by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), which is survey based, as well as Sweeting 
(1991), which instead is a qualitative and case-study research.  
Passively, VCs either receive unsolicited proposals from entrepreneurs or through a 
referral process. Based on observations made in the early to mid-1980s, Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984) find that unsolicited proposals from the entrepreneur typically generate from cold calls 
and the usual response from VCs is to request a business plan. Referrals also originate from the 
VCs’ business network made up of personal acquaintance, consultants, prior/existing investees 
(Sweeting, 1991). However, as shown by Chan (1983), passive methods of deal origination are 
more subject to adverse selection issues as, with VCs only passively receiving investment 
proposals, entrepreneurs are more likely to undertake projects offering low returns. Being 
aware of this, VCs have positive information costs and might not be willing to participate in the 
VC market, having the option of investing their funds in other low return projects. Also, 
passively received proposals might not get funding in case the VC does not have funds 
available for investment when the proposal is received. 
 
 23  
 
On the other hand, proactive methods of deal origination help VCs minimize adverse 
selection. Proactively, Sweeting (1991) reports that the most widely used criteria by VCs are the 
search for new deals through their network of contacts or ventures held in the existing portfolio; 
origination through referrals from other VCs, while used, appears to be of lower importance. In 
such a way, VCs are able to receive good potential deals as they become more informed thanks 
to the role played by the referrer: at this stage VCs usually know much more about the quality 
of the source by which the deal is referred than about the quality of the referred deal itself. Most 
of the referrers are reluctant to recommend an entrepreneur to a VCs unless they are confident 
that the entrepreneur is a good candidate for VC. VCs are, thus, assuming that the quality of the 
source of the deal, which they know, can be a proxy for the quality of the deal, which is 
unknown.  
However, while the early study by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) concludes that proactive 
behaviour by VCs in seeking out deals was not a widely adopted means of deal origination, 
Sweeting (1991) shows that a decade after VCs appear to have become more proactive, with VCs 
mainly using referrals from ventures already held in the portfolio, or by contacting other 
entities, such as consultants, personal acquaintance, and participation to conferences. In 
addition, Steier and Greenwood (1995) report that social endorsement takes precedence over the 
technical merit of a business plan in attracting VC financing. It might be the case that the 
divergence in Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) and Sweeting (1991) reflects the fact that the former 
study was conducted at the early stages of the VC industry. This is confirmed by Wright and 
Robbie (1998) who remark that the shift towards more proactive behaviours implies for VCs 
both an increase of costs and greater technical as well as financial skills, which may not be 
possessed by certain segments of the VC market and which may not be present in a young field.  
Table 2.3.1 and Table 2.3.2 summarize the sources, variables and ranking attributed by 
VCs to passive and proactive methods of deal origination respectively. 









Entrepreneur  1 1 
Referrals Business network 2 2 
Source: Elaboration by the author. 
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Variable Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) 
Referrals Network of venture capitalists - 
 Ventures in the existing portfolio - 
 Proactive contact of other entities 1 
Source: Elaboration by the author. 
Transposing the above arguments to the PhVC field, given the high level of adverse 
selection that passive methods of deal origination involve, the expectation is that Sweeting 
(1991)’s findings in terms of frequency of use of proactive methods hold in PhVC, leading to 
Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1: The higher the perception of adverse selection, the higher the use of 
proactive methods of deal origination by philanthropic venture capitalists. 
2.3.2. Deal Screening and Evaluation 
In the traditional principal-agent relationship, the principal cannot completely observe 
and verify the skills of the agent. This holds for VCs who might not able to distinguish, a priori, 
between a bad or good entrepreneur. As Sahlman (1990) presents, entrepreneurs face a 
temptation to deliberately overstate the performance of their venture. Although the failure rate 
of new ventures is high, entrepreneurs frequently over-project their venture’s performance 
because VCs’ investments, while discounted, are directly related to these projections. Since 
entrepreneurs are motivated to acquire as much funding as possible (both for the venture and 
as a positive signal to the market) and under the most favourable terms, the short-term reward 
of a large initial investment creates a temptation to manipulate information given to the VCs 
(Bowden, 1994). This leads to adverse selection in the sense discussed in chapter 1.3.1.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that agency problems can be decreased if an optimal 
contract between the principal and the agent is determined. However, to formulate such an 
optimal contract, the approach advocates that the principal needs to conduct a pre-investment 
collection of information followed by a screening of the agent so that both agency and adverse 
selection problems can be decreased and a better contract can be negotiated.  
Amit et al. (1993) point to the fact that the managerial track record of the entrepreneur 
and his or her familiarity with the product and the sector may provide some hints as to the 
future success of the venture. This is confirmed by Reid, Terry, and Smith (1997) who show that 
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VCs attempt to manage the adverse selection risks involved in their activity through the 
selection of the most profitable ventures among a large number of proposals through a two-
stage evaluation due diligence. This includes an initial screening of the venture followed by a 
detailed evaluation of the pre-selected deal aiming at identifying signals to overcome the 
asymmetric information surrounding a deal (Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel, 2005; Wright and 
Robbie, 1998). The entrepreneur “must convincingly reveal the value of their venture to potential 
investors in order to obtain financial support (Prasad, Bruton, and Vozikis, 2000: 168).” The more 
positive a venture’s signals, the more likely it is that VCs can reduce the time and money 
invested in the due diligence process (Harvey and Lusch, 1995). 
In the absence of perfect information, VCs need to look at various indicators to 
understand what future outcomes are likely to be. Previous studies on the VC decision making 
process (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2005; MacMillan, Zemann, and SubbaNarasimha, 1987; 
MacMillan, Siegel, and Narasimha, 1985) show that adverse selection is limited through an 
extensive due diligence process focusing on five dimensions that are summarized in Table 2.3.3:  
1. Human capital;  
2. Activity of the organization;  
3. External environment; 
4. Assessment of the deal; 
5. Potential.  








Human capital Entrepreneur and management team 1 2 
Product 2 - Activity of the 
organization Business strategy - 4 
 Technology - 7 
 Customer adoption - 5 
Market growth 3 1 
Market size 4 1 
External 
environment 
Market competition 5 6 
Deal terms 6 3 Assessment of the 
deal Fit in the VCs portfolio - 9 
Potential  Potential expected financial return 7 8 
 
Source: Elaboration by the author. 
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The focus on human capital involves an extensive evaluation of the agent that, by 
definition, causes adverse selection issues. Knowledge specificity creates a division of labour 
between entrepreneurs and VCs that can enhance the value of the venture. Entrepreneurs are 
alert to unexploited opportunities and have working knowledge about combining intangible 
and tangible resources to exploit these opportunities in a novel fashion and specialize in the 
day-to-day development of the new business activities (MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian, 
1989). Biglaiser (1993) shows that in an environment characterized by adverse selection, even a 
middlemen can reduce the inefficiencies associated with it thanks to the experience they have 
accumulated. To this respect, Choo and Trotman (1991) explain that experience is a good proxy 
for expertise. However, as Gorman and Sahlman (1989) ascribe, due to a lack of an efficient 
replacement on the downside, market knowledge specificity can also be the cause of the failure 
of the venture when adverse selection is severe. Also, Stuart and Abetti (1990), MacMillan et al. 
(1985), as well as Smart (1999) suggest that VCs typically focus their attention on the personality 
and experience of the entrepreneur and the management team of the venture as key factors that 
contributes to the success of the venture. These findings are also consistent with the resource-
based view, according to which resources that are valuable, costly to imitate, and non-
substitutable become core competencies serve as a means to attain a competitive advantage.  
Also, evidence that over time VCs have changed their behaviour while selecting new 
entrepreneurial projects is found. According to MacMillan et al. (1985), VCs ranked the 
entrepreneur and management as the most important variable in the screening phase, followed 
by product, market, deal terms, and expected financial return. In the study by Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2001) conducted almost fifteen years later, VCs ranked market size as the most 
important variable, followed by the entrepreneur, deal terms, business strategy, customer 
adoption, technology, potential expected financial return, and last, fit in the portfolio. Product is 
not mentioned in Kaplan and Strömberg (2001). The change in the ranking attributed to the 
entrepreneur as screening variable is a signal that, in an underdeveloped field like VC was in 
the early eighties, it is an internal factor to the venture, i.e., the entrepreneur, which determines 
whether the VCs will invest. Using MacMillan et al. (1985)’s words: “There is no question that 
irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria) it is the jockey 
(entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all 
(MacMillan et al., 1985: 128).” Once the field becomes more mature, the focus moves from 
internal factor to an external one, namely the market.  
However, MacMillan et al. (1985) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2001)’s results can be also 
explained taking into account Shepherd (1999) who argues that survey-based research has 
significant limitations on account of their retrospective nature as well as on the biases and 
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errors inherent in self-reporting. More specifically VCs would tend to overstate the least 
important criteria and understate those that are most important and Zacharakis and Meyer 
(1998) further argue that VCs are poor at introspecting about their own decision process. 
At the organizational activity level, MacMillan et al. (1985) as well as Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2001) show that business strategy, product or service, technology, and customer 
adoption are considered of key importance by VCs in terms of portfolio screen. More 
specifically, Ireland and Hitt (2005) explain that leaders must enable their organizations to 
exploit the technology in the market. As such, Zacharakis and Shepherd (2005) show that the 
quality of the human capital dimension and the organizational activity level are complementary 
resources. 
At the external environment level, MacMillan et al. (1985) identify market competition and 
market growth as key screening factors. Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) further argues that the 
external resource dependence and other environmental influences, together with leadership’s 
role in competitive positioning affect performance. If then combining human capital and 
organizational activity, while studies by Goslin and Barge (1996) suggest that entrepreneur and 
management team is more important than the characteristics of the product or of the market, 
MacMillan et al. (1987) identify only two criteria as consistent predictors of venture 
performance: the degree of initial competitive insulation and the degree of market acceptance of 
the product. The characteristics of the venture team do not emerge as predictors of 
performance. In explaining these results, MacMillan et al. (1987) consider all the venture 
characteristics simultaneously, bundling characteristics of the product and market with 
characteristics of the entrepreneurial team, and argue that the management team’s 
characteristics are necessary but not sufficient for success. Rather, it is the market that 
ultimately determines the venture’s survival. This is confirmed by Zacharakis and Shepherd 
(2005) who find that VCs place greater emphasis on the entrepreneur in environments in 
environments that have a greater number of competitors and where, thus, asymmetric 
information is more severe.  
Kaplan and Strömberg (2001), Quindlen (2000), Rea (1989), and Timmons and Bygrave 
(1986) report that the assessment of the deal mainly takes into account variables like deal terms as 
well as fit of the new investment in the VCs’ portfolio. On the one hand, given that VCs seek to 
maximize financial return, they will likely focus on the price of the deal as a mechanism to 
decrease agency and adverse selection issues: if the agent is willing to accept a lower valuation, 
this can be interpreted by the principal as a signal that the entrepreneur possesses additional 
information about the venture and that this reveals that the venture is a lemons. On the other 
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hand, thanks to the knowledge accumulated through the companies already in the portfolio, 
VCs are able to better understand the quality of a new potential entrant in the portfolio. 
Last, MacMillan et al. (1985) suggest that the dimension potential, measured by financial 
indicator, e.g., required rate of return, is taken into account in the selection phase of VC 
investments. 
Shifting the focus on PhVC, Austin et al. (2006) argue that differences in the markets and 
motivations for financial and human capital attached to social and commercial ventures imply 
distinct resource mobilization techniques for these different types of ventures. However, the 
results of this study indicate that the resource mobilization process of commercial and social 
entrepreneurs shows many similar patterns in terms of the assembly of managers. This finding 
leads to the expectation that in PhVCs like VCs the social entrepreneur is the key factor 
considered in the screening phase. However, since PhVCs invest in SEs funded by visionary, 
innovative, and change-maker social entrepreneurs, the expectation is that they behave as 
presented by MacMillan et al. (1985) rather than by Kaplan and Strömberg (2001). Furthermore, 
as social entrepreneurs are assumed to be the engines of social change, PhVCs invest in the 
person as a way to maximize social impact. This discussion leads to Proposition 2: 
Proposition 2: The higher the perception of adverse selection by philanthropic venture 
capitalists, the higher the importance of the human capital in the screening phase. 
 
2.3.3. Deal Structuring 
Once the venture has been evaluated as viable, the deal is closed only if the VCs and the 
entrepreneur are able to structure a mutually acceptable investment agreement (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984). From the perspective of the VCs, the agreement serves to structure the financing 
in such a way that her own interest is protected against the opportunistic behaviour of the 
entrepreneur, while simultaneously enhancing the likelihood that the new venture will succeed. 
Large academic literature on traditional financial contracting typically refers to a situation in 
which an investor negotiates with an entrepreneur over the financing of a company. Much of 
the theoretical literature has been concerned with the staged process by which project 
information is revealed and venture financing is obtained. Questions related to this area have 
been explored in the firm formation and labour economics literature (Allen, 1985; Kihlstrom 
and Laffont, 1979).  
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In the VC area Cooper and Carleton (1979) focus on the project continuation decision and 
on debt optimality based on Jensen and Meckling (1976). Chan, Siegel, and Thakor (1990) 
present an agency model where two contracting parties have the skills to control production but 
one party’s skill is unknown to both at contracting time. Interim information reveals this skill to 
both and is used to determine who controls second period production, justifying the bundling 
by VCs. Furthermore, Admati and Pfleidere (1994) determine that a constant fractional holding 
of equity sends an incentive compatible signal to the market regarding the quality of the 
venture. Sahlman (1991) conjectures that preferred stock may serve to shift more risk away from 
VCs to entrepreneurs, suggesting that greater risk might have the effect of “smoking out” lower 
quality ventures and giving the entrepreneur an incentive to perform well. Also, Trester (1998) 
finds that preferred equity allows the VCs to receive some positive return because without 
foreclosure the entrepreneur is not pushed into behaving opportunistically. However, as 
presented by Cooper and Carleton (1979), debt would seem to perform a similar function.  
Fama and Jensen (1983a) offer a general rationale for exploring potential agency 
problems between social entrepreneurs and funds providers, suggesting that many of the 
agency-related costs associated with debt financing may be applied to SEs as well. Arguably, 
the most prominent difference between traditional and non-profit debt financing is that in the 
US the Internal Revenue Code prevents non-profits from structuring bond covenants in which 
cash is used to collateralize the debt. As a consequence, Wedig, Hassan, and Morrisey (1996) 
suggest that there is an asset substitution effect on cash: it may either be invested in risky 
projects or consumed by management and employees outright, making moral hazard issues 
even more severe. Also, Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, and Morrisey (1988) find indirect evidence that 
leverage decisions have impact on SEs bankruptcy due to the high cost of debt for SEs. 
Furthermore, convertible debt, which might be able to address potential moral hazard issues 
arising in the post-investment phase, is barred for non-profits due to the non-distribution 
constraint mentioned in chapter 1.3. John (2007) shows that in Europe, the most used 
instrument by PhVCs while financing SEs is grants. This finding suggests that informational 
asymmetries in the form of moral hazard are not perceived as relevant as in VC: donations do 
not involve alienable residual claims and all net cash flows are transferred to outputs (i.e., 
services provided by SEs) rather than to donors (i.e., funds providers). Fama and Jensen (1983a) 
thus argue that the absence of residual claims avoids the donor-residual claimant agency 
problem: residual nets cash flows are indeed allocated but there are no specific residual 
claimants with alienable property rights in net cash flows. Furthermore, no evidence of use of 
preferred stock vs. common stock is found, while Kingston and Bolton (2004) mention quasi-
equity as a financial instrument developed to invest in those SEs which debt financing is 
“inappropriate or too onerous. […] Quasi-equity shares the risk and reward of the investment between 
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the investor and the investee by allowing the investor to take a share of future revenue streams (Cheng, 
2008: 2).” Taking the discussion into account, Proposition 3 is thereby formulated:  
Proposition 3: The lower the perception of potential post-investment moral hazard by 
philanthropic venture capitalists, the higher the use of grant financing.  
The price of the deal, “namely the equity relinquished to the investor (Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984: 1051)” is the output of a valuation process conducted by the VCs. It aims at establishing a 
fair price to be paid contingent with the level of risk perceived by the investor. The process also 
identifies the required return on the investment as well as the estimate (future) cash flows and 
profit potential. Valuation in VC is characterized by a high level of asymmetric information as 
start-up companies often do not have historical accounting data. The company valuation 
performed by VCs takes into account the projections presented by the entrepreneur in the 
business plan and the accounting data that are available. However, as Sahlman (1990) explains, 
entrepreneurs may disclose only what they deem necessary in order to get the funding: they 
may deliberately or inadvertently withhold important information or give a biased view of 
important facts.  
According to standard corporate finance theory, the return an investor seeks on an 
investment is a function of the non-diversifiable risk of the investment: the higher the risk, the 
higher the required return. In particular, the most used equity valuation method, i.e., the capital 
asset pricing model (Sharpe, 1964) states that the required return is positively related to the 
long-term risk free interest rate and to the difference between the expected return of the stock 
market and the risk free rate.  
However, traditional company valuation methods, e.g., the discounted free cash flow 
(DCF) (Copeland and Weston, 1983) and the dividend discount model (DDM) (Brigham and 
Gordon, 1968) which the CAPM is embedded in, are rarely used for valuing potential VC 
investments. On the one hand, the DCF approach based on the forecast of future streams of cash 
flows might lead to high expected errors in the forecasts due to the highly uncertain 
environment of a start-up. On the other hand, the DDM might be difficult to apply as rarely 
early stage investments ever pay out (significant) dividends. 
Indeed, most companies are cash constrained when requiring funds to VCs in order to 
finance future expansion. The expected increase in value of the venture is thus not reflected in a 
cash flow or dividend stream in the short term, but it is hoped that a significantly higher value 
will be placed on the company at the time of the exit of the VCs. Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and 
Pindyck (1996) show that options theory offers a more suitable approach for valuating high 
uncertain and fast-growing enterprises. The reasons are twofold. First, investing in such a 
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company creates the opportunity to invest further (if needed) at a later date and to benefit from 
its future growth. The investor is not forced to further investments in the same company but 
can wait until new information reveals its true fair value. The fact that a further investment is a 
right of the investor and not an obligation gives the investor a valuable option on the value of 
the company. Second, investments in company-specific knowledge may result in future cash 
flows that wither far exceed initial outlays or total loss, either of which is difficult to predict.  
Manigart, Wright, Robbie, Desbrières, and De Waele (1997) as well as Wright and Robbie 
(1996) find that VC projects are typically valued by applying one or more valuation methods to 
the financing and accounting information typically contained in the business plan submitted to 
the VCs by the management of the investee. By surveying VCs in four European countries, 
Manigart et al. (1997) find that most importance is attached to price earnings multiples 
valuation methods, whilst least importance is attributed to asset value methods as the 
liquidation and replacement value of the assets is neither a theoretically correct valuation 
method, nor a method that has a large appeal for this type of investment. Also, valuation 
increases the contractual efficiency of accounting information. 
Taking into account that valuation models used by profit-seeking VCs aim at estimating 
a fair price to be paid for retaining an equity stake in the backed venture, in PhVC investments 
two distinctions must be considered. First, in the case of investments in non-profit SEs, 
valuation procedures cannot be applied due to the non-distribution constraint. Second, in the 
case of for-profit SEs for which equity is indeed present, multiples, cash flow based or asset 
value based models might be hard to be used. Multiples method imply the presence of a 
comparable venture for which price is established by capital markets. However, “[...] the culture 
of [traditional capital markets] is very different from the culture of social enterprises. There are few or 
no companies with a primarily ethical remit, and indeed corporate social responsibility issues are afforded 
a lower priority [...] The investors in these markets are primarily profit driven, and have little interest in 
ethical concerns (Hartzell, 2007: 7).” Also, Hartzell (2007) points out that “there are still many 
hurdles to overcome before an effective ethical exchange can be created (Hartzell, 2007: 26).” At the 
same time, cash flow and asset value based valuation methods can be difficult to be applied as 
most of SEs are cash constrained with negative cash flows and their assets are mainly donations.  
As such, for firms within rich information environments, accounting information appears 
to fulfil a predominantly confirmatory role, being it more useful in making economic decisions. 
On the contrary, firms operating in weak information environments lack the channels to 
effectively communicate valuation-relevant information by any means. A recent study by Van 
Slyke and Newman (2006) present PhVCs as stewards of the SEs they back rather than self-
interest seeking actors. Commenting on a case study of a PhVCs developing strategies in 
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community redevelopment, Van Slyke and Newman (2006: 360) claim: “[...] support services are 
an important component of [the PhVCs’] stewardship.” Arising from Proposition 3 and the higher 
expected use of non-equity financing, it might be thereby conjectured that in PhVC it is more 
relevant stewardship-related-accounting information than valuation accounting information, 
meaning that PhVCs will tend to have specific need valuations rather than corporate valuation. 
As a result, Proposition 4 is presented: 
Proposition 4: The higher the stewardship by philanthropic venture capitalists, the lower 
the use of valuation models.   
Arising from a the high level of stewardship, it might be also the case that PhVCs prefer 
less elaborated governance structures characterized by a lower use of bundling provisions than 
done in VC. As Williamson (1979) argues, governance mechanisms emerge to protect parties to 
economic exchanges from unforeseen events or opportunistic actions which can adversely affect 
their economic well being. Williamson (1979) hypothesizes a positive relationship between the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour and the use of elaborate governance structures. Barney, 
Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel (1989) shows that in VC, the level of risk associated with a new 
venture can be affected by decisions made by managers in the new venture; if agents are tied 
financially to their venture, to some extent, they are reducing the agency risk that would 
otherwise be borne by the VCs. Also, since the knowledge held by the entrepreneur is specific 
to the individuals and a VCs is unlikely to locate another entrepreneur with the skills necessary 
to support the same opportunity, contractual provisions are set in such a way that it is more 
costly for the entrepreneur to leave and vesting is one of the strongest as it is a form of time-
contingent compensation. According to vesting clauses, contracted payments of equity shares to 
an entrepreneur are often vested over time, or paid out only after the entrepreneur has 
remained with the firm for a specified time period. If the entrepreneur quits or is fired from the 
firm prematurely, unvested shares are not paid to the entrepreneur; however the entrepreneur 
keeps any shares already vested. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) show that vesting is extensively 
used in VC contracts in association with the risks of general uncertainty, asymmetric 
information, project complexity, and potential hold-up between the VCs attributed to them in 
the screening phase (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001; MacMillan et al., 1985). 
However, if stewardship prevails over potential post-investment moral hazard issues in 
PhVC, then the notion of management prerogatives disappears as everyone involved in an 
organization is active towards bringing value to the organization itself. Stewardship is the 
willingness to hold power without using reward and punishment and directive authority to get 
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things done. This demands a choice for service with partnership and empowerment as basic 
governance strategies. This discussion thus leads to Proposition 5: 
Proposition 5: The lower the perception of moral hazard by philanthropic venture 
capitalists, the lower the use of entrepreneur’s binding contractual provisions.  
Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2007) show that in a dynamic moral hazard setting, 
renegotiation clauses, namely anti-dilution protection, can ensure that the contract parties make 
efficient ex-ante investments in the venture by constraining renegotiation. Anti-dilution serves 
at offsetting the dilutive effect of the issue of cheaper shares. In the absence of this clause, 
renegotiation intended to achieve the necessary changes in the parties’ stakes, may distort the 
parties’ shares of the firm’s payoff, thereby distorting their ex-ante investment. Also, Nöldeke 
and Schmidt (1995) consider that a contract granting the option to impose a specific trade at a 
fixed price can solve the hold-up problem arising when relation-specific investment makes a 
party vulnerable to opportunism on the part of the investment partner (Grossman and Hart, 
1986). Pre-emptive rights allow existing shareholders to purchase a new offering of shares 
before any other investors or before the general public and maximize shareholder wealth as it 
offers the option of picking the least costly method for raising additional financing (Bhagat, 
1983). On the other hand, management welfare maximization holds that management will use 
the passage of the amendment to maximize their own welfare, sometimes to the detriment of 
shareholders; hence, the amendment decreases shareholder wealth. On the other hand, 
liquidation preferences are set up in such a way that, in the event that the company is 
liquidated, the VCs will receive a certain amount of the proceeds before any other shareholder.  
Drag-along and tag-along rights refer to a specific cluster of renegotiation clauses in 
which any holder intending to sell its shareholding have to right to require any other 
shareholder to sell their shares at the same time and price as the holder. This right enables the 
VC, which is typically the holder of the right, to deliver 100 percent of the firm to a third party 
acquirer and deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the payoff by threatening to 
hold out on a value-increasing trade sale. Tag along rights enable the holder to force any other 
shareholders to sale shares on a pro rata basis (and at the same price) as a selling shareholder. 
Thus, the holder denies the parties the ability to increase their share of the payoff by threatening 
to sell their stake to a trade buyer who would decrease the value of the firm, or by preceding the 
other parties in selling their stake to a trade buyer who will increase the value of the firm. 
Typically, tag-along rights are a form of put options, whereby a party can put his stake to a 
trade buyer or to the public market. 
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Following the discussion on PhVC that led to the formulation of the previous hypothesis, 
Proposition 6 is specified: 
Proposition 6: The lower the perception of moral hazard by philanthropic venture 
capitalists, the lower the use of renegotiation clauses.  
 
2.3.4. Post-Investment Activities 
In an effort to explain why VCs implement post-investment activities as well as their 
typologies much of the work of VC scholars has been focused on agency theory. On the one 
hand, VCs actively monitor the progresses of the ventures they back in such a way that 
corrective activities can be implemented if signals of a bad performance are received; on the 
other hand, VCs also cooperate with these firms on a strategic and managerial level in order to 
contribute with the entrepreneur towards the maximization of the organization’s performance. 
Monitoring and cooperative behaviours are here, thus, reviewed. 
 
2.3.4.a. Monitoring 
Barney et al. (1989) and Sapienza, Korsgaard, Goulet, and Hoogendam (2000) show that 
the higher the level of business and agency risk, the higher the level of formal monitoring by the 
VC. Formal monitoring is typically excercised by VCs through sitting on the board of the 
backed company and having voting power during formal meetings. This result is consistent 
with Eisenhardt (1989), Fama and Jensen (1983b), Jensen and Meckling (1976) based on which 
the board is a mechanism employed by outside owners to detect and correct agency problems. 
Lerner (1995) also finds that the VCs’ representation on the boards is stronger when the need for 
oversight is greater, i.e., when the agency risk is perceived as severe. 
MacMillan et al. (1989) asked VCs to rate their amount of involvement in various post-
investment activities. They rated serving as a sounding board to management the highest. 
Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, and Taylor (1993) used the same classification scheme for activities, 
but looked at the issue from the viewpoint of the entrepreneur. They asked CEOs of venture-
capital backed firms to rate the usefulness of VC activities. Of 17 post-investment activities, 
serving as a sounding board was considered most useful.  
Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) used a slightly different scheme to classify VCs’ activities: 
their importance and effectiveness are examined from the perspective of both the entrepreneur 
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and the VCs. The main finding is that serving as sounding board is rated as the most important 
activity throughout. This was also the activity where VCs were judged most effective, with a 
mean effectiveness score above eight on a 10 point scale. 
Additionally, Gompers (1995) demonstrates that staging the total amount of committed 
capital is one of the most important formal monitoring tools used by VCs to minimize the 
present value of agency costs: staging of capital infusions allows venture capitalists to gather 
information and monitor the progress of firms, maintaining the option to periodically abandon 
projects. Sahlman (1990) argues that through staging VCs encourage entrepreneurs both to 
perform and to reveal accurate information: staged financing provides VCs with a real option 
which can be exercised or abandoned over time as the uncertainty about the firm is reduced. 
VCs are concerned that entrepreneurs’ private benefits from certain investments or strategies 
may not be perfectly correlated with shareholders’ return. Because monitoring is costly and 
cannot be performed continuously, the VCs will periodically check the project’s status and 
preserve the option to abandon. The duration of funding and hence the intensity of monitoring 
should be negatively related to expected agency costs. Agency costs increase as the tangibility of 
assets declines, the share of growth options in firm value rises, and asset specificity grows.  
The advantage of staged financing is pointed out in Neher (1999) who shows that as 
human capital is gradually transformed to physical capital, the venture increases the value of its 
collateral, hence makes outside financing more affordable. Staging should coincide with 
significant economic developments in the enterprise. Wang and Zhou (2004) also argue that 
with the flexibility of staged financing, many projects, which may otherwise be abandoned 
under upfront financing, become profitable and show that the efficiency of staged financing 
approaches the first best for highly promising firms. However, Wang and Zhou (2004) also 
show that staged financing is not always dominant over upfront financing in terms of social 
welfare. When the project does not look very promising, staged financing is inferior to upfront 
financing. The reason is that VCs may under invest in a project in the early stages when the 
project does not look very promising, which may cause a viable project to fail and result in a 
loss of social welfare. 
Last, formal monitoring can be implemented by requiring investees to periodically 
inform investors about their performance. Reporting is thus a monitoring instrument of 
collecting information for investors through which information asymmetries can be decreased 
and corrective actions, if necessary, can be implemented (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
Stewardship theory recognises a range of non-financial motives for managerial behaviour 
that include the need for achievement and recognition, the intrinsic satisfaction of successful 
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performance, respect for authority and the work ethic. These concepts are well supported in the 
organizational literature (Argyris, 1990; Herzberg, 1971; McClelland, 1961). Managers are 
viewed as interested in achieving high performance and capable of using a high level of 
discretion to act for the benefit of shareholders and the external environment, which in the case 
of PhVC is society (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). They are essentially good stewards of 
corporate assets, loyal to the company, pursuing a higher purpose than profit and managers are 
driven by a sense of duty toward the organization and society which induce them to engage 
also in course of actions that may be seen as personally unrewarding (Etzioni, 1961). The 
assumption that managers have a wide range of motives and behaviours beyond self-interest is 
the rationale for arguing that goal conflict may not be inherent in the separation of ownership 
from control. Using the stewardship model, insider dominated boards are favoured for their 
depth of knowledge, access to current operating information, technical expertise and 
commitment to the firm. Stewardship theory predicts that shareholders can expect to maximise 
their returns when the organization structure facilitates effective control by the management. 
Based on this, formal monitoring, either through board seat, stage financing, or formal 
reports, is no end in itself, but in a teleological sense means of information procurement for 
decision-making of stewards, i.e., PhVCs, such that social entrepreneurs can better improve the 
organizational strategy towards his current social mission. Taking stewardship theory into 
account and contrasting VC results obtained from an agency theory perspective, PhVCs are 
indeed expected to formally monitoring the SEs they back through board seat, stage financing 
as well as reporting, for a sense of duty toward the organization and ultimately society. 
However, to fulfil this sense of duty PhVCs might implement monitoring activities on an 
informal level, which are expected to be more important than formal ones. Based on this 
discussion, the following proposition is thus formulated:  
Proposition 7: The higher the stewardship offered by philanthropic venture capitalists, the 
higher the importance of informal monitoring. 
 
2.3.4.b. Cooperation 
The perspective presented so far assumes that VCs and entrepreneur have unequal 
power where a principle seeks control of an agent’s behaviour (Cable and Shane, 1997). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that after selling a portion of the ownership in their companies 
entrepreneurs bear only a fraction of the direct costs of their actions. This may reduce 
managerial incentive to work toward long-term profit rather than short-term gain. VCs, thus, 
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need to implement value added activities that although being privately costly, benefit the 
company, increasing its value. However, scholars have argued that agency theory can be 
applied if there is an interest divergence between actors when decision making authority is 
delegated (Eisenhardt, 1989). As such, while agency theory can appear to be able in explaining 
the VCs-entrepreneur relationship in the pre-investment phase, after the VCs has decided to 
invest in the new venture, the VCs and entrepreneur’s goals tend to become aligned as both 
focus on venture success. Thus, agency theory can be less capable of explaining the relationship 
between the two actors. 
As a result, a bunch of VC scholars have tried to reframe VCs’ value added by taking into 
account a procedural justice view(Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; Korsgaard, Schweiger, 
andSapienza, 1995), the prisoner-dilemma approach (Cable and Shane, 1997), or stewardship 
theory (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). Independently from the theoretical basis that might be 
chosen to explain why VCs add value, the common factor underlying them is that cooperation 
rather than competition between the VCs and the entrepreneur needs to be taken into account 
for the successful post-investment performance of the backed venture.  
MacMillan et al. (1989) identify three specific levels in which VCs become cooperative 
with the entrepreneurs they back. VCs can be cooperative at the strategic level by serving as 
sounding board and by collaborating with the entrepreneur in the formulation of the venture’s 
business strategy. Also, VCs collaborate on a supportive level, i.e., in monitoring financial and 
operating performance and, as Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and Strömberg (2001), 
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) as well as Timmons and Bygrave (1986) document, in playing a 
significant role for the professionalization of the firms, fostering the development of human 
resources in start-ups, both at the top and bottom levels of the organization. Last, VCs assist the 
backed companies on a networking level aiming at assisting them in finding alternative sources 
of funds (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1989). To this respect, Wright and 
Lockett (2003), Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002), Lerner (1994a), Bygrave (1988) and 
Bygrave (1987) show that syndication in VC is a response to the need of sharing or accessing 
information in the selection and management of investments: involving other VCs provides a 
second, and third, and fourth option on the investment opportunity, which limits adverse 
selection problems. Also, Sorenson and Stuart (2001) argues that syndication is a powerful way 
to extend the geographical and industry investment scope of VC firms, creating a dense inter-
firm network which allows for information dissemination across geographic and industry 
boundaries, thus decreasing adverse selection issues.  
MacMillan et al. (1989) results are consistent with Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and 
Sapienza and Timmons (1989) and supported by a later study by Rosenstein et al. (1993) for 
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what concerns role identification, while they diverge in terms of role importance. On the one 
hand, while Rosenstein et al. (1993), MacMillan et al. (1989), and Sapienza and Timmons (1989) 
all find that the most important value-added activities provided by the VCs consist of strategic 
involvement, MacMillan et al. (1989) finds that supportive roles are more important than 
networking roles. However, MacMillan et al. (1989) is based on the VCs’ own assessment of the 
extent of their involvement, while both Rosenstein et al. (1993) and Sapienza and Timmons 
(1989) base their analysis on a dyadic study of VCs-entrepreneurs perception of importance.  
Table 2.3.4: Post-investment cooperative involvement in VC deals – Ranking. 
 Ranking 
 Rosenstein et al. 
(1993) 
Macmillan et al. 
(1989) 
Sapienza and Timmons 
(1989) 
Strategic roles 1 1 1 
Supportive roles 2 3 2 
Networking roles 3 2 3 
Source: Elaboration by the author. 
Empirically, by surveying a sample of European funds, John (2007) finds out that PhVCs 
stewards SEs offering them a wide range of services through a variety of delivery channels. 
Strategy consulting constitutes the most popular service provided to SEs, followed by support 
in strengthening board governance and financial management/accounting. John (2007) also 
reveals that PhVCs actively deliver their support through their own staff or board members, but 
given the diversity of skills required and the relatively small staff numbers found within PhVC 
funds, other channels for delivery are sought. Partnerships with professional service firms that 
offer pro-bono services to PhVCs are an attractive, long-term solution. John (2007) shows that 
PhVCs do offer SEs the access to their network, but he does not mention syndication practices. 
However, in a previous paper John (2006) identifies co-financing as important characteristics of 
PhVC funds.  
By combining stewardship theory with the results obtained by VC scholars, the 
expectation is that if the argument by Van Slyke and Newman (2006) is valid, PhVCs should 
implement strategic, supportive, and networking roles. This leads to the following propositions:  
Proposition 8: The higher the stewardship offered by philanthropic venture capitalists, the 
higher the importance of strategic roles. 
Proposition 9: The higher the stewardship offered by philanthropic venture capitalists, the 
higher the importance of supportive roles.  
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Proposition 10: The higher the stewardship offered by philanthropic venture capitalists, 
the higher the importance of networking roles. 
 
2.4. PROPOSITIONS: EXITING 
For their raison d’être, VCs must turn illiquid stakes in private companies into realized 
returns. Typically, VCs invest in entrepreneurial firms for 5–10 years prior to an exit event 
(Sahlman, 1990) and the duration is interpreted as a signal of reduced informational 
asymmetries between the seller (in this case the VCs) and the buyer. Cumming and MacIntosh 
(2001) find a positive relationship between the degree of adverse selection and the duration of 
VCs’ investment: the longer the investment period, the better VCs are able to mitigate adverse 
selection issues and the better the quality signal. No research investigating the duration of the 
PhVCs’ engagement in the backed SEs exists. The expectation is that the positive relationship 
between the duration of the investment and the quality of the investment identified by VC 
scholars hold in PhVCs, which implies a negative relationship between the length of the 
investment period and the perception for adverse selection. The following proposition is 
thereby formulated: 
Proposition 11: The lower the perception of adverse selection by philanthropic venture 
capitalists, the longer the duration of the investment. 
Cochrane (2005) as well as Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) and Wright and Robbie 
(1998) identify the following exit methods adopted in VC investments: initial public offering 
(IPO), acquisition, buyback, and secondary sale.  
Cumming and Johan (2008) argue that when VCs are better able to mitigate the 
information asymmetries and agency costs faced by new owners, they will be more likely to 
have a successful exit outcome. Sahlman (1990) and Gompers and Lerner (1999), amongst other 
scholars, recognize IPOs as the most successful exit route for successful entrepreneurial firms 
backed by VCs. Since IPOs involve a large number of diverse shareholders, many of which do 
not have time, inclination, or expertise to carry out due diligence on the quality of the firm 
going public, they are characterized by the highest level of information asymmetries. As well, 
there is the agency problem of running a publicly listed firm whereby managerial interests 
diverge from that of the firm’s owners. Hence, only the very best firms that are able to 
overcome these problems of information asymmetries faced by new shareholders end up listing 
on a stock exchange. To this respect, VCs play a certification role supporting Lerner (1994b), 
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Megginson and Weiss (1991) as well as Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990). 
Further, it is more expensive to go public than to exit via other vehicles due to the obligatory 
legal, financial, and other professional advisors required to initiate the process, the transaction 
costs of preparing a prospectus, and the underpricing of IPOs, not to mention the ongoing costs 
of reporting requirements for publicly listed firms (Ritter, 2003; Ritter, 1987).On the hand, the 
exit strategy characterized by the least degree of information asymmetries is a buyback, in 
which the entrepreneur and/or managers repurchase the shares held by the VCs (Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2001). Buybacks are followed by acquisitions and secondary sales respectively. 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2001) also show that the shorter the duration of the investment, the 
more likely is a buyback. However, as stated in Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) buybacks are 
an inferior form of exit reserved for cases in which the investment is a “living dead” or 
“lifestyle” company that satisfies the entrepreneur’s desire for profit but has virtually no home 
run potential. Although buybacks do not suffer from problems of informational asymmetry, 
they put a large strain on the firm’s and/or entrepreneur’s cash resources, and thus almost by 
definition will not involve companies with high valuations. 
Table 2.4.1 summarizes VC exit strategies by their involved degree of adverse selection 
and use, where 1 indicates the lowest level of adverse selection or use, and 4 the maximum. 







Buyback 1 1 
Acquisition 2 4 
Secondary sale 3 3 
IPO 4 2 
Source: Elaboration by the author. 
Hartzell (2007) argues that existing capital markets are unsuitable for SEs for two main 
reasons. First, the culture of these markets is very different from that of SEs. There are few or no 
companies with a primarily ethical remit and indeed corporate social responsibility issues are 
afforded a lower priority; also, investors are primarily profit driven and a listing on these 
markets will give existing social investors little comfort and may even undermine their 
confidence in the social nature of the company. Second, in many cases the purpose of listing for 
an entrepreneur or VCs to be able to realise the gains they have built up through their early 
stage investment. They would hope to achieve a significant profit on their initial investment 
through this offering, and this will be of far greater concern than the future shape and direction 
of the company.  
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At the same time, stock exchanges work as an intermediary between fund seekers and 
fund providers where seekers offer equity stakes which is traded on the market. The demand 
for and supply of equity in turn determines the price to be paid for it which then follows 
auction mechanisms. Arising from Proposition 3 is the expectation of PhVCs using grant 
financing rather than equity. By definition, a grant cannot be the object of an auction or cannot 
be traded on an existing formal stock exchange. Also, even in the case of PhVCs backing SEs 
using equity instruments, this equity cannot be efficiently traded on traditional capital markets: 
the lack of a consensus of social performance and risk measurement tools makes price 
determination harder, and thus, investment decisions as well. As a consequence, the actual non-
existence of a social formal capital market makes IPOs not feasible exits for PhVCs’ investments. 
In an effort to divest in such a way that adverse selection issues among present and future 
funders/owners of the SE are minimized, if IPOs are not feasible, then it could be the case that 
secondary sales rather than IPOs allow for that minimization (cfr. Table 2.4.1). Also, it could be 
the case that the lower degree of perceived adverse selection leads PhVCs to highly use this type 
of exit route from their investments which could be interpreted as a signal provided to other 
investors on the quality of the project being divested. This would differentiate PhVCs from VCs, 
which according to Table 2.4.1 are seldom used. The following proposition is thus formulated: 
Proposition 12: The lower the perception of adverse selection by philanthropic venture 




Building on asymmetric information and stewardship theory in this chapter a set of 
proposition concerning the PhVC investment model have been formulated. Summarizing the 
discussion, while the pre-investment and exit phases have been presented within asymmetric 
information theory, the post-investment ones have been motivated around stewardship theory. 
Table 2.5.1 summarizes the propositions and the relationship between the issue they refer to and 






 42  
 
Table 2.5.1: Summary of propositions and relationship with theoretical issues. 
Investment 
phase 






1 Proactive methods Adverse selection + 
Deal screening 
and evaluation 
2 Human capital Adverse selection + 
3 Grant financing Moral hazard - 
4 Valuation  Stewardship - 
5 Entrepreneur binding 
provisions  
Moral hazard + 
Deal 
structuring 
6 Renegotiation clauses Moral hazard + 






10 Cooperation: strategic 
roles 
Stewardship + 





12 Cooperation: networking 
roles 
Stewardship + 
13 Holding period of 
investment 
Adverse selection - Exit 
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This chapter proposes the methodology used to address the propositions presented in the 
previous one to understand how asymmetric information theory can explain the investment 
process of PhVCs.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, the process followed to identify the target 
PhVCs population is described. Second, demographics of the target population in terms of legal 
structure, nationality, year of creation, and money managed by PhVCs are presented. Last, the 
methodologies used in this research are commented and methodological issues surrounding 
them are discussed. 
 
3.2. IDENTIFICATION OF THE POPULATION 
The data collection process started with the definition of the geographical regions to be 
considered for the research. As such, Europe and the United States (US) were considered as 
they were characterized by the highest presence of PhVCs.  
As a second step, in terms of sampling frame process, the existence of regional PhVC 
associations was checked. For what concerns Europe, the European Venture Philanthropy 
Association (EVPA) was identified. EVPA was established in 2004 and gathers individuals as 
well as organisations interested in or practising PhVC. EVPA has three membership categories 
(European Venture Philanthropy Association, 2009): 
1. Full membership, open to organizations or individuals whose primary activity is 
PhVC; 
2. Associate membership, open to organizations or individuals with an interest in PhVC, 
but for whom it is not their primary activity. Associate members include business 
schools, traditional foundations, as well as private equity and VC firms; 
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3. Honorary membership, offered at the discretion of the EVPA board to those 
individuals or organizations that the board believes can provide valuable insight 
and/or assistance in helping the EVPA achieve its mission and goals.  
Annually, EVPA publishes a directory including a list of all members and a description 
of their activity. In this research, the 2008-09 directory was used (EVPA, 2008) and following the 
discussion on the characteristics required to be considered as PhVCs presented in chapter 1, 
only EVPA full members are considered. 
As concerns the US, no counterpart to EVPA was found. However, the National Venture 
Capital Association (NVCA), which represents the US VC industry, lists a series of American 
PhVCs, defined as “organizations that work in the venture philanthropy arena (NVCA, 2008)” in a 
sub-section of its web pages (NVCA, 2008).  
Third, following the procedure presented by Groves (2004), to make sure that the target 
population does have a convenient sampling frame that matches it such that undercoverage 
error and coverage bias, i.e., elements of the target population that are missing from the frame, 
are minimized, additional identification steps were conducted. Figure 3.2.1 depicts, on a general 
level, the process of correction for coverage error.  







Source: Groves (2004: 54). 
European PhVCs identified through EVPA were thereby integrated with a list of 
organizations reported by John (2006) while US PhVCs was integrated with a list of 
organizations provided by Morino Institute (2000). However, given that both John (2006) and 
Morino Institute (2000) present a list of organizations “highly engaged in social enterprises” 
including consultancy firms, a correction for ineligible units, i.e., elements that are not members 
of the target population but might be members of the frame population, was required. As a 
result, their list was compared with the information provided by the organization itself on its 
web pages to check whether it effectively fulfils the above mentioned requirements.  
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Furthermore, a screening of the members of the board of directors of the PhVCs funds 
identified by the above mentioned sources was done. Last, other sources including newspapers 
articles and web pages were consulted. The list of European and US PhVCs funds identified is 
presented in Appendix 1.  
 
3.3. TARGET POPULATION 
The process presented in the previous paragraph led to the identification of a population 
of 74 PhVCs, of which 38 in Europe and 36 in the US. A demographic description of the 
sampling frame population in terms of legal structure, location, year of creation of the fund, and 
Assets Under Management (AUM) is here thereby presented.  
Table 3.3.1 classifies PhVCs according to their legal structure. Based on this, PhVCs are 
mainly foundations and public charities with the former legal structure being the mostly used. 
Table 3.3.1: Population of PhVC funds by legal structure. 
Number % over population
Foundation 29 39.2%
Public charity 28 37.8%
Donor-advised fund 4 5.4%
Trust 1 1.4%
Other 2 2.7%
Total non-profit 64 86.5%
For-profit 9 12.2%
N/A 1 1.4%
Total 74 100.0%  
Generally speaking, exempt charitable organizations are classified as either private 
foundation or public charity. Organizations are considered public charities if they: 
•  Are churches, hospitals, qualified medical research organizations affiliated with 
hospitals, schools, colleges and universities; or 
•  Have an active program of fundraising and receive contributions from many sources, 
including the general public, governmental agencies, corporations, private foundations 
or other public charities; or 
•  Receive income from the conduct of activities in furtherance of the organization’s 
exempt purposes; or  
•  Actively function in a supporting relationship to one or more existing public charities.  
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A public charity must get at least one third of its support from gifts, grants and fees, and 
not more than one third of its income from investments.  
Foundations, in contrast, typically have a single major source of funding, usually gifts 
from one family or corporation; foundation’s primary activity consists of making donations to 
other charitable organizations and to individuals (European Foundation Center, 2010).  
Furthermore, 5.4 percent of the identified PhVC funds undertake the legal structure of a 
donor-advised fund. Typically, in a donor-advised fund, the donor contributes cash or assets to 
a public charity that sponsors and sets up the fund. The minimum contributions can be as small 
as $10,000 and the donor receives up to three tax benefits from making the donation: an 
immediate tax deduction, the avoidance of capital gains taxes if the gift is appreciated property, 
and a reduction of the gross estate by the amount of the excluded assets. The public charity 
does all the legal, philanthropic and accounting work, allowing the donor to focus on grant-
making functions. 
However, considering that the decision of undertaking one particular type of legal 
structure might be influenced by factors related to the legal environment where the fund 
operates, or to the nature of its donor/s rather than to the core activity of the entity, the legal 
structures mentioned so far have been grouped into a single one taking into account the non-
distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980). Two sub-categories of PhVCs were thereby created: 
Non-profit and For-profit. 63 PhVCs amounting to 85 percent of the sampling frame population 
result to into it, meaning that, independently of the particular legal structure PhVCs indeed 
undertake, profits are reinvested into the fund itself rather than re-distributed. 9 PhVCs, 
representing 12 percent of the population, were identified as for-profit. In just one case the 
identification of the legal form of the PhVC fund was not possible due to a lack of publicly 
available information.  
Table 3.3.2 lists PhVCs by nationality which is established according to the location of the 
PhVCs’ headquarters.  
Table 3.3.2: Population of PhVC funds by nationality. 
Number % over population
Continental Europe 20 27.0%
UK 15 20.3%
Eastern Europe 3 4.1%
Total Europe 38 51.4%
US 36 48.6%
Total 74 100.0%  
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Table 3.3.3 shows PhVCs by year of creation and reveals that the majority of funds are 
relatively young: 59 percent were created in the time period 2000-2008, providing empirical 
support to the claim that PhVCs started to emerge mainly after the burst of dot.com bubble.  
Table 3.3.3: Population of PhVC funds by year of creation. 
Number % over population
1980 - 1990 4 5.4%
1991 - 1999 26 35.1%
Total 1980 - 1999 30 40.5%
2000 - 2004 30 40.5%
2005 - 2008 14 18.9%
Total 2000 - 2008 44 59.5%
Total 1980-2008 74 100.0%
 
To grasp how much money is involved in the PhVC industry, a look at their Assets Under 
Management (AUM) is given. Based on this measure, 28 percent of PhVCs, the relative majority, 
manage up to 10 million US dollars. However, given the high number of missing data, no 
conclusions about this measure can be drawn. 
Table 3.3.4: Population of PhVC funds by Assets Under Management (AUM). 
AUM Number % over population
0 - 10 M $ 21 28.4%
10.1 M - 100 M $ 18 24.3%
More than 100 M $ 5 6.8%
N/A 30 40.5%
Total 74 100.0%  
 
 
3.4. METHODOLOGY  
In order to decide which research methodology to use in this piece of work Gill and 
Johnson (1991) was taken into account while explaining that in an ongoing developing market, 
theory can be the outcome of research. Being the PhVC movement a recent phenomenon, a 
qualitative and inductive research approach was considered the most appropriate. The 
epistemological stance of interpretivism was considered suitable for this study, particularly 
considering the developing nature of the PhVC field and its relative newness both in Europe 
and in the US.  
After the identification of the strategies adopted by VCs to manage asymmetric 
information and the formulation of a set of propositions concerning PhVC (cfr. chapter 2.3 and 
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2.4), the validity of the constructs used in the research was checked through a series of semi-
structured interviews aiming at determining the PhVCs’ understanding of the constructs and to 
adjust the latter taking into account peculiar variables considered in their investment model 
that reflect their specific value proposition (as opposed to that of VCs). Interviews were 
conducted with seven PhVCs through March, 2008 and May, 2008. Of the seven interviewed 
PhVCs, four were located in the US and three in Europe. The transcription of interviews is 
presented available upon request. It is worthy to remark that, given that some of the 
interviewed PhVCs preferred not to be recorded, notes were taken. Notes and registrations 
were then reordered and integrated with additional information and documents provided by 
PhVCs.  
Results from the interviews were then taken into account for the development of a 
questionnaire which was sent to the entire population of PhVC funds. On the other hand, 
interviews were also analyzed through content analysis, a methodology that reliably develops 
measures to interpret textual material (Krippendorff, 2004) and it has long been used in VC 
studies (cfr, amongst others Smart, 1999; Zacharakis, Meyer, and DeCastro, 1999; Hisrich and 
Jankowicz, 1990; Ruhnka and Young, 1987; ). Content analysis enables the researcher to include 
large amounts of textual information and systematically identify its properties by detecting the 
more important structures of its communication content. The content analysis software NVivo, 
version 8.0, facilitated the coding of variables within the focused dimensions of each phase of 
the PhVC investment process. Content analysis results will be presented in the next chapter and 
will be followed by results from the survey. The aggregation of data collected from these 
sources would ensure both triangulation, minimising bias from the author or from the 
methodology used, and construct validity (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2007). 
For what concerns the survey, which is presented in Appendix 3, the quality of the 
questions was established following Presser and Blair (1994), and more specifically having as 
expert professor W. Saris, one of the leading expert in the survey research field in Europe (Saris 
and Gallhofer, 2007; Van der Veld, Saris, and Gallhofer, 2000). Additionally, as Zacharakis and 
Meyer (1998) note, “it is notoriously difficult to secure VCs participation in academic research 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998: 697)”: the response rate to the survey was thus tried to be 
maximized by implementing the following strategies. First, a network of contacts was 
developed by: 
• The interviews; and  
• Participation to a workshop on Social impact assessment organized by EVPA (July, 
2008) in Barcelona which was attended by 26 participants belonging to the European 
PhVC industry; and  
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•  Participation to the EVPA annual conference held in September, 2008 in Frankfurt 
which was attended by 330 delegates from Europe, US and China;  
• Contact with the EVPA Trustees; 
• If not being able to have a contact through one of the previous sources, this was 
indentified via the web-page of the PhVCs. 
Second, a personalized email outlining the purpose of the study, time commitment, and a 
cover letter was sent to the top management of the PhVC fund with instructions on how to 
reply. An example of email sent is presented in Appendix 2. Third, after the first email, overall 
three reminders were sent out by email to complete the web version of the survey. After the first 
reminder, non-respondents were contacted by phone to obtain a commitment to fill it. 
Thereafter, non-respondents were solicited by sending them the survey by fax. Last, a paper 
copy of the questionnaire was sent by mail to the PhVCs’ headquarters.  
 
3.5. CONTENT ANALYSIS  
3.5.1. Sample 
In order to identify the peculiar variables considered by PhVCs in their investment 
process as opposed to those used by VCs and identified by the VC literature, seven semi-
structured interviews were conducted with European and US PhVCs, representing almost 10 
percent of the target population. However, given that two of the interviewed PhVCs explicitly 
asked not to be recorded, overall five interviews could be content analyzed. In this section, a 
brief description of the interviewed sample is presented. Accordingly, 4 out of 5 content 
analyzed interviewees were located in the US, and the remaining one in the UK, with 2 created 
in 1998, 1 in 2001, 1 in 2005, and 1 in 2006. The average portfolio includes 73 percent of non-
profit SEs and 27 percent of for-profit SEs, with two of the interviewees backing 100 percent of 
non-profit SEs, and the remaining three backing a mix of non-profit and for-profit SEs.   
To this respect, based on the discussion presented in chapter 1.3, two of the interviewed 
PhVCs were categorized as pure highly-engaged philanthropists, and the remaining ones as 
hybrid philanthropists.  
Table 3.5.1 list the mean and median number of portfolio organizations held by 
interviewed PhVCs in terms of stage of development of backed SEs and shows that they focus 
on supporting expansion SEs. However, in terms of SD, the number of expansion stage SEs is 
characterized by the highest SD, indicating the existence of a high dispersion of data, meaning 
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that the number of expansion SEs highly varies from fund to fund.   
Table 3.5.1: Average composition of interviewed PhVCs. 
 Mean Median SD 
Early-stage 5.00 5.00 4.82 
Expansion stage 10.83 9.00 9.77 
Maturity stage 1.17 1.00 1.83 
 
3.5.2. Coding Scheme 
In content analysis, concept operationalization implies the construction of a coding scheme 
including a set of measures in a codebook. In it, dimensions that are used for a given measure 
must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Neuendorf, 2002). The coding scheme presented in 
Appendix 4 lists the categories and variables identified through the content analysis of pilot 
interviews; it also shows how references to each category and variable are calculated. To this 
respect, methodologically, first the number of references to each variable was quantified 
through the software Nvivo 8.0. Second, the procedure followed by Meyskens (2009) was used. 
As such, the number of references associated to each variable was used to determine the 
absolute number of references to the dimension they refer to, which was computed as sum of all 
the references of the variables making up the category. Third, this sum was used to estimate the 
use of each dimension in relative terms. 
3.5.3. Reliability 
The open coding of the interviews led to the development of variables in the categories of 
each of the phases of the investment process presented in Figure 2.2.1.  
Additionally, as Neuendorf (2002) notes “given that a goal of content analysis is to 
identify and record relatively objective (or at least intersubjective) characteristics of messages, 
reliability is paramount. Without the establishment of reliability, content analysis measures are 
useless (Neuendorf, 2002: 141)”, a set of measures have been thereby considered to assess the 
overall reliability of the dimensions and variables identified through content analysis, whose 
assumption is that explicitly and accepted concept definitions control assignment of content to 
particular categories by coders. Generally speaking, the notion of reliability consists of 
understanding if it is not possible trust the measures such that any analysis that uses that 
measure can be trusted: the measurement instruments applied to observations must be highly 
consistent over time, place, and circumstances. Reliability in content analysis is defined as 
agreement among coders about categorizing content (Krippendorff, 2004); specific issues in 
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content analysis reliability thus involve the definition of concepts and their operationalization in 
a content analysis code sheet which will needs to be evaluated by different coders. In such a 
way, dimensions control assignment of content such that content coding is determined by the 
concept definitions.  
Three steps are required when addressing reliability issues in content analysis. First, 
dimensions and variables that are necessary to the study must be identified. Second, coders 
need to be trained to apply those dimensions and variables to the content of interest. Third, the 
process ends with through coders reliability tests that quantify how well the concept definitions 
have controlled the assignment of content to appropriate analytic categories. 
After coding the five interviews led with PhVCs, two additional coders were asked to 
perform the coding task, with three overall coders including the author of the research 
conducting the analysis. Coders other than the author required a three hour training session to 
enable them to familiarize with the content being analyzed. As Riffe (2005) explains the aim of 
training sessions is not to pre-code material but to increase the coders’ comfort level with the 
content being analyzed.  
The inter-coder reliability was thus estimated using two indicators. First, the simplest 
coder reliability test, i.e., the overall percentage of inter-coder agreement, was considered. Based 
on Riffe (2005), the minimum standard acceptable level of agreement for reliability is 80 percent. 
The estimation of the inter-coder percentage of agreement was done using the software Nvivo 
8.0 which, after the first inter-coding phase, gave a value of 99.9 percent.  
Second, as simple agreement might over-inflate reliability because the chances of 
accidentally agreeing increase as the number of coders decreases, Cohen's (1960) kappa was 
included in the analysis. Cohen's (1960) kappa assumes nominal-level data and has a range from 
0.00 (agreement at chance level) to 1.00 (perfect agreement). Accordingly, a result of 74 percent 
was obtained. 
3.6. SURVEY  
3.6.1. Response Rate  
The survey was opened on October, 6th and closed on December, 14th. Overall, 40 
complete surveys were received which corresponds to a 54 percent response rate. This has been 
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Based on the Council of American Research Organization (CASRO), on the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research (American Association for Public Opinion Research, 
2008), and on Lynn, Beerten, Laih, and Martin (2001) surveys can be considered complete if the 
respondent is cooperative and at least 80 percent of the questions have been reliably and validly 
answered.  
The calculation of the response rate employed the Simple Interactive Statistical Analysis 
(SISA) (SISA, 2010) tool, created by CASRO, AAPOR, and Lynn et al. (2001). Appendix 5 shows 
the relative output. The SISA response rate output first provides confidence intervals for four 
main response categories that make up the four main proportions of all sampled cases, 
providing guide on the expected value of the response rate in the case the design is repeated 
under a similar situation. According to the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(2008) response categories are the followings: 
1. Complete and partial responses; 
2. Refusals; 
3. Unknown responses, indicating the impossibility of determining the eligibility of 
respondents; 
4. Responses for which the ineligibility could be determined. 
SISA also provides the following rates: 
• Co-operation rate, i.e., the number of completed interviews in the number of contacted 
eligible respondents. In the case of the ISER cooperation rate an estimate is 
considered of the number of contacted eligible persons in the unknown category, in 
the case of the AAPOR cooperation rate unknowns are not considered; 
• Contact rate which measures the number of eligible persons which were contacted. 
ISER considers the number of contacted possibly eligible unknowns; AAPOR does 
not consider unknowns; 
• Refusal rate which gives the proportion of eligible respondents who refused to give 
an interview. This is the least important rate. 
Accordingly, a response rate of 54 percent was obtained. In order to establish whether 
this response rate can be considered as acceptable, a comparison with VC studies conducted 
using survey methodology is run. Table 3.6.1 lists the response rate obtained in VC studies cited 
in this piece of work and used, amongst others, as a reference for the identification of the 
variables proposed in the survey. If compared with these studies, the result obtained in this 
research is in line with the top response rate of VC studies, which range from 68 percent 
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(MacMillan et al., 1985), 58percent (Wright and Robbie, 1996), as well as (Amit et al., 1998). The 
main limitation indeed is not the response rate itself, rather is the number of responses, which 
will prevent the use of regression analysis or other statistical methodologies such as factor 
analysis.  
 




Table 3.6.1: Summary of VC survey-based studies cited in this research. 











The Roles of Venture Capitalists in New 
Ventures: What Determines Their 
Importance? Academy of Management.  
1989 Understanding how much and 
when VCs’ involvement is 
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Why Do Venture Capital Firms Exist? 
Theory and Canadian Evidence. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 13 (6), 441-446 
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and monitoring entrepreneurial 
projects. 








Criteria Used by Venture Capitalists to 
Evaluate New Venture Proposals. Journal 
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1985 Identification of the most 
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Venture Capitalists and Unquoted Equity 
Investment Appraisal. Accounting and 
Business Research, 26 (2), 153-168. 
1996 Valuation and assessment of 
potential investments. 
114 UK 58% 
Scarlata, 
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F = 33 
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Average = 66 
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3.6.2. Respondent Sample 
To analyze the respondent sample, first the profile of the person that materially 
responded to the survey was analyzed. Figure 3.6.1 depicts the percentage of respondents by 
professional profile within the PhVC fund. As such, responses were mainly received from the 
CEO or the investment manager of the PhVC fund. The Other category includes positions like 
investment analyst, development manager and assistant to the PhVC fund’s CEO.  












Second, respondent PhVCs were classified based on the legal structure. Results are 
reported in Table 3.6.2.  




Foundation 29 39.2% 17 23.0% 42.5% 58.6%
Public charity 28 37.8% 9 12.2% 22.5% 32.1%
Donor-advised 
fund 4 5.4% 4 5.4% 10.0% 100.0%
Trust 1 1.4% 1 1.4% 2.5% 100.0%
Other 2 2.7% 2 2.7% 5.0% 100.0%
Total non-profit 64 86.5% 33 44.6% 82.5% 51.6%
For-profit 9 12.2% 7 9.5% 17.5% 77.8%
N/A 1 1.4% -       -             -             -             










Accordingly, 42.5 percent of respondent PhVCs are foundations while 20 percent are 
public charities. With respect to the population, 58.6 percent of PhVCs undertaking the 
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foundation form replied to the survey, while 32 percent of those being public charities. All 
donor advised funds, trusts, and funds falling into the “other” category replied to the survey.  
As done in chapter 3.2, the previously mentioned legal structures are now grouped into 
the single Non-profit one, reflecting the non-distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980). 82.5 percent 
of respondent PhVCs fall within this category, equivalent to a 52 percent response rate over the 
Non-profit population. Among the for-profit category, 17.5 percent of respondents (78 percent of 
for-profit population PhVCs) participated to the survey. The same pattern was found for what 
concerns the population (cfr. Table 3.3.1). 
Next, respondents were classified according to their nationality. 55 percent of the sample 
belongs to Europe vs. 45 percent to the US. Within Europe, 32.5 percent of PhVCs are from 
Continental Europe, 20 percent from UK, and 2.5 percent from Eastern Europe respectively. 
With respect to the population the percentage of respondents amount to 65 percent with respect 
to those funds located in Continental Europe responded, 33 percent of those located in Eastern 
Europe, 53 percent of those in UK, and 50 percent of those in the US. These results show that 
respondents follow the same pattern of the population (cfr. Table 3.3.2).  
Table 3.6.3 presents the year of creation of respondent PhVC funds.  




1980 - 1990 2 2.7% 2 2.7% 5.0% 100.0%
1991 - 1999 26 35.1% 10 13.5% 25.0% 38.5%
Total 1980 - 1999 28 37.8% 12 16.2% 30.0% 42.9%
2000 - 2004 31 41.9% 17 23.0% 42.5% 54.8%
2005 - 2008 11 14.9% 11 14.9% 27.5% 100.0%
Total 2000 - 2008 42 56.8% 28 37.8% 70.0% 66.7%
N/A 4 5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%











Table 3.6.4 lists respondents by AUM, while Table 3.6.5 reports PhVCs by AUM corrected 
for size. Concerning Table 2.6.4, the same range categories used for describing the population 
are used here. Due to the high number of missing data about the AUM of the population, the 
column labelled as % over population is not presented. Accordingly, half of respondents manage 
assets up to 10 million US dollars. Overall, 32 funds (91 percent of respondents, excluding 
missing AUMs) fall into the category of AUM up to 100 million US dollars. Among the 
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remaining funds (9 percent of respondents), only 3 PhVCs manage funds of more than 100 
million US dollars.  
Table 3.6.4: Number of respondent PhVC funds by AUM. 
AUM Number % Number %
0 – 10 M $ 21 28.4% 20 50.0% 50.0%
10.1 M - 100 M $ 18 24.3% 12 30.0% 30.0%
More than 100M $ 5 6.8% 3 7.5% 7.5%
N/A 30 40.5% 5 12.5% 12.5%
Total 74 100.0% 40 100.0% 100.0%
Population Sample % over 
sample
 
Table 3.6.5: Number of respondent PhVC funds by AUM corrected for size. 
AUM Corrected for size # of respondents % over sample
0 - 100 K $ 9 22.5%
100.01K - 500K $ 8 20.0%
500.01K - 1M $ 8 20.0%
1.01M - 10M $ 9 22.5%
More than 10M $ 1 2.5%
N/A 5 12.5%
Total 40 100.0%  
Figure 3.6.2 depicts PhVCs taking into account the legal structure and their AUM. The 
two PhVCs with more than $10 billions, considered as extreme outliers, are not included in the 
analysis. Based on Figure 3.6.2 the following observations can be drawn. First, that PhVCs being 
either foundations or public charities have similar median corrected AUM ($683,333 for 
foundations vs. $465,909 for public charities) with for-profit PhVCs managing the highest 
amount of money ($1,550,000). Donor-advised funds present the highest dispersion of AUM, 
ranging this from a minimum of $1,000 to a maximum of $5,000,000. These also present the 
lowest median corrected AUM, i.e., $150,000. 
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3.6.3. Selection Bias  
In survey sampling, bias refers to the tendency of a sample statistic to systematically 
over- or under-estimate a parameter characterizing the population. Following the survey 
inference process, statistics computed on respondents are used to draw inferences about the 
characteristics of the population. Figure 3.6.3 depicts, in ovals, the sources of bias arising during 
the representational process of a survey, which are: 
1. Coverage error; 
2. Sampling error; 
3. Non-response error; 
The first source of bias was discussed in details in chapter 3.2. Here, a discussion 
concerning sampling error and non-response error is presented.  
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Figure 3.6.3: Representational process of a survey. 
 
Source: Elaboration by the author based on Groves (2004). 
3.6.4. Sampling Error 
Sampling error happens when not all persons in the sampling frame are measured. Two 
components of sampling error exist: sampling bias and sampling variance. Sampling bias arises 
when some members of the sampling frame are given no chance (or reduced chance) of 
selection. In such a design, every possible set of selections exclude them systematically (Groves, 
2004). On the other hand, sampling variance arises because, given the design for the sample, by 
chance many different sets of frame elements could be drawn (Groves, 2004). 
In this research, the sampling frame population coincides with the sample. As a 
consequence, rather than being present a sampling error, the potential presence of coverage 
error dominates. 
3.6.5. Non-Response Error 
Non-response error arises when the values of statistics computed based only on 
respondent data differ from those based on the entire sample data (Groves, 2004). Miller and 
Smith (1983) report that using information only from those that choose to respond can 
introduce error as data gathered from self-selected respondents may not represent the opinions 
of the entire sample or population.  
By conducting content analysis of brief articles published in the Journal of Extension in the 
period 1995-1999, Lindner and Wingenbach (2002) find that non-response error is a threat to 
external validity in 82 percent of the cases. Further, they also find that in 80 percent of the 
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articles, no attempts to control for non-response is mentioned. In this case, findings can only be 
generalized to respondents. 
Radhakrishna and Doamekpor (2008), Lindner, Murphy, and Briers (2001), as well as 
Miller and Smith (1983) suggest to comparing early, late, and non-respondents. In case no 
significant statistical evidence of differences among these is found, then results can be 
generalized to the population. Figure 3.6.4 depicts the comparison and generalization based on 
early, late, and non-respondents. 
Figure 3.6.4: Logic of comparing early, late, and non-respondents. 
 
Source: Radhakrishna and Doamekpor (2008). 
In order to establish whether significant differences exist, two levels of analysis are taken 
into account. The first level investigates whether a significant difference is found between 
respondents and non respondents. If this is the case, the second level of analysis is performed 
which is based on categorizing respondents in early and late respondents, and in comparing 
these two categories with non-respondents to check whether the latter behaves more like early 
or late respondents.  
As a result, a test for independence is conducted between Type of respondent, i.e., 
respondents and non-respondents with the three variables for which the distribution of the 
entire population is known. These are Legal structure, Nationality, and Year of creation of the 
PhVC fund.  
For what concerns the variables Legal structure and Nationality, the Pearson chi-square 
test for independence was conducted, given both variables are nominal. However, one of its 
assumptions is that the contingency table cells which the test is based on must have a minimum 
expected count of 5. In the case of both Legal structure and Nationality, 8 (66.7 percent) and 2 
(25.0 percent) cells respectively did not fulfil this assumption. The following strategy was thus 
followed. In terms of Legal structure, PhVC funds were categorized taking into account the non-
distribution constraint, and accordingly divided in non-profit and for-profit: the variable 
Organizational form of PhVCs was thus created. This strategy was also followed to solve for the 
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one unit of missing data characterizing the distribution of Legal structure (cfr. Table 3.3.1): by 
using secondary sources, it was possible to identify it as non-profit, while it was not possible to 
discern its specific legal form. Concerning the variable Nationality, PhVC funds were 
categorized based on the region where they are located, i.e., Europe and the US: the variable 
Location of PhVCs was thereby built.  
The Fisher exact test, which is suitable for 2x2 crosstables like those considered in this 
test, was then considered and its results corroborated by the Pearson’s contingency coefficient. 
Results reported in Table 3.6.6 fail to reject the hypothesis of independence between the rows of 
legal structure in the form of Organizational form of PhVCs and Location of PhVCs and the column 
Type of respondent. 
Table 3.6.6: Relationship of the organizational form of PhVCs with location and 
type of respondent - Fisher exact test and Pearson’s contingency coefficient. 













Organizational form of 
PhVCs 
- 0.174 0.121 0.128 
Location of PhVCs - 0.079 0.327 0.496 
 
For what concerns the variable Year of creation, the procedure proposed by Morgan (2004: 
96) was followed. According to this, with a dependent ordinal variable (in this case, Year of 
creation) and one independent variable (in this case, Type of respondent) characterized by 2-levels 
or categories, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test needs to be used. Table 3.6.7 indicates 
that the null hypothesis of equality is failed to be rejected.  
Table 3.6.7: Difference between the PhVCs’ year of creation and the type of 
respondent - Mann-Whitney U test. 
 Type of respondent 
PhVCs’ year of creation  505.500 
 
Following the above mentioned strategy to test for non-response error and considering 
that no statistical significant dependence of being a respondent/non-respondent and the 
variables Location of PhVCs and Year of creation is found, this allows to conclude that non-
respondents are not statistically significant different from respondents. 
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3.7. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented the methodology used in this piece of work to address the 
research question. Through a series of interviews led with European and American PhVCs a 
survey was developed and addressed to the entire population of PhVCs active in the two 
regions. Content analysis of the interviewed added richness and consistency to the development 
of the survey and to the subsequent analysis.  
Concerning the survey, if controlling for non-response error, the major source of selection 
bias in this research, results show that respondents are not significantly different from non-
respondents, allowing for a generalization of the results. 
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This chapter presents the results obtained from the five in-depth interviews led with 
European and US PhVCs. Interviews were analyzed through content analysis, a methodology 
used in social sciences to study the content of communication.  
The open coding of the interviews led to the development of a set of variables in the 
dimensions characterizing each phase of the PhVCs investment process; these, together with the 
use by PhVCs based on the number of references made to each variable, are here presented.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, an overview of the sample of interviews 
that were content analyzed and the coding scheme on the operationalized dimensions and 
variables is presented. Second, results are analyzed based on the perspective presented in 
chapter 2.3 and 2.4. Last, conclusions are drawn. 
 
4.2. INVESTMENT STRATEGY OF INTERVIEWED PHILANTHROPIC 
VENTURE CAPTIALISTS 
The content analysis of the five interviews led to the identification of the investment 
strategy dimensions and variables reported in Table 4.2.1. Based on these, the highest emphasis 
is placed on the dimension SEs’ stage of development which accounts for 26.5 percent of the 
discussion. In terms of variables, expansion stage SEs were the most mentioned, which confirms 
the fact that PhVCs fulfilment of their value proposition is pursued through backing SEs that 
are ready to grow and, thus, ready to expand their social activity and maximize impact.  
Also, both dimensions SEs’ organizational form and Sector focus received 23.5 percent of all 
references. Within the dimension SE’s organizational form PhVCs mostly mentioned non-
profits, whereas in terms of sector SEs operating in the educational field either working towards 
 
 66  
 
improving the current state of the world of public schools or aiming at improving students 
achievement. Only one PhVCs claimed not to have a specific sector investment focus.   
The dimension Geographic focus accounted for 20.6 percent of references; of these, the 
variable In the PhVCs’ country received 57.1 percent of the references, while the remaining 
dimensions, overall, were only marginal.  
Table 4.2.1: Investment strategy category and variables. 
Dimension Variable % of references 
SE’s stage of development  26.5% 
 Expansion stage 55.6% 
 Maturity stage 33.3% 
 Early stage 11.1% 
SE’s organizational form  23.5% 
 Non-profit 62.5% 
 For-profit 42.5% 
Sector focus  23.5% 
 Education 25.0% 
 Health 12.5% 
 Energy 12.5% 
 Food 12.5% 
 Housing 12.5% 
 No sector focus 12.5% 
Geographic focus  20.6% 
 In the PhVCs’ country 57.1% 
 In the PhVCs’ continent 14.3% 
 Africa 14.3% 
 Asia 14.3% 
Note: % of references is calculated based on the absolute number of references to each 
variable and the absolute total number of references made to all the variables 
making up a category. 
 
 
4.3. CONTENT ANALYSIS RESULTS: INVESTING 
 
4.3.1. Deal Origination  
Starting from findings obtained by VC scholars, two dimensions of deal origination were 
identified: passive and proactive. The content analysis of the question concerning the 
origination phase of PhVC investments led to the subsequent identification of the sources and 
variables which are listed in Table 4.3.1. 
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Table 4.3.1: Passive and proactive deal origination – Categories, sources, and 
variables identified through content analysis. 
Dimension Source Variable % of references 
Passive    43.8% 
 Social entrepreneur  85.7% 
  Application 71.4% 
  Web pages 14.3% 
 Referrals  14.3% 
  Business network 14.3% 
Proactive   56.3% 
 Referrals  16.7% 
  Proactive contact of other referral partners 33.3% 
  Philanthropic investors 11.1% 
  Organization in the portfolio 11.1% 
  Network of VCs 11.1% 
 Creation of ad-hoc SE  11.1% 
 Other  12.5% 
  Own research 22.2% 
Note: % of references was calculated based on the absolute number of references to each variable and the absolute total 
number of references made to all the variables making up a category. 
 
Results show that among passive deal origination methods, the most widely used source 
is the social entrepreneur who submits a business plan, and among proactive ones referrals 
through other contacts than those explicitly mentioned in the table and belonging to the PhVCs’ 
business network. Also, the source Creation of an ad-hoc SE was identified and accounted for 11.1 
percent of all references to proactive deal origination. The Other variable in proactive deal 
origination includes the search through the PhVCs’ own research and received 12.5 percent of 
references. Overall, content analysis reveals that proactive deal origination is the most used 
method of deal flow.  
The PhVCs own research was described as an active process requiring networking and 
identification of those organizations willing to grow: 
 “It’s a variety of networking and talking to people. We talk to the people to find out who is 
making an impact.” (PhVCs F) 
Also, the creation of an ad-hoc SE is seen as one of the possible consequences of the 
PhVCs’ own research: if a suitable investment candidate cannot be identified in the investment 
arena, the PhVCs might decide to scout out for a social entrepreneur willing to carry out the 
PhVCs’ idea: 
“We have done that a couple of times and probably the best example is [name of the company 
 
 68  
 
that was incubated] that is an organization in [name of place] that develops charter school 
facilities. We thought that that was a real need for the charter school organizations we 
invested in. We found an entrepreneur to write the business plan and then funded the 
company to fulfil their needs. We financed the social entrepreneur with a grant and the 
organization was incorporated as a non-profit.”(PhVCs F) 
The sum of the references attributed to each variable listed in Table 4.3.1 led to the 
quantification of the use of passive and proactive deal origination. Results indicate that passive 
and proactive deal origination receives 56.3 and 43.8 percent of references, confirming the 
expectation for Proposition 1. However, since the PhVCs might proactively seek for new 
potential investments as a consequence of not having a track record or visibility, the motivation 
underlying the higher use of proactive criteria might be due to potential for adverse selection on 
the side of the social entrepreneur and other players who then might present lemons rather than 
good projects to the PhVCs, providing support to what claimed by PhVCs D.  
4.3.2. Deal Screening and Evaluation  
The deal screening and evaluation phase of PhVC investments is felt like very much 
following that characterizing traditional VC, with a particular focus on the social component of 
the investment: 
“[...] to be honest with you, our due diligence process looks very much like that of venture 
capital firms. Most of the diligence is focused on the social entrepreneur and the business 
model, the unit economics, the customer need, the quality of the organization, the integrity of 
the leadership team, and the financial plan” (PhVCs E) 
Also: 
“We have a pretty regular due diligence process doing everything from extensive financial 
analysis, interviews with the social entrepreneurs and management team, interview with 
customers and competitive analysis to see if their infrastructure is scalable. I mean, our 
selection and evaluation process is pretty much similar to that of venture capitalists but with 
a strong focus on the social entrepreneur and on social impact”(PhVCs D) 
In terms of variables, results presented in Table 4.3.2 suggest that the most importance is 
attributed to the social entrepreneur, which is identified as a proxy for the dimension Human 
capital dimensions receives a reference percentage higher than 30 percent. In particular, what is 
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looked for is enthusiasm and the ability to lead an organization towards the accomplishment of 
its social mission: 
“[…] a special focus [is] on the social entrepreneur and the ability to pursue the social 
mission via a well defined social strategy. We want social entrepreneurs who are enthusiastic 
about the mission of their social enterprise and that’s what we seek” (PhVCs D) 
“The social entrepreneur is the one who develops the social mission of the organization and is 
the one who can identify which social markets to play in to achieve that mission and how to 
solve potential problems within the organization and face external ones” (PhVCs B) 
Table 4.3.2: Deal screening and evaluation dimensions and variables. 
Dimension Variable % of references 
Human capital  30.4% 
 Social entrepreneur 100.0% 
Organization activity  28.3% 
 Social mission 30.8% 
 Business strategy 23.1% 
 Achievement of clear outcomes with a 
significant number of people 
 
7.7% 
 Credible and sustainable revenue model 7.7% 
 Technology 7.7% 
External environment  17.4% 
 Social market served 75.0% 
 Market size 25.0% 
Potential  10.9% 
 Social impact 40.0% 
 Financial sustainability 60.0% 
Assessment of the deal  2.2% 
 Deal terms 100% 
Note: % of references was calculated based on the absolute number of references to each variable and the 
absolute total number of references made to all the variables making up a category. 
 
Also, among the Organizational activity dimension, social mission and the business 
strategy implemented by the social entrepreneur to pursue the social mission are of key 
importance and received 30.8 and 23.1 percent of references. Also, elements of sustainability are 
taken into account: 
“Traditionally, social enterprises have mixed income streams you know grants, donations, 
services etc. There is an element of sustainability within the criteria we consider in our 
selection process. Our mission is to improve the sustainability conditions of social enterprises 
and working on the missing 50% of unsustainable income related to the grants they are still 
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receiving in such a way that the income of the organization is 100% earned income although 
we know that in social enterprises this may not ever happen but we work in getting towards 
that” (PhVCs B) 
External environment, evaluated taking into account variables such as the typology of 
social market served by the SEs and its size, account for 17.4 percent of the discussion. Within 
the dimension Potential, which receives overall 10.9 percent of references, financial sustainability 
accounts for 60 percent of the discussion. This result suggests that PhVCs look for SEs with 
good prospects of becoming self-sufficient and thus surviving in the long-term. This finding 
could be of key importance in the post-investment and exiting phase of PhVCs investments 
while understanding how PhVCs enable SEs to achieve sustainability. For what concerns the 
potential for social impact, which accounts for 40 percent of the references of the dimension 
Potential, remarkably one interviewee claimed: 
 “So, in order to make an investment we must look at a couple of things. […] Then, I think 
what is most interesting is: will these companies be able to materially impact the lives of at 
least one million people making less than four dollars a day? We estimate through their 
financial expectations in their business plans how many customers they are going to serve in 
a 5 to 10 years period and we are able to estimate what their expectations are. Sometimes it is 
a bit earlier depending on the stage of development and the targets achieved by the 
investment. Are they really serving people in the low income bracket? There are some 
companies for whom 10 percent of their customers are 10 percent of the base of the pyramid: 
that is not enough for us” (PhVCs E) 
Content analysis results support the expectation of Proposition 2, signalling that among a 
pool of investment, PhVCs consider the social entrepreneur as a proxy for social impact thus, 
placing the highest importance on it while selecting deals.  
 
4.3.3. Deal Structuring 
The content analysis of the question concerning the type of financial instrument used by 
PhVCs led to the identification of three typologies of instruments: grant, loan, and equity which 
accounted for 46.7, 26.7, and 26.7 percent of the discussion respectively. One of the interviewees 
claimed: 
“[Name of PhVCs] does provide capital and strategic assistance but at the moment capital is 
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provided in the form of grants. […]So we would fund an IT system or, you know, pay 
salaries for senior members of staff or a working capital facility. So in that sense it is equity 
like but literally speaking it is structure as a grant. So there is no return of the money back to 
[Name of PhVCs]. It is equity like in time engagement.” (PhVCs B) 
This suggests that the use of grant financing, despite not being comparable with equity 
financing contractually speaking, is perceived by the PhVCs as binding as equity in terms of 
engagement and responsibility towards the backed SEs. 
As such, based on the expectation proposed in Proposition 3, the higher use of grants to 
finance SEs vs. loan and equity indicates a low perception of moral hazard. On the contrary, the 
use of instruments that involve some kind of return, other than social, can be seen as clashing 
with the PhVC’s intrinsic value proposition of creation of social value. Grants tend thereby to be 
preferred to other financing instruments that can be misleading and misunderstood by the 
general public, as one of the interviewees claimed:   
 “[…] we are much into the feeling of our cornerstone investor, did not wants to have any 
element of return based on the media perception of private equity and private equity would be 
seen to be profiting from social enterprises or charities that might be a negative black clash for 
us” (PhVCs B) 
This might suggest that stewardship theory rather than moral hazard is better able to 
explain the deal structuring behaviour of PhVCs. Consequently, since in stewardship theory the 
principal fully enables the steward to act in the best interest of the organization, the binding 
relationship is built on a trust mechanism that enables the steward to make choices that 
maximize the long-term return for the organization. In fact, putting control structures on 
stewards will significantly de-motivate the steward and be counter-productive for both the 
steward and for the organization (Argyris, 1990). If stewardship theory is able to explain this 
phase of the PhVCs investment, the expectation is that PhVCs will place a higher importance to 
the variable trust than to any other contractual provision. Content analysis thus leads to the 
formulation of the following proposition which will be analyzed in the survey result section: 
Proposition 13: The higher the importance of trust vs. Formal contractual provisions, the 
higher the stewardship offered by philanthropic venture capitalists. 
If trying to understand under which conditions a specific type of financing is used, 
interviews reveal that grant financing was mentioned in relationship with the financing of 
early-stage SEs and it tends to follow a staging model, according to which SEs are planned to 
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receive additional and greater grant financing based on the achievement of milestones, both on 
a social and economic perspective: 
“We tend to invest in what we call capacity grant or smaller grants or you know 50 to 100 
thousands when it’s really early and they have readied their business plans. Once we want 
them to be part of our portfolio that tends to be a larger, multimillion dollar grant that is used 
out of the course of several years based on the milestones they achieve” (PhVCs F) 
On the other hand, loans and equity tend to be used with mature SEs: 
“We have also made loans and equity investments in the for-profit companies. So far we have 
provided loan to one organization that was a non-profit […] it was a more developed 
organization so I think it must have been a capital need at that moment” (PhVCs F) 
 “[We] Mainly [use] grants, but occasionally we use also debt for mature organizations” 
(PhVCs G) 
Based on Proposition 4, a positive relationship between the use of traditional valuation 
models and moral hazard risk is expected to be found. Findings suggest that formal valuation 
models tend to be related to the use of loan and equity as financing instrument, and more 
specifically, with the financing of for-profit SEs.  
“I guess the valuation question comes mostly with our for-profit companies and that I guess 
follows the standard rules for valuing for-profit companies” (PhVCs F) 
However, those PhVCs performing a formal valuation declared that social components 
are not taken into account in this specific phase of the investment. 
“When doing valuation we do consider discounted or multiples so as far as it is for valuation 
that’s not where the social criteria comes into place. We consider them when we have to 
decide whether we wanna make the investment or not, that’s when we look at the social 
impact” (PhVCs D) 
For what concerns the use of grants, they result to be used in connection with non-profit 
SEs, and in this case: 
“On the non-profit side, valuation is a little bit messier and tends to be a little bit more about 
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what are the scale and growth plans of the organizations. So their sort of financial model for 
what they believe it’s gonna bring the organization to scale. So it is definitely not a typical 
valuation model but it is a little bit more understanding this what we’ve done so far and this 
is what it takes to go from here to there and how a combination of philanthropy and revenues, 
if there is ever any, and our public fund, like our first one, can help them in achieving the 
goal” (PhVCs F) 
“You know, we do not value non-profits as in the for-profit field. We estimate how much the 
non-profit needs based on what they plan to do with the funds we will provide them. This is 
the sort of valuation we do.” (PhVCs G) 
Concerning contractual provisions, a difficulty in collecting information was encountered 
with interviewees as they were not involved in the contractual design of the deal. However, 
those PhVCs who backed SEs with grants claimed that, generally speaking, provisions that are 
typically used in VC are not included in the term sheet. A request for an analysis of a contract 
that is typically used was made but, for confidentiality reasons, it was not possible to obtain 
information. After investigating the issue with their legal staff, one of the interviewed PhVCs 
came back to the question by email and confirmed the use of entrepreneurs’ binding provisions 
as well as liquidation and renegotiation clauses. Given the paucity of information, no general 
conclusions can be drawn. 
 
4.3.4. Post-Investment Activities 
In order to understand how stewardship is offered by PhVCs, questions on monitoring 
and cooperative activities were asked. Results, including dimensions and variables are 
presented in the following sections.  
4.3.4.a. Monitoring 
PhVCs were asked to describe how they perform monitoring roles in the SEs they back. 
Starting from findings obtained by VC scholars (cfr. the discussion in paragraph 2.3.4.a), the 
interviews with PhVCs led to the identification of two monitoring dimensions, i.e., formal and 
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Table 4.3.3: Monitoring dimensions and variables. 
Dimension Variable % of references 
Formal  63.6% 
 Board seat 42.9% 
 Reports 35.7% 
 Stage financing 21.4% 
Informal  36.4% 
 Informal meetings 100.0% 
Note: % of references was calculated based on the absolute number of references 
to each variable and the absolute total number of references made to all the 
variables making up a category. 
 
In terms of formal monitoring, this results to be performed mainly through the 
participation to formal meetings of the management of the backed SE thanks to the right to take 
a sit in the board of the organization, which accounts for 42.9 percent of the references to the 
dimension of Formal monitoring. However, if digging into this finding, interviews reveal that 
formal monitoring through board seat, despite being used, is referenced more in terms of 
cooperative activities rather than a tool to protect investments from harmful behaviours on the 
side of the social entrepreneur. Only one reference, accounting for 11 percent of the overall 
references for formal monitoring, was made in this sense:  
“[…] in our first investment we do take a seat on the board, we are not looking to take over a 
company but we are looking for some sort of control so we can protect our investment and then 
being in a position to help the company to overcome their obstacles to growth” (PhVCs F) 
Concerning formal monitoring through board seat, one of the interviewed PhVCs stated: 
“Being involved on a board level is something we are necessarily striving for either. It is 
about assisting the organization to meet their strategic roles. We would not even get involved 
with them unless we believe we are comfortable with the social entrepreneur and the strategic 
goals of the organization. Then, how we do this, well, dialogue, good cooperation. Our 
support is considered very valuable and our suggestions and recommendations are strongly 
taken into account by the social enterprises we support. You know, they recognize their 
weaknesses and pay great attention at all the strategies they can adopt to achieve their social 
mission. The social enterprise trusts us and we trusts the social enterprise and both want to 
maximise the impact of the grant” (PhVCs A) 
Formal monitoring through reports required by the PhVCs accounts for 35.7 percent of 
the references, and particularly, results to be strictly related to SE’s performance in terms of 
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social impact: 
“So, for our first investment they have reporting us how many pounds of books they had from 
XXXX, how many employees they have that live in long term neighbourhoods or how many 
pounds of carbon they offset” (PhVCs D) 
“Each company we support has to send us quarterly reports filling up traditional business 
metrics including variables such as strength of the management team, capacity of achieving 
social impact” (PhVCs E) 
“We also use the online data system […] that helps us in collecting up-to-date […] data from 
the organizations and their performance, how they are doing and their plans for the future in 
terms of scale and philanthropy needs for sustainability” (PhVCs F) 
Stage financing was mentioned as a monitoring device, and, like in VC, is subject to the 
achievement of milestones: 
“We tend to do a sort of a combination of stage financing and upfront investments. We tend 
to approve upfront investments up to two million dollars over the course of two years and 
then we do set up as I mentioned milestones which then sort of define the time frame and the 
dollar amount for, you know, in the next six months we expect that you will hire a chief 
financial officer, you know, whatever, so that’s sort of the combination we weight up.” 
(PhVCs F) 
If comparing the use of formal and informal monitoring dimensions, based on the 
references to each variable, content analysis results suggest a higher importance of the Formal 
dimension vs. Informal, accounting for 63.6 and 36.4 percent of the overall references. This 
finding suggests that Proposition 7 is not supported. 
4.3.4.b. Cooperation 
Of the cooperative dimensions identified through the VC literature, i.e., Strategic, 
Supportive, and Networking, results from the content analysis of PhVCs interviews are presented 
in Table 4.3.4. Accordingly, PhVCs appear to be pretty strong on cooperation at the strategic 
level and particularly, through the variable strategic advice which accounts for more than 85 
percent of the discussion on cooperation through strategic roles.  
 
 76  
 
Table 4.3.4: Cooperative dimensions and variables. 
Dimension Variable % of references 
Strategic  57.4% 
 Strategic advice 85.2% 
 Board seat 11.1% 
Supportive  29.8% 
 Human resource  42.9% 
 Financial management and accounting 28.6% 
 Marketing and communication 14.3% 
 Legal 7.1% 
 IT  7.1% 
Networking  12.8% 
 Syndication 50.0% 
 Access to future funders 50.0% 
Note: % of references was calculated based on the absolute number of references to each 
variable and the absolute total number of references made to all the variables making up a 
category. 
 
In particular, strategic advice can be delivered in a variety of ways: 
“[…] generally speaking, ehm, each organization we work with will have a [name of private 
equity firms] mentor that works with the chief executive. They will have monthly or even 
more frequently meetings where they would discuss the main strategic problems of the 
organization and what [name of private equity firms] can provide is a totally different 
mindset. You see, working in the third social sector that is where social enterprises operate 
there is a certain way that these organization think about, the market thinks about, the cash 
flow is thought about, revenue, whatever and [name of private equity firms] offers a fresh 
perspective on the ways of looking at the organization. […] We provide capital and strategic 
and managerial support to established non-profit social enterprises and help in scaling up 
their business […] In some cases we would advice organizations to move away from a 
particular market focus, or we would ask them to focus internally on their operations. With 
one of the organizations in our portfolio, we asked them to focus on their internal operations 
and they moved from a situation of stable revenues to one of increasing revenues.” (PhVCs 
B) 
“During the investment term, PhVCs E provides strategic management support to help 
investees reach expected exit targets” (PhVCs E) 
“In our team we have a lot of experience, we have a serial entrepreneur [name of partner] so 
he knows a lot of these growth and market formation issues. We have a lot of friends and 
professionals through our network that have experience in growing companies. So we try to 
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put us in a position to be able to use that for the benefit of our investment or of our 
investees.” (PhVCs F) 
As previously mentioned, being formally engaged on a board level is perceived as a 
cooperative value-added activity provided to the backed organization rather than a control 
mechanism, as stated by PhVCs F: 
“[Cooperation] for us means that we do that through taking a board seat in the social 
enterprise we work with, we are pretty active on a board level taking a seat in every 
investment that we make. We are pretty active on the board at the strategic and financial 
level.” (PhVCs F) 
Overall, strategic roles account for 57.4 percent of the discussion on cooperative activities, 
with supporting and networking roles amounting to 29.8 and 12.8 percent respectively. Among 
supportive roles, PhVCs are mostly involved in human resource activities, which include 
finding skilled professionals able to manage social and financial aspects: 
“Ehm, growing non-profit organizations struggle to secure skilled resource, high-quality 
advice and expertise; they lack funds and professionals with experience in managing financial 
and social aspects.” (PhVCs B) 
In terms of networking, references were alternatively concerned about syndication 
practices, also referred to as co-investments and providing access to future funders. Syndication 
is mentioned in relationship with the backing of for-profit SEs: 
“We build a network for the social entrepreneurs we work with both in the financial and 
philanthropic communities […] [Syndication] depends. If we are supporting a for-profit 
organization, we typically do so. We tend to purchase it with a larger round that usually 
includes other venture capital investors. When it is a non-profit organization we tend to just 
be us. However, we work closely throughout the years with other funders but when we come 
to the table it’s just us.” (PhVCs F) 
The interviews indicate a shift of focus from what the investor believes might allow the 
backed SE to maximize its social impact to what the SEs effectively needs towards that. As a 
result, as expected in Proposition 8 through Proposition 10, PhVCs behave as stewards of the 
organizations they back, placing emphasis on cooperative behaviours for the SEs rather than 
cooperating for protecting the investment. Furthermore, content analysis indicates that PhVCs 
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behave as prescribed by (Rosenstein et al., 1993) and (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989) rather than 
by (MacMillan et al., 1989). 
 
4.4. CONTENT ANALYSIS RESULTS: EXITING 
Proposition 11 expected a positive relationship between the duration of PhVCs 
investments and the risk for adverse selection. The content analysis of PhVCs interviews 
identified the holding period presented in Figure 4.4.1 which indicates that 50% of the 
references concerned an investment period ranging from 5 to 7 years. This finding suggests that 
Proposition 11 is supported as references keep on increasing as the duration period enlarges, 
showing a spike in the 5-7 years period, as happens for VC investments.  





1-2 years 5-7 years More than 7 years  
In terms of exit strategies, it should be acknowledged that for the PhVC investor, exits do 
not look like more typical “take-out” strategies in the for-profit sector, as one interviewees 
noted while asked about which exit strategy they adopt: 
“That’s a hard question for us and I guess it will be also a hard question for philanthropic 
venture capitalists in general because we generally don’t, especially if funding non-profits, 
have a good comparison with what you can make in the for-profit market, where you either 
sell the company or you take it public or you are taking your money back and that 
organization is going for additional funding from another source.” (PhVCs F) 
Through content analysis, five variables indicating PhVCs’ exit strategies were identified 
and collated in Table 4.4.1.  
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Table 4.4.1: PhVCs exit strategies. 
Variable % of references 
New financial partners 36.4% 
Follow-on investments 18.2% 
Ongoing management strategic support 18.2% 
Buyback 9.1% 
M&A 9.1% 
Repayment of loan 9.1% 
Note: % of references was calculated based on the absolute number of 
references to each variable and the absolute total number of references 
made to all the variables making up a category. 
 
Findings show that the most mentioned exit strategy was helping the SEs in getting 
funded by other investors or institutions, as a result of the achievement of operational goals and 
social impact. This exit strategy accounts for 36.4 percent of the overall references, and new 
financial partners can be other PhVCs, traditional foundations, or the government itself, whose 
task would be to further scale up the mission of the SE: 
“At this stage what is exit is still not well defined and you know there is not a developed 
social market for these companies. Part of it is definitely pass them and moving them to new 
sources of funding and because these support agreements are very well defined and we 
monitor the performance, we signal success to other players.” (PhVCs B) 
“For us the closest thing that we got is to stop our funding and make sure that the 
organization is backed up by a larger foundation so that it can continue to get funding and 
the organization can grow to scale; or the organization becomes sustainable with its own 
combination of revenue and kind’ a public money.” (PhVCs F) 
Also, follow-on investments and on-going management support result widely 
mentioned, confirming Proposition 12: 
“We have also extended our support for the organisations beyond the original two-year 
agreement, in some cases through additional funding, but in most cases with ongoing 
management support.” (PhVCs B) 
“PhVCs E strives to maintain a strong relationship with investees post-exit and provides on-
going support by continuing to communicate with investees on their progress even after our 
investments end. When appropriate opportunities arise, PhVCs E considers a follow-on 
investment in an existing or exited investee. As PhVCs E ’s initial investment aim is to help 
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enterprises reach scale and access more commercial forms of capital, a follow-on investment is 
more likely to be directed towards a new business line, such as developing a new and 
innovative product.” (PhVCs E) 
 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS FROM CONTENT ANALYSIS  
The results obtained by content analyzing five interviews led with PhVCs suggest that 
while the overall investment process, in terms of investment stages, follow that characterizing 
the traditional VC one, differences are found for what concern the structure of each phase. More 
specifically, while theoretical background on VC explain both pre-investment and exiting 
phases within an adverse selection framework, post-investment activities are motivated using 
an agency and moral hazard perspective and basically explain the VCs’ behaviour as motivated 
by the necessity of protecting the value of the investment.  
Findings from PhVCs interviews, which are summarized in Table 4.5.1, confirm the 
relationships set by the propositions presented in chapter 2.3 and chapter 2.4. Like VCs, PhVCs 
face severe adverse selection which induces them to both originate new potential deals by a 
proactive search and to select deals considering the characteristics of the social entrepreneur. 
However, whereas the shift from the explanation of VCs behaviour based on the risk of moral 
hazard to that of PhVCs based on stewardship was expected to happen in the post-investment 
phase of the process, results indicate this happens already in the deal structuring stage. The use 
of preferred equity characterizing VC as a means of shifting away risk from the VCs to the 
entrepreneur, is substituted in PhVCs with the large use of grant financing, which by definitions 
is “money for free”, meaning no return of money back to the investor/donor is 
expected/required. The absence of any binding terms in the grant instrument should cause a 
higher risk for moral hazard entirely borne by the PhVCs: the SEs might, in fact, “take the 
money and run”. PhVCs should thus have either sophisticated contractual financing agreement 
to compensate for this risk, as done by VCs, or full trust in the backed social entrepreneurs. The 
corroboration of this finding would have been possible if more information was available in 
terms of the typology and nature of contractual provisions established between the PhVCs and 
the SEs; in this part of the research no generalizable results were obtained. However, if the 
expectation of a lower perception of moral hazard holds in PhVCs investments, as posited by 
the set of proposition investigating the deal structuring phase, then contracts could be replaced 
by a higher level of trust in the social entrepreneur they back, thus making trust more important 
than contractual provisions.  
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For what concerns the post-investment stage of the process, despite it might sound a 
romantic and optimistic explanation, the PhVCs focus is not on the protection of their 
investment but it is indeed focused on the activities that the PhVCs can implement to enable the 
backed SE to expand its activity and, consequently, maximize its potential social impact thanks 
to the shaping of a managerial and strategic organizational culture. Also, monitoring activities, 
which are typically explained in VC through an agency theory perspective and aim at 
“monitoring to protect”, in PhVCs monitoring it aims at “monitoring to add value”. Thus, 
formal monitoring, which contrary to expectations results to prevails on informal monitoring, is 
run more as cooperative activity than as a means for the PhVCs’ investment protection, 
confirming the expectation of PhVCs behaving as stewards of the organizations they back rather 
than self-interested motivated actors.  
Table 4.5.1: Summary of content analysis results with respect to propositions 
and relationship with theoretical issues. 
Investment 
phase 







1 Proactive methods Adverse 
selection 
+   
Deal screening 
and evaluation 
2 Human capital Adverse 
selection 
+   
3 Grant financing Moral hazard -   
4 Valuation Stewardship -   
5 Entrepreneur 
binding provisions  














  X 
8 Cooperation: 
strategic roles 
Stewardship +   
9 Cooperation:  
supportive roles 





Stewardship +   




-   Exit 
12 Secondary sale Adverse 
selection 
-   
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This chapter presents the results obtained by the survey addressed to the population of 
PhVCs and it is organized as follows. First, PhVCs are cluster analyzed to confirm the different 
categories identified in chapter 1.3. Second, a broad understanding on the identity of 
investors/donors in PhVC funds is gained. Third, the investment strategy of PhVCs is analyzed 
on different levels, including the nature of the backed SEs’ organizational form, the sectors 
mostly present in the PhVCs’ portfolio, the location of portfolio SEs as well as their stage of 
development. Third, results on the investing and exiting phase of the PhVCs investment process 
are reported. All throughout the chapter, results are also analyzed to identify whether 
differences exist with respect to the professional profile of the person who materially responded 
to the question, respondents’ location of the PhVC fund, the legal form of the fund, and last the 
PhVCs cluster.  
 
5.2.  CLUSTERS OF PHILANTHROPIC VENTURE CAPITALISTS  
As a first step, respondent PhVCs were cluster analyzed according to their organizational 
form (non-profit or for-profit) and the outcome associated with the type of SEs they back. To 
this respect, a combination of hierarchical and nonhierarchical clustering algorithms was used 
(Hair, 2006). The hierarchical procedure using Ward’s linkage method for distance measure is 
first used both to establish the number of clusters and to specify initial cluster seed points 
(Edelbrock, 1979). Subsequently, the nonhierarchical k-means procedure is implemented to 
classify data through a certain number of clusters (assume k clusters) fixed a priori. The main 
idea is to define k centroids, one for each cluster such that the objects are separated into groups 
from which the cluster distance to be minimized can be calculated (Milligan and Cooper, 1986). 
Accordingly, three clusters were identified whose final centers are presented in Table 
5.2.1. Results from the cluster analysis suggest that respondents reflect the clusters of PhVCs 
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identified based on the literature in chapter 1.3. Cluster 1 includes those PhVCs investing 
mainly in non-profits and identified as pure highly-engaged philanthropists; cluster 2 groups those 
PhVCs that invest in for-profit SEs, and previously identified as social VCs; last, cluster 3 gathers 
those PhVCs that invest alternatively in non-profit and for-profit SEs, identified as hybrid 
philanthropists.  
Table 5.2.1: Final cluster centers of PhVCs. 
  Clusters 




















































Figure 5.2.1 depicts the percentage of respondent PhVCs belonging to each of the 
previously identified clusters.  










If analyzing the typology of respondent PhVCs by location, results show that in the US 
PhVCs fall mainly under the category of pure highly-engaged philanthropists, while in Europe they 
are better spread across all clusters. This suggest that there might be a difference in the 
definition of PhVC in Europe vs. the US, with US considering PhVCs those entities that are non-
profits, provide capital as well as non-financial support to non-profits, and their primary and 
unique objective is seeking a social return. 
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Following this divergence in the percentage of PhVCs belonging to each cluster with 
respect to location, a test for difference was conducted using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
U test. Results in Table 5.2.2 show that the null hypothesis of equality is failed to be rejected.  
Table 5.2.2: Difference between the number of cases of PhVCs in each cluster 
and the location of the PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test.  
 Number of cases in clusters 
Location of PhVCs 183.00  
5.3. INVESTORS IN PHILANTHROPIC VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS 
According to responses, PhVCs receive funds that will be used to back SEs mainly by 
private individuals, followed by foundations and corporations. Additionally, 43 percent of 
respondent PhVCs receive funds from financial system participants, such as banks (28 percent) 
and private equity and VC firms (25 percent). 11 percent of PhVCs receive funds from other 
entities, namely either other PhVCs active in supporting previous or subsequent stages of 
development of social enterprises or non-profit organizations.  
Table 5.3.1: Investors in PhVC funds. 
Investors % of PhVCs 




Private equity and VC funds 25% 
Government 21% 
Endowment funds 9% 
Pension funds 2% 
Other 11% 
The % of cases does not sum up to 100 percent as PhVCs might have different 
categories of investors as source of funds (cfr. Question 4 in Appendix 4).  
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In terms of combination of investors, survey results show that 20 percent of PhVCs 
receive funds only from private individuals who are the main source of funding. These are 
followed by a combination of foundations, corporations, and private individuals (10 percent), 
foundations and private individuals (10 percent) as well as foundations, corporates, banks, and 
private individuals (5 percent). Summing up these combinations of investors, 45 percent of 
PhVCs employ these sources. The remaining combinations are each used by 2.5 percent of 
PhVCs each.  
When investigating whether having one of the above mentioned investors is influenced 
by the organizational form of the PhVC fund in terms of the being a non-profit or for-profit, the 
Fisher exact test is run and corroborated by the contingency coefficient. Table 5.3.2 shows that 
the type of investor is not influenced by the non-profit or for-profit legal structure of the PhVCs, 
except the case of having banks or private and VC funds as investors.  
Table 5.3.2: Relationship of the organizational form of the PhVCs with the type 
of investor in the fund - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 









coefficient value  
Fisher exact 
test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 
Private individuals - 0.172 0.279 0.268 
Foundations - 0.020 0.617 0.900 
Corporations - 0.066 0.500 0.677 
Banks - 0.323 0.050 0.031 
Private equity and 
VC funds 
- 0.393 0.020 0.007 
Government - 0.066 0.569 0.677 
Endowment funds - 0.118 0.448 0.453 
Pension funds - 0.074 0.825 0.641 
Other - 0.152 0.448 0.332 
More likely than expected under the null hypothesis, for-profit PhVCs have banks as 
investors. Cramer’s V’s value, which indicates the strength of the association between the two 
variables and is reported in Table 5.3.3, amounts to 0.342 in the case of PhVCs being for-profit 
and 0.428 if PhVCs are non-profits and the effect size is considered to be medium (Cohen, 1988).  
Table 5.3.3: Strength of association between the organizational form of the 
PhVCs and investor in the fund being banks or private equity and VC funds. 
  Organizational form of PhVCs  
Investor n Non-profit For-profit Cramer’s V 
Banks 33 6 4 0.342* 
Private equity and VC funds 7 4 4 0.428* 
Investigating now any differences of Investors between European and US PhVCs, the 
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Fisher exact test was again used and corroborated with the contingency coefficient. Table 5.3.4 
reports that the null hypothesis of equality is rejected in the case the investor is a bank.  
Table 5.3.4: Relationship of the location of PhVCs with the type of Investor in 
the fund - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 









coefficient value  
Fisher exact 
test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 
Private individuals - 0.042 0.565 0.789 
Foundations - 0.010 0.601 0.949 
Corporations - 0.197 0.170 0.204 
Banks - 0.376 0.011 0.010 
Private equity and 
VC funds 
- 0.197 0.193 0.204 
Government - 0.197 0.193 0.204 
Endowment funds - 0.249 0.156 0.103 
Pension funds - 0.143 0.550 0.360 
Other - 0.197 0.230 0.204 
To better investigate the statistical significant difference encountered with respect to 
banks, a cross tab analysis reveals that in Europe banks support PhVCs funds more than 
expected, with a count of 9 vs. an expected count of 5.5. Considering the bank centralism of the 
European financial system together with the result in Table 5.3.3, it is not surprising to 
encounter this finding.  
Last, an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was run to identify how well the type of 
Investor predicts the amount of money managed by the PhVC fund, measured by the variable 
AUM. Since 3 respondents were identified as outliers (cfr. Table 3.6.4) and might have an impact 
on the regression’s results, an analysis of these outliers was performed to understand if all 
outliers might have an impact on regression’s results. To do so, the 10 most extreme values for 
the studentized deleted residuals were identified. Table 5.3.5 indicates that the case number 32 
in the dataset has the largest value (50.400) suggesting it to be the outlier.  
Table 5.3.5: Outlier statistics – Studentized deleted residuals for AUM. 
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This finding is also confirmed when outliers are identified based on those observations 
whose standardized residuals exceed 2 (cfr. Table 5.3.6).  
Table 5.3.6: Outlier identification – Standardized residuals larger than 2.  
Case Number Stud. Deleted Residual AUM Predicted Value Residual 
32 50.400 1750000000 819171212.33 930828787.671 
Dependent Variable: AUM. 
 
The following step was to analyze the leverage value to identify observations that would 
have potential great influence on regression coefficient estimates. Generally, a point with 
leverage greater than (2k+2)/n should be carefully examined, with k being the number of 
predictors and n being the number of observations. In this case k = 9 and n = 40, which implies 
that a value exceeding 0.5 is worthy of further investigation; based on Figure 5.3.1, 3 
observations fulfil this condition. 
Figure 5.3.1: Centered leverage value for AUM.  
 
 
If combining information on the residuals and leverage, the Cook’s distance was 
calculated and observation 32 was identified as the only outlier based on a cut-off point of 0.11. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 The conventional Cook’s D cut-off point for the identification of outlier is given by the formula 4/n with n=number of 
observations.  
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Table 5.3.7: Identification of outliers by AUM - Cook’s distance. 












Since observation 32 appears as an outlier as well as an influential point in every analysis 
conducted so far, it was omitted in the regression between AUM and Investor whose results are 
reported in Table 5.3.8. After checking the fulfilment of all the assumptions underlying the 
regression model, results concerning the ability of the type of Investor to predict AUM were 
found to be statistically significant with F(9,23) = 5.55, p<0.001, and adjusted R square of 0.561 
(cfr. Table 5.3.8).   
Table 5.3.8: Regression results – AUM (no outliers) and Investors. 
 Standardized 
coefficient 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 β t-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Constant  0.237 0.815   
Private individuals 0.063 0.471 0.642 0.766 1.305 
Foundations 0.335 2.351 0.028 0.677 1.476 
Corporations -0.306 -1.962 0.062 0.563 1.775 
Banks -0.072 -0.543 0.593 0.779 1.284 
Private equity and VC funds -0.038 -0.267 0.792 0.693 1.444 
Governments 0.089 0.642 0.527 0.722 1.385 
Endowment funds 0.027 0.195 0.847 0.721 1.387 
Pension funds 0.767 5.753 0.000 0.772 1.296 
Other 0.116 0.788 0.439 0.629 1.589 
R Square 0.685     
Adj. R Square 0.561     
Std. Error of the Estimate 25046921.123     
Durbin-Watson 2.033     
Predictors: (Constant), Private individuals, Foundations, Corporations, Banks, Private equity and VC 
funds, Government, Endowment funds, Pension funds, Other. Dependent Variable: AUM. 
Findings indicate that 56.1 percent of the PhVCs’ AUM’s variance can be explained by the 
type of Investor in the fund. More specifically, findings suggest that having a foundation or a 
pension fund as Investor in the PhVC fund increases the AUM by 33.5 percent and 76.7 percent 
respectively, while other types of Investor are found to be not significantly related to the money 
managed by PhVCs.   
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5.4. INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
While seeking to understand the investment policy characterizing PhVC funds, the 
survey asked them to provide information about their target and actual portfolio. On the one 
hand, the motivation that pushed for an understanding of the PhVCs’ target rather than actual 
portfolio is that, being some of the surveyed PhVCs relatively young and created in the time 
period 2005-2008 (cfr. Table 3.6.3), these might have not concluded their investment phase yet. 
The target composition of the PhVC portfolio takes into account the legal form of the supported 
SE. On the other hand, the present situation of the portfolio of PhVC funds is explored on a 
sector level, on a spatial distribution level and lastly on a development stage level.  
Based on the discussion presented in chapter 1.3 and taking into account the non-
distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980), SEs were divided into non-profits and for-profits. 
However, considering that PhVCs might also want to have projects in their portfolio to better 
diversify risk, this response category was also proposed in the survey. It is worthy to note here 
that investing in projects does not make the PhVC model presented in   
Figure 1.2.3 invalid as long as this category constitutes a marginal portion of the PhVCs’ 
portfolio. The results obtained from the questionnaire are presented in Table 5.4.1: Composition 
of PhVCs’ target portfolio by organizational form of SEs and projects. Accordingly, the average 
target portfolio is made up of 68 percent of non-profits, 29 percent of for-profits, and 3 percent 
of projects with a standard deviation of 37.7 percent, 35.9 percent, and 10 percent respectively.  
Table 5.4.1: Composition of PhVCs’ target portfolio by organizational form of 
SEs and projects.  
 Organizational form of SEs and projects backed by PhVCs 
 % of Non-profits % of For-profits % of Projects 
Mean 68.50 28.50 3.00 
Median 80.00 15.00 0.00 
SD 37.697 35.89 9.98 
 
 
Combining the different typologies of backed SEs and projects that PhVCs can invest in, 
Table 5.4.2 is presented. The relative majority of PhVCs invest either only in non-profit SEs (42.5 
percent) or both in non-profit and for-profit SEs (32.5 percent).  
 
 91  
 
Table 5.4.2: Percentage of PhVCs by target portfolio of SEs and projects. 
For-profit Non-profit Both Total
Supports organizations 10.0% 42.5% 32.5% 85.0%
Supports organzations and projects 2.5% 2.5% 10.0% 15.0%
Total 12.5% 45.0% 42.5% 100%  
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to test for differences between the dependent 
variable Backed SEs’ organizational form and the PhVCs’ location measured by the regions 
Location of PhVCs. Whereas in the case of PhVCs backing for-profits SEs or projects differences 
are not statistically significant in Location of PhVCs, Table 5.4.3 indicates that the equality 
hypothesis is failed to be rejected for when PhVCs back non-profit SEs. More specifically, US 
PhVCs result to back more non-profits than their European counterparts with a mean rank of 
24.75 for US and 17.02 for Europe. 
Table 5.4.3: Difference between the composition of the target portfolio in terms 
of SEs organizational forms and projects and the location of PhVCs - Mann-
Whitney U test.   
 Organizational form of SEs and projects backed by PhVCs 
 % of Non-profits % of For-profits % of Projects 
Location of PhVCs 121.500** 133.000 162.500 
** Significant at 5% level. 
To investigate if the choice of backed SEs organizational form might be influenced by the 
preference of investors/donors to focus on that particular form, a correlation analysis was run 
and results are presented in Table 5.4.5. As a methodological issue, being dichotomous the 
categories making up the variable Investors, the point-biserial correlation should be computed, 
which captures the relationship between a dichotomous variable (in this the categories making 
up the variable Investor) and a continuous variable (in this case the categories making up the 
variable Organizational form of SEs and projects backed by PhVCs). However, the normality 
assumption of the continuous variable underlying the point-biserial is rejected (cfr. Table 5.4.4). 
The non-parametric Spearman correlation coefficient thus needs to be used. 
Table 5.4.4: Organizational form of SEs and projects backed by PhVCs - 
Normality test. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
% of Non-profits 0.223 40 0.000 0.779 40 0.000 
% of For-profits 0.236 40 0.000 0.769 40 0.000 
% of Projects 0.468 40 0.000 0.346 40 0.000 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table 5.4.5 indicates that the hypothesis of no linear relationship between the categories 
making up the variable investor and the portfolio by the organizational form of SEs and projects 
backed by PhVCs is failed to be rejected excepted for the Investor category Endowment funds and % 
of Projects. The direction of the Spearman correlation is positive, hence suggesting that PhVCs 
whose investors include endowment funds are more likely to have a higher percentage of 
projects in their portfolio. The same statistic was employed to investigate if there is a statistical 
significant association between AUM and the organizational form of SEs and projects backed by 





Table 5.4.5: Correlation coefficient between the PhVCs portfolio by the organizational form of backed SEs and projects and Investors. 
  Investors 
  Private 
individuals 
































































































*** Significant at 1% level. 
Table 5.4.6: Correlation matrix - Portfolio by backed SEs’ organizational form and AUM (no outliers). 
 Organizational form of SEs and projects backed by PhVCs 
 % of Non-profits % of For-profits % of Projects 
AUM -0.090 0.153 0.129 
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Analyzing now the PhVCs’ portfolio in terms of Backed sectors, education and health 
result to be the most widely present in their portfolio, with about 76 and 57 percent of PhVCs 
supporting at least one SE operating in these sectors respectively (cfr. Table 5.4.7); 68 percent of 
PhVCs hold at least one SEs categorized under the Other sector category which groups together 
a number of sectors such as civic engagement, human rights, economic development, food and 
nutrition, legal advocacy, and non-violence.  
Table 5.4.7: Percentage of PhVCs backing at least one SE by sector. 








Other 67.6%  
The % of cases does not sum up to 100 percent as 
PhVCs might have different categories of investors as 
source of funds (cfr. Question 10 in Appendix 4).  
 
Table 5.4.8 groups by sector the number of SEs held by PhVCs. If considering the range 
of the number of SEs belonging to each sector and held by PhVCs, it is clear the presence of 
outliers which were subsequently identified through a boxplot analysis.  
Table 5.4.8: PhVCs’ average portfolio by sector – Outliers included. 
Mean Median Max Min SD
Education 21 4 297 1 56.12
Health 18 3 271 1 58.36
Employment 10 3 59 1 18.19
Disabled people 8 2 64 1 16.90
Energy and environment 5 2 34 1 9.18
Housing 5 2 21 1 5.90
Water 4 3 10 1 4.10
Other 42 3 818 1 162.78  
 
Figure 5.4.1 identifies observation 15 as an extreme outlier, and observations 2, 9, and 1 
as mild outliers. Analyzing these observations in terms of demographics, two are in Europe and 
two in the US; all are non-profit PhVCs and, more interestingly, all are public charities. Findings 
were then taken into account while trying to identify a non-inflated composition of the 
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portfolio. To this respect, after the identification of which observations needed to be considered 
as outliers, any differences between the number of backed SEs by sector for outliers and non-
outliers was investigated using the Mann-Whitney U test. The analysis aimed at understanding 
whether a detailed study of the sector composition of the portfolio of outliers and non-outliers 
was worthy.  




Table 5.4.9 indicates a statistical significant difference in the number of SEs held by 
PhVCs in all sectors but “Water”, suggesting a deeper and separate examination of the portfolio 
of outliers and non-outliers. 
Table 5.4.9: Difference between the number of SEs in the PhVCs portfolio by 
sector and being an outlier or a non-outlier - Mann-Whitney U test.  
 Number of SEs in the PhVCs portfolio by sector 








7.000*** 4.000*** 1.000*** 24.000** 42.500 2.500*** 1.500** 27.500* 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
As a consequence, the portfolio of outliers and non-outliers reported in Table 5.4.10 and 
Table 5.4.11 was compared. Results indicate that the highest number of SEs in the non-outlier 
portfolio is active in the “Education” field, aiming at improving school leadership and student 
achievement across the system; in the case of non-outliers the “Other” sector is the most 
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represented. This confirms the significant different result encountered in Table 5.4.9. Also, the 
water sector appears to rank more in the non-outlier portfolio. 
The non-outlier portfolio results to be more consistent in terms of representativeness: if 
looking at the standard deviation (SD) an average decrease by about 85 percent across the 
education, health, and energy and environment sectors is found. Also, the analysis of the 
composition of the PhVCs’ portfolio depurated from outliers reveals that the maximum number 
of held SEs is 42 and these are active in the education sector.  
Table 5.4.10: PhVCs’ portfolio by sector – Outliers. 
Mean Median Max Min SD
Education 100 49 297 7 132.91
Health 79 21 271 5 128.07
Employment 34 36 59 6 28.97
Disabled people 25 6 64 6 33.49
Energy and environment 16 14 34 2 14.45
Housing 10 8 21 3 7.87
Water 6 6 10 1 6.36
Other 313 96 818 25 438.78  
 
Table 5.4.11: PhVCs’ portfolio by sector – No outliers. 
Mean Median Max Min SD
Education 8 4 42 1 10.81
Health 4 2 22 1 5.29
Water 4 3 10 1 3.71
Disabled people 3 1 20 1 5.62
Employment 3 2 10 1 2.42
Energy and environment 2 1 5 1 1.16
Housing 2 1 6 1 1.73
Other 5 3 24 1 5.68  
 
The last analysis conducted on the number of SEs by sector held by non-outlier PhVCs 
was to identify any differences with respect to the variable Location of PhVCs and Organizational 
form of PhVCs. Results in Table 5.4.12 show that the null hypothesis of no differences is failed to 
be reject but in the case of the number of SEs operating in the “Disabled people” sector and the 
Location of the PhVCs: results suggest that an average of 0.85 and 0.2 SEs active in this sector are 
supported by European and US PhVCs respectively. 
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Table 5.4.12: Difference between the number of SEs in the PhVCs portfolio by 
sector and the location as well as the organizational form of the PhVCs - Mann-
Whitney U test. 
 Number of SEs in the PhVCs portfolio by sector 








105.00 121.50 112.00 76.50** 100.50 120.00 130.50 93.50 
Organizational 
form of PhVCs 
74.50 58.00 46.00 80.50 66.00 65.00 75.00 63.50 
** Significant at 5% level. 
 
Geographically, results show that SEs held by PhVCs are mainly in the PhVCs’ country 
(cfr. Figure 5.4.2), confirming the presence of home bias in the PhVC portfolio. This, in turn, 
suggests that like in VC, geographic proximity helps PhVCs in the due diligence and screening 
phase of their investments, facilitating information flow and monitoring, as well as cooperative 
behaviours between the PhVCs and the backed SE. Also, 20 percent of PhVCs do not have a 
specific geographic focus considered in their investment strategy.  













Categories do not sum up to 100 percent as respondents were allowed to choose multiple 
options (cfr. Question 11 in Appendix 4). 
 
Taking into account the previously identified outliers with respect to the number of 
PhVCs backed SEs by sector, it was investigated if outliers can be said to differ from non-
outliers in that they focus on backing SEs in a specific location. Since the categories making up 
the variable SEs’ location are dichotomous as well as the variable Outlier, the analysis employed 
the statistical procedure used in chapter 3.6.5. Accordingly, the Fisher exact test was computed 
and corroborated by the contingency coefficient. Table 5.4.13 indicates that the null hypothesis 
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of being an outlier influences the SEs’ location is failed to be rejected for all categories of SEs’ 
location but when PhVCs invest in SEs located in their own country or if they do not have a 
geographic focus. Findings suggest that non-outlier tend to invest more than expected in SEs’ in 
their country and vice versa for outliers (for non-outlier PhVCs 26 out of an expected count of 
24 invest in SEs’ in their own country, whereas for outlier PhVCs 1 out of an expected count of 
3), and that non-outliers appear to have a geographic focus more than outliers (for non-outlier 
PhVCs 5 out of an expected count of 7 do not have a geographic investment focus, whereas 3 
outliers out of an expected count of 1 do have it).    
Table 5.4.13: Relationship of SEs’ location with outlier PhVCs - Fisher exact test 










coefficient value  
Fisher exact 
test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 




















Africa - 0.136 1.000 0.403 













If then considering only non-outliers, a test for difference with respect to the variable 
Organizational form of SEs and projects backed by PhVCs and Location of PhVCs was conducted. 
Table 5.4.14 and Table 5.4.15 indicate that the null hypothesis of any relationship is failed to be 
rejected in both cases. 
Table 5.4.14: Relationship of SEs’ location with the organizational form of 
PhVCs - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 
 Organizational form of PhVCs 
 







coefficient value  
Fisher exact 
test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 




















Africa - 0.196 0.561 0.230 
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Table 5.4.15: Relationship of SEs’ location with the location of the PhVCs - 
Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 
 Location of PhVCs 
 







coefficient value  
Fisher exact 
test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 




















Africa - 0.100 0.672 0.549 











Lastly, the PhVCs’ investment strategy was analyzed in terms of backed SEs’ stage of 
development, measured as early stage, expansion stage, and maturity stage. As a matter of fact, 
a test of difference with respect to the variable Outlier was run to understand if a separate and 
distinct analysis needed to be conducted. The null hypothesis of no differences is failed to be 
rejected. 
Table 5.4.16: Difference between the percentage of SEs by stage of development 
and PhVCs being outliers - Mann-Whitney U test. 
 Percentage of SEs by stage of development 
 Early-stage Expansion Maturity 
Outlier 40.500 41.000 28.500 
 
Analyzing thus the composition of the PhVCs’ portfolio by stage of development, 
findings suggest that 34.3 percent of respondents back a mix of early and expansion stage SEs, 
followed by 22.8 percent backing exclusively early stage companies, and 20 percent only 
expansion stage SEs. Summing up these three categories, 77.1 percent of PhVCs result to 
support those SEs for which barriers to growth are more pressing.  
Table 5.4.17: PhVCs portfolio by backed SEs’ lifecycle. 
SEs' lifecycle % of PhVCs
Early and expansion stage 34.3%
Only early stage 22.8%
Only expansion stage 20.0%
Early, expansion, and maturity stage 20.0%
Expansion and maturity stage 2.9%
Only maturity stage 0.0%  
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No significant differences are found with respect to the percentage of PhVCs backed SEs 
and the variable Organizational form of PhVCs; differences are instead significant at 10 percent 
level with respect to early-stage and expansion and Location of PhVCs (cfr. Table 5.4.18). 
Table 5.4.18: Difference between the percentage of SEs by stage of development 
and the PhVCs’ organizational form as well as its location - Mann-Whitney U 
test. 
 Percentage of SEs by stage of development 
 Early-stage Expansion Maturity 
Organizational form of PhVCs 86.000 78.000 64.000 
Location of PhVCs 80.500* 84.500* 118.500 
* Significant at 10% level. 
A boxplot analysis of the differences reveals that European PhVCs tend to invest less in 
early stage SEs and more in expansion stage SEs that their American counterparts. Results are 
presented in Figure 5.4.3 and Figure 5.4.4 respectively. 
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Figure 5.4.4:  Boxplot analysis - Percentage of expansion stage SEs and location 
of the PhVCs. 
 
  
5.5. RESULTS: INVESTING 
5.5.1. Deal Origination 
Following the discussion presented in chapter 2.3.1 and the results obtained in chapter 
4.3, five passive and seven proactive criteria of deal origination were identified, collated, and 
assembled in Table 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.2.  
Passive methods were classified in three groups based on their source (cfr. Table 5.5.1). 
The first group deals with the entrepreneur as source of proposal, which becomes the social 
entrepreneur in case of PhVC. Within this group of passive methods, criteria A and B were 
identified through the pilot interviews and confirmed by content analysis results. Nor Tyebjee 
and Bruno (1984) or Sweeting (1991) mention these specific methods in the case of VC.  
With respect to proactive methods, group 1 presented in Table 5.5.2 – referrals – was 
identified based on the VC literature. Within this group, method A derives out from pilot 
interviews. As in the case of passive methods, the remaining groups were identified from the in-
depth pilot interviews conducted with PhVCs. In particular, group 2 includes the creation of a 
SE by the PhVC fund; group 3 includes other methods, than those previously mentioned, of 
proactive search.  
Findings presented in Table 5.5.1 indicate that in 52.5 percent of the cases PhVCs 
passively receive proposals mainly via mail from the social entrepreneur. If considering also the 
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method of applying via the PhVCs’ web page, passive deal origination having the social 
entrepreneur as source is used by an average of 45 percent of PhVCs: internet and post mail are 
used by 52.5 percent and 37.5 percent of PhVCs respectively.  
The second group of passive methods deals with proposals received through referrals 
arising from the PhVCs’ business network of contacts, including personal acquaintance, 
consultants, and/or prior/existing investees, as Sweeting (1991) shows for VC. Referrals are 
used by 42.5 percent of PhVCs. The same pattern with respect to the source of the deal was 
found through content analyzing PhVCs interviews in chapter 4.3. 
As third group, 12.5 percent of PhVCs declared to use other passive methods for deal 
origination than those proposed in the questionnaire, more specifically conferences. Given the 
low use of this method, the results confirm that PhVCs mainly adopt the previously mentioned 
methods and sources. These PhVCs declared to use conferences to passively originate potential 
deals: this method is not found in Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) or Sweeting (1991). Interestingly 
enough, 25 percent of PhVCs declared a deal flow policy of not accepting unsolicited proposals: 
this indicates that these PhVCs only adopt proactive methods in their origination phase. 
Table 5.5.1: PhVCs use of passive deal origination. 
Source Variable Use
Specific section on the PhVCs web page 52.5%
Mail 37.5%




The sum of the categories does not amount to 100 percent as respondents were allowed to choose 
multiple options (cfr. Question 19 in Appendix 4). 
 
As such, deal origination through referrals results to be the most used source, confirming 
that the quality of the source is considered by PhVCs as a good proxy for the quality of the deal, 
as in VC. However, as discussed on chapter 2.3.1, being passive deal origination more prone to 
adverse selection, proactive deal origination practices are used by VCs. The same holds for 
PhVCs that proactively tend to use a referral network approach in their search for new SEs to 
support (cfr. Table 5.5.2).  
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Referrals 90.6% 4.53 4.75 1.65
Network of philanthropic investors 95.0% 4.95 5.00 1.62
Organizations in the existing portfolio 92.5% 4.60 5.00 1.69
Network of VCs 80.0% 3.25 3.00 1.84
Proactive contact of other referral 
partners 95.0% 5.30 6.00 1.45
Creation of a SE 46.3% 2.44 1.50 1.80
Incubation 50.0% 2.58 2.00 1.74
Direct creation of a SE if a suitable 
candidate is not found 42.5% 2.30 1.00 1.86
Other 27.5% 2.07 1.00 1.87  
The sum of the categories in column Use does not amount to 100 percent as respondents were allowed to choose 
multiple options (cfr. Question 19 in Appendix 4); 1-7 scale, 1 = “Never used”, 4 = “Sometimes used”, 7 = “Always used”.  
 
On average, the deal origination source Referrals is used by more than 90 percent of 
PhVCs, with 95 percent of them proactively seeking out new deals either by contacting their 
network of philanthropic investors or through other referral partners than those explicitly 
proposed as response categories. On average, 50 percent of PhVCs incubate SEs to test their 
suitability in the fund’s social strategy and 42.5 percent declare to create an ad-hoc SE in the 
event of no suitable SE being found, averaging to more than 46 percent those PhVCs that use 
deal origination though Creation of SE. PhVCs also mentioned the use of other proactive search 
methods to those explicitly proposed in the survey, such us own research, conferences, network 
of public agencies, and one PhVCs seeks out new investment proposals through consultants. 
However, results show that these methods are only marginally used by PhVCs. 
Differently than passively originated deals, which are originated by external sources than 
the PhVCs who receives the investment proposal, in the case of proactive methods PhVCs were 
asked to rank the frequency of use of each of those proposed as response categories using a 1-7 
scale, with 1 indicating “Never used” and 7 indicating “Always used”, with the middle category 4 
indicating “Sometimes used”. Results are presented in the third, fourth, and fifth column of Table 
5.5.2. Accordingly, the channel most often used by PhVCs while seeking for new deals is 
referrals through proactive contact of third parties (other than those previously listed in the 
table) which receives an average score of 5.3 points and a median of 6, with the lowest standard 
deviation (SD) among the proposed options. This finding confirms and strengthens the result 
presented in the second column of the table. Within the source Referrals, another important 
source of deal origination is the PhVCs network of philanthropic supporters, which receives an 
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average rating close to 5 and referrals from SEs that have already been backed by PhVCs which 
receive an average rating of 4.6; both criteria present one of the lowest SD. Only sometimes 
PhVCs originate deals by contacting their network of VCs, but it is characterized by the highest 
SD among the criteria having Referrals as source.  
Proactive search through incubation, which was identified through content analysis, 
despite being used by an average of 50 percent of PhVCs, it is barely used in terms of frequency: 
both E and F receive a rating above 2 and are characterized by a high level of SD. This might be 
a signal that PhVCs actually consider the option of having entrepreneurs in residence programs 
but the current situation only allows them to use them in a very few cases. Understanding the 
conditions under which these kinds of programs are implemented could be an avenue for future 
research. In the source Other, proactive search is done by research on the PhVCs’ management 
team side and by attending business conferences. 
Comparing findings in Table 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.2, PhVCs adopt proactive deal 
origination more frequently than passive (92.5 percent and 45 percent of use for referrals 
respectively), suggesting they do face a high level of information asymmetries and due to 
bounded rationality an active contact of referral partners, being these philanthropic investors, 
backed organizations, or other entities, helps them in better managing and minimizing adverse 
selection risks. In such a way financial resources are assumed to be channelled to high quality 
SEs with the potential for the maximum social impact. Survey results, thus, corroborate findings 
obtained through content analysis.  
As a result, integrating PhVC findings with those presented in Table 2.3.1 and Table 2.3.2 
for VC, the following tables can be created with respect to the source of the deal to identify if 
VCs and PhVCs adopt the same strategies to minimize adverse selection problems. Based on 
results, although proactive deal origination is more used than passive, the ranking in the source 
of PhVC deals does not differ from that characterizing traditional VC (cfr. Table 5.5.3 for passive 
deal origination and Table 5.5.4 for proactive in PhVCs). 
Table 5.5.3: Passive deal origination – VC and PhVC comparison. 








Entrepreneur 1 1 1 
Referrals 2 2 2 
Other - - 3 
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Table 5.5.4: Proactive deal origination – VC and PhVC comparison. 
 VC Ranking PhVC Ranking 
Source Tyebjee and Bruno (1984)  
Referrals 1 1 
Creation of a SE - 2 
Other - 3 
 
Next, any differences between the frequency of use of each proactive origination variable 
and the profile of respondents were investigated: the Kruskal-Wallis test presented in Table 
5.5.5 indicates no differences. 
Table 5.5.5: Difference between the frequency of use of proactive deal 
origination and the profile of respondents - Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Source Variable Profile of 
respondents 
Referrals Network of philanthropic investors 0.271 
 Organizations in the existing portfolio 0.978 
 Network of VCs 1.514 




Incubation 3.776 Creation of a 
SE Direct creation of a SE if a suitable 
candidate is not found 
 
1.398 
Other  1.719 
 
If performing a bivariate analysis in terms of use of deal origination methods and control 
variables such as the legal form of the PhVC with respect to Organizational form of PhVCs and 
Location of PhVCs, a chi-square test was performed as done in chapter 3.6.3: both Fisher and 
contingency coefficient indicate that the null hypothesis of no relationship is failed to be 
rejected, suggesting that both American and European PhVCs employ the same sources.  
The null hypothesis of no difference between the frequency of use of proactive deal 
origination and the Organizational form of PhVCs is failed to be rejected. Findings are presented in 
Table 5.5.7. 
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 Table 5.5.6: Relationship of passive and proactive use of deal origination 
sources with the organizational form of PhVCs - Fisher exact test and 
contingency coefficient. 
  Organizational form of PhVCs 
 




















Specific section on the 









 Mail - 0.235 0.210 0.126 
Referrals Business network - 0.129 0.677 0.412 
Other Conferences - 0.171 0.565 0.271 
Proactive deal origination     








 Organizations in the existing 
portfolio 
- 0.130 1.000 0.407 
 Network of VCs - 0.098 0.611 0.533 








Incubation Incubation - 0.066 1.000 0.677 
 Direct creation of a SE if a 














Other  - 0.011 1.000 0.944 
Table 5.5.7: Difference between the frequency of use of proactive deal 
origination criteria and the organizational form of PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U 
test. 
Proactive deal origination 
Source Variable 
Organizational form of 
PhVCs 
Referrals Network of philanthropic supporters 70.000 
 Organizations in the existing portfolio 112.000 
 Network of VCs 101.000 
 Proactive contact of other referral partners 105.000 
Incubation Incubation 103.500 




Other  92.000 
Next, an analysis of difference is run to understand whether PhVCs differ in their 
origination process according to their location. The analytical process is similar to that adopted 
for what concerns the variable Organizational form of PhVCs. While the hypothesis of no 
differences is failed to be rejected for the use of all passive and proactive deal origination 
variables (cfr. Table 5.5.8) and the frequency of use of proactive ones (cfr. Table 5.5.9), a 
significant difference is found for what concerns the location of the PhVCs and the frequency of 
use of the PhVCs’ network of philanthropic supporters (5 percent significant level) as well as 
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organizations in the PhVCs’ portfolio (10 percent significance level) (cfr. Table 5.5.9).   
Table 5.5.8: Relationship of passive and proactive use of deal origination 
sources with the location of PhVCs - Fisher exact test and contingency 
coefficient. 
  Location of PhVCs 
 




















Specific section on the 









 Mail - 0.122 0.526 0.436 
Referrals Business network - 0.066 0.755 0.676 
Other Conferences - 0.187 0.355 0.230 
Proactive deal origination     
















 Network of VCs - 0.050 1.000 0.751 
 Proactive contact of other 
referral partners 
- 0.023 1.000 0.884 
Incubation Incubation - 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 Direct creation of a SE if a 














Other  - 0.106 0.723 0.499 
Table 5.5.9: Difference between the frequency of use of proactive deal 
origination criteria and the location of PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test. 
Proactive deal origination 
Source Variable 
Location of PhVCs 
Referrals Network of philanthropic supporters 107.000** 
 Organizations in the existing portfolio 127.000* 
 Network of VCs 187.500 
 Proactive contact of other referral partners 198.000 
Incubation Incubation 191.500 
 Direct creation of a SE if a suitable candidate is not found 177.000 
Other  157.000 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level. 
On the one hand, referrals from the PhVCs’ network of philanthropic supporters results 
to be widely used in the US: a comparison of the frequency of use of this variable reveals that 
the significant difference can be found in the high-end of the rating scale: US PhVCs tend to use 
more than expected this variable, with overall 13 funds (out of 18) attributing a rating of 6 and 7 
vs. a total expected count of 8. On the other hand, a boxplot analysis presented in Figure 5.5.1 of 
the frequency of use of referrals from organizations in the PhVCs’ portfolio indicates that US 
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PhVCs tend to use it more than European ones. 
Figure 5.5.1: Boxplot analysis – Frequency of use of origination through 
organizations in the PhVCs’ portfolio and location of the PhVCs. 
 
Last, any difference in use of passive and proactive variables of deal origination sources 
as well as frequency of use of proactive ones was analyzed with respect to PhVCs clusters 
identified in chapter 1.3 using the Kruskal-Wallis test. Table 5.5.10 presents results in terms of 
use of origination variables, whereas Table 5.5.11 shows findings on the frequency of use of 
proactive ones. Both tables indicate that the null hypothesis of no difference is failed to be 
rejected except for the other variable in the use of proactive deal origination and the frequency 
of use of referrals from PhVCs’ network of VCs. 
Table 5.5.10: Difference between passive and proactive use of deal origination 
sources and PhVCs clusters - Kruskal-Wallist test. 
Passive deal origination 
Source Variable 
PhVCs clusters 
Social entrepreneur Specific section on the PhVCs web page 1.006 
 Mail 0.425 
Referrals Business network 0.390 
Other Conferences 4.599 
Proactive deal origination  
Referrals Network of philanthropic supporters 1.254 
 Organizations in the existing portfolio 0.926 
 Network of VCs 5.734 
 Proactive contact of other referral partners 2.053 
Incubation Incubation 3.528 
 Direct creation of a SE if a suitable candidate is not found 3.221 
Other  9.747** 
** Significant at 5% level. 
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Table 5.5.11: Difference between the frequency of use of proactive deal 
origination and PhVCs clusters - Kruskal-Wallist test. 
Proactive deal origination 
Source Variable 
PhVCs clusters 
Referrals Network of philanthropic supporters 2.607 
 Organizations in the existing portfolio 0.001 
 Network of VCs 9.578** 
 Proactive contact of other referral partners 2.008 
Incubation Incubation 3.948 
 Direct creation of a SE if a suitable candidate is not found 4.757 
Other  5.897 
** Significant at 5% level. 
 
Both the frequency of use of other variable of proactive deal origination and of referrals 
from VCs result to be more used by social VCs as reported in Table 5.5.12. This is compatible 
with the definition of social VC provided in chapter 1.3, based on which investors falling into 
this category invest in for-profit SEs seeking double- or triple-bottom line returns. As such, 
traditional VCs might pass onto social VCs those investment prospects they receive from for-
profit organizations that are looking for funds and that, because of the social component that is 
intrinsic in their activity, might not be able to offer traditional VCs an adequate economic rate of 
return on the investment.  
Table 5.5.12: Proactive deal origination - Frequency of use of referrals from 
network of VCs and PhVCs clusters. 
  PhVCs clusters 






  Count Count Count 
Never 0 8 1 Referrals from 
Network of VCs 2.00 0 5 3 
 3.00 2 3 1 
 Sometimes 2 1 3 
 5.00 4 1 0 
 6.00 1 1 2 
 Always 0 1 1 
 
 
5.5.2. Deal Screening and Evaluation 
Moving now to the second phase of the investment process as described in chapter 2.3.2, 
Proposition 2 expected a positive relationship between the risk for adverse selection and the 
importance attributed to the Human capital dimension in the screening and evaluation phases of 
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the PhVC investment process. Before moving on to the analysis of selection dimensions and 
variables considered by PhVCs, it was asked PhVCs which is the important document that they 
require applicants to send them. Findings show that the business plan receives an average 
importance rating of 6 (SD = 1.39), the financial plan of 5.73 (SD = 1.42), and audited accounts of 
5 (SD = 2.02). 
Results from Table 5.5.13 indicate that the PhVCs selection process result to be indeed 
focused on the Human capital dimension, and more particularly, on the experience of the social 
entrepreneur and of the management team. The Human capital dimension receives the highest 
importance among those proposed in the survey, with an average rating of 6.82 (median of 7), 
the lowest SD (0.55), and 90 percent of PhVCs considering it as a very important variable for 
screening.  
Table 5.5.13: Selection variables – PhVCs’ rating. 








Human capital  90% 6.82 7.00 0.55 
 Social entrepreneur 90.0% 6.82 7.00 0.55 
Activity of the 
organization 
 27.5% 5.00 5.25 1.44 
 Business strategy 40.0% 6.17 6.00 0.81 
 Credible and sustainable revenue 














 The SE is achieving clear outcomes 









 Technology - 3.18 4.00 1.74 
External 
environment 
 26.25% 5.31 5.50% 1.43 
 Social market served 42.5% 5.85 6.00 1.29 
 Market size 10.0% 4.78 5.00 1.56 
Assessment of 
the deal 
 21.45% 4.47 5.00 1.97 
 Fit in the portfolio 35.0% 5.23 6.00 2.02 
 Deal terms 7.9% 3.71 4.00 1.92 
Potential  40.83% 5.94 6.33 1.14 
 Financial sustainability 27.5% 5.80 6.00 1.07 
 Social impact 55.0% 6.33 7.00 0.89 
 Scale 40.0% 5.70 6.00 1.47 
Other  7.5% 3.17 4.00 2.34 
1-7 scale, 1 = “Never used”, 4 = “Sometimes used”, 7 = “Always used”.  
If ranking the dimensions which each variable represent, the pattern found is the 
following: 
1. Human Capital measured by the experience of the social entrepreneur and of the 
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management team and receiving an average rating of 6.82; 
2. Potential measured by the social impact the SE is estimated to be able to create, 
receiving an average importance of 5.94; 
3. External environment considering the type of social market the SE is targeting which is 
rated on average 5.31; 
4. Activity of the organization in terms of the business strategy pursued to achieve the 
SE’s social mission and, thus, maximize its social impact which receives an average 
importance of 5.00; 
5. Assessment of the deal measured by variables indicating the fit in the existing portfolio 
and the terms of the deal which receives an average rating of importance of 4.47. 
Results thus suggest that adverse selection issues are perceived as severe by PhVCs, as 
expected by Proposition 2. Survey results confirmed those obtained through content analysis in 
terms of importance of the Human capital dimension. However, the ranking comparison of Table 
5.5.13 with Table 4.3.2, the dimension Potential appears to be or greater importance than what 
found from content analysis. Furthermore, survey respondents appear to place more emphasis 
on external rather than internal characteristics of the SEs, with the dimension External 
environment ranking higher than Activity of the organization. 
Survey also indicates that the dimension Assessment of the deal, measured by the variables 
Fit in the portfolio, in the way discussed in chapter 5.4 and Deal terms are considered of lower 
importance and higher SD while selecting for new potential investments. This is also confirmed 
by the very low percentage of PhVCs rating them as very important (35 percent and 7.9 percent 
respectively). 
If comparing Table 5.5.13 with Table 2.3.3, findings suggest that PhVCs behave more as 
presented by MacMillan et al. (1985) rather than by Kaplan and Strömberg (2001): both PhVCs 
and VCs rate the dimension Human capital as the most important one. However, while VCs 
appear to strongly focus on the dimension External environment, PhVCs appear to attribute more 
importance to Potential. 
As a further step, any differences between the importance of selection variables was 
investigated with respect to Profile of respondents, Organizational form of PhVCs as well as the 
Location of PhVCs. Table 5.5.14 presents results with respect to the organizational form, whereas 
Table 5.5.15 in terms of location. Accordingly, among respondents Table 5.5.14 shows that the 
null hypothesis of no differences underlying the Kruskal-Wallis test is failed to be rejected but 
for the selection variable “Technology” which result to be significant at 10 percent level.  
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Table 5.5.14: Difference between rating of selection variables and profile of 
respondents - Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Dimension Variable Profile of 
respondents 
Human capital Social entrepreneur 1.583 
Business strategy 4.769 Activity of the 
organization Credible and sustainable revenue model and/or 
credible, sustainable funding model 
 
2.314 
 The SE is achieving clear outcomes with a significant 
number of people 
 
1.714 
 Technology 6.562* 
Social market served 3.074 External 
environment Market size 2.631 
Fit in the portfolio 1.732 Assessment of 
the deal Deal terms 3.529 
Potential Financial sustainability 4.587 
 Social impact 7.449 
 Scale 1.397 
Other  1.388 
* Significant at 10% level. 
 
The boxplot analysis of the identified differences presented in Figure 5.2.2 reveals that 
CEOs and investment directors rated the importance of the “Technology” variable lower than 
all other profiles. 
Figure 5.5.2: Boxplot analysis of technology and profile of respondents. 
 
Table 5.5.15 indicates a statistical significant difference at 10 percent level between the 
importance of the two selection variables “Social market served” and “Scale” and the location of 
PhVCs.  
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Table 5.5.15: Difference between the rating of selection variables, the 
organizational form of PhVCs and their location - Mann-Whitney U test. 
Dimension Variable Organizational 
form of PhVCs 
Location of PhVCs 
Human capital Social entrepreneur 101.500 154.000 
Business strategy 95.500 137.500 Activity of the 
organization Credible and sustainable 
revenue model and/or 








 The SE is achieving clear 
outcomes with a significant 





 Technology 90.500 138.500 
Social market served 86.500 134.000* External 
environment Market size 104.500 139.500 
Fit in the portfolio 102.500 171.000 Assessment of 
the deal Deal terms 91.000 112.000* 
Potential Financial sustainability 81.500 163.500 
 Social impact 112.500 151.000 
 Scale 111.000 136.000* 
Other  28.500 59.000 
* Significant at 10% level. 
A boxplot analysis of the differences, presented in Figure 5.5.3 and Figure 5.5.5, shows 
that both for “Social market served” and “Potential for scalability” European PhVCs tend to rate 
them lower than the American counterparts. On the contrary, “Deal terms” are way far 
important for European than US PhVCs (cfr. Figure 5.5.4).  
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Figure 5.5.4: Boxplot analysis rating of deal terms and location of PhVCs. 
 
Figure 5.5.5: Boxplot analysis rating of potential for scalability and location of 
PhVCs. 
 
Last, any differences in the importance of selection variables and PhVCs cluster was 
checked using the Kruskal-Wallis test: the null hypothesis of no difference is failed to be rejected 
for all the variables except in the case of Deal terms (cfr. Table 5.5.16).  
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Table 5.5.16: Difference between the rating of selection variables and PhVCs 
clusters - Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Dimension Variable PhVCs 
clusters 
Human capital Social entrepreneur  1.722 
Business strategy 3.468 Activity of the 
organization Credible and sustainable revenue model and/or credible, 
sustainable funding model 
2.825 
 The SE is achieving clear outcomes with a significant 
number of people 
3.292 
 Technology 0.005 
Social market served 3.516 External 
environment Market size 0.070 
Fit in the portfolio 4.026 Assessment of 
the deal Deal terms 11.238** 
Potential Financial sustainability 2.161 
 Social impact 2.569 
 Scale 2.253 
Other  4.939 
** Significant at 5% level. 
To further investigate the issue, a boxplot analysis was run and results are reported in 
Figure 5.5.6 which shows that pure highly-engaged philanthropists tend to rate it lower than 
social VCs and hybrid philanthropists. The rationale behind this finding must take into account 
the definition of the cluster pure highly-engaged philanthropist provided in chapter 1.3: 
investing in non-profits does not entail PhVCs in retaining an equity stake, which then 
decreases the importance of the variable deal terms, namely the price paid for becoming 
shareholder of a venture.  
Figure 5.5.6: Boxplot analysis of Rating of Deal terms and PhVCs cluster. 
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5.5.3. Deal Structuring 
Following the discussion presented in chapter 2.3.3, VCs structure their deals such that 
their own interest is protected against any harmful behaviour of the backed entrepreneur. As a 
result, Proposition 3 predicted that the higher the risk of moral hazard, the lower the use of 
grant financing by PhVCs. However, both on an aggregate level and by backed SEs’ stage of 
development, results reveal that grant financing is the most widely used financial instrument 
by PhVCs, supporting thus John (2007) and content analysis results in chapter 4.3.3. On an 
aggregate level, Table 5.5.17 indicates that 72.7 percent of PhVCs use grants to back SEs, 
suggesting a low perception of moral hazard given that grants do not need to be repaid and do 
not entail grant providers in retaining any shareholding. Also, this finding with the use of 
equity financing by 34.3 percent of PhVCs confirm John (2007). Only marginally various 
typologies of debt financing are used, supporting Wedig et al. (1988) argument of a low use of 
debt in the social sector due to the related high risk of bankruptcy.  
Table 5.5.17: Percentage of PhVCs by use of financial instrument.  





Subordinated loan 8.6% 
Senior debt 8.3% 
Unsecured loan below market rate 8.3% 
Unsecured loan at market rate 8.1% 
The sum of the categories in column % of use does not amount to 100 
percent as respondents were allowed to choose multiple options (cfr. 
Question 13, 15, and 17 in Appendix 4). 
Table 5.5.18 presents the use of the different typologies of financial instruments by stage 
of development of PhVC backed SEs confirming the prominence of grants vs. all the remaining 
instruments.   
Table 5.5.18: Percentage of PhVCs by use of financial instrument and SE’s stage 
of development. 
 SEs’ stage of development 
Financial instrument Early stage Expansion stage Maturity stage 
Grant 77.4% 64.5% 62.5% 
Equity 32.3% 38.7% 31.3% 
Quasi-equity 25.8% 25.8% 31.3% 
Subordinated loan 16.1% 16.1% 6.3% 
Underwriting 12.9% 12.9% 12.5% 
Unsecured loan below market rate 9.7% 12.9% 12.5% 
Senior debt 6.5% 9.7% 12.5% 
Unsecured loan at market rate 6.5% 6.5% 6.3% 
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However, if investigating whether differences in the use of financial instruments exist 
with respect to PhVCs clusters, significant differences are found concerning grant, equity, quasi-
equity, senior debt, and unsecured loan at market rate, as results in Table 5.5.19 show.  
Table 5.5.19: Relationship of the use of financial instrument with PhVCs 
clusters - Contingency coefficient. 
 
** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. 
A cross-tab analysis considering PhVCs clusters and the use of those financial instruments 
for which differences were found reveals that social VCs tend not to use grants (cfr. Table 
5.5.20). This is compatible with their double or triple bottom line outcome as grants do not entail 
donors to receive any payoff from investments. Following this result, equity and quasi-equity 
are thus used more than expected by social VC and by hybrid philanthropists, whereas senior 
debt and unsecured loan at market rate results to be more used by hybrid philanthropists. 
Table 5.5.20: Financial instrument and PhVCs clusters - Cross tab analysis. 
   PhVCs clusters 
Financial 
instrument 






Grant Used Count - 15.0 9.0 
  Expected count 5.1 11.6 7.3 
Equity Used Count 4.0 2.0 6.0 
  Expected count 2.1 6.2 3.8 
Quasi-equity Used Count 4.0 1.0 5.0 
  Expected count 1.9 5.0 3.1 
Senior debt Used Count - - 3.0 
  Expected count 0.7 1.5 0.8 
Used Count - - 3.0 Unsecured loan 
at market rate  Expected count 0.6 1.5 0.9 
 
Proposition 4 expected a positive relationship between the use of formal valuation 
methods and moral hazard risk. In VC, the typical valuation process consists of three sequential 
steps. First, information is gathered on the venture, its management team, and its future 
prospects. Second, this information is used to appraise the risk of the venture and hence the 
 PhVCs clusters 




Subordinated loan 0.141 
Underwriting 0.203 
Unsecured loan below market rate 0.150 
Senior debt 0.437** 
Unsecured loan at market rate 0.415** 
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required return on the investment, and to estimate the (future) cash flows and profit potential. 
Finally, one or more valuation method is used, which combines the elements of risk, return, and 
profits or cash flows in order to compute the value of the company. 
Table 5.5.21 shows that the majority of PhVCs do not perform any valuation of the SEs 
they select, suggesting that no moral hazard issues are expected. Of those using valuation 
methods such as multiples (more than 25 percent) or the discounted free cash flow (DCF) 
method (more than 19 percent), 16 percent use both as a way to better estimate and confirm the 
fair value of the organization. Furthermore, the frequency of use of these two valuation models 
as well as their combined use show that PhVCs follow the behaviour of traditional VCs, as 
shown by Manigart et al. (1997). Into the Other response category, PhVCs listed valuation 
methods based on the estimation of the potential social impact or on legal issues. Digging more 
into this finding is an interesting area for future research. 
Table 5.5.21: Percentage of PhVCs by use of valuation methods. 
Valuation method % of use 
No valuation 61.3% 
Multiples 25.8% 
DCF valuation 19.4% 
Multiples and DCF valuation 16.0% 
Other 12.9% 
 
Table 5.5.22 shows a significant negative correlation between the use of no formal 
valuation models and equity as financial instrument whereas Table 5.5.23 indicates that the use 
of no formal valuation model is associated with a lower importance of the business plan as well 
as of the estimation of the funds needed by the SE.  
Table 5.5.22: Association between the financial instrument and no use of 
valuation methods - Correlation coefficient. 




Subordinated loan -0.224 
Underwriting 0.120 
Unsecured loan below market rate 0.032 













Unsecured loan at market rate -0.055 
*** Correlation is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.5.23: Association between the importance of the information required 
by the PhVCs and no use of valuation methods.  
  No valuation 
Business plan -0.385** 
Estimation of funds -0.434** 














Financial plan -0.314 
** Correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2.3.3, since no formal valuation models are used, PhVCs are 
expected to fund specific SEs’ needs. Table 5.5.24 shows the frequency of funding specific SEs’ 
needs based on a 1-7 scale, where 1 indicates Never, 4 Sometimes, and 7 Always. Findings indicate 
that the most often financed need, with a median rating of 6, consists of increasing the SE’s 
management capacity. The concept of capacity building in SEs is similar to the concept of 
organizational development, organizational effectiveness and/or organizational performance 
management and capacity building efforts can include a broad range of approaches, e.g., 
granting operating funds, granting management development funds, providing training and 
development sessions, providing coaching, supporting collaboration with other non-profits.  
Table 5.5.24: Frequency of backed need.  
Need backed Mean Median SD 
Increase management capacity 5.18 6 1.85 
Working capital 4.34 4 1.82 
Outsourced project support 4.03 4 1.67 
Capex 3.97 4 1.96 
Cash 3.37 4 1.96 
Other 1.00 1 0.00 
1-7 scale, 1 = “Never used”, 4 = “Sometimes used”, 7 = “Always used”.  
Table 5.5.25 presents correlations between the frequency of use of the above mentioned 
needs and the stage of development of the SEs backed by PhVCs. The analysis was run based on 
the hypothesis that there could be a relationship between a specific need and the stage of 
development of the organization. However, findings suggest that no significant association 
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Table 5.5.25: Association between the frequency of backed need and backed 
SE’s stage of development - Correlation coefficient. 
  Early-stage Expansion-stage Maturity-stage 
Increase management capacity 0.155 -0.091 -0.169 
Working capital 0.133 -0.020 -0.261 
Outsourced project support 0.348 -0.298 -0.153 
Capex 0.283 -0.139 -0.305 







Other - - - 
 
Next, any relationship between the frequency of use of each need and the use of 
valuation methods was investigated to understand whether the funding of a specific need is 
associated with the use of a valuation model. Table 5.5.26 indicates a positive significant 
correlation between the frequency of financing working capital needs and valuation based on 
multiples (ρ = 0.44, p<0.05) or DCF (ρ = 0.49, p<0.01). Furthermore, whereas a positive 
correlation is found between the frequency of financing CAPEX needs and valuation through 
the DCF model (ρ = 0.46, p<0.05), a negative correlation exists between the frequency of funding 
outsourced project support and other methods of valuation (ρ = 0.38, p<0.05). 
Table 5.5.26: Association between the frequency of backed need with the used 
valuation method - Correlation coefficient. 
 Valuation method 
Need backed No valuation Multiples DCF 
valuation 
Other 
Increase management capacity -0.154 0.034 0.081 0.179 
Working capital -0.332 0.439*** 0.496** -0.091 
Outsourced project support 0.287 -0.045 -0.221 -0.381*** 
Capex -0.186 0.382 0.459*** -0.227 
Cash -0.004 0.089 0.157 -0.105 
Other - - - - 
** Correlation is significant at the 5% level; *** Correlation is significant at the 1% level. 
 
The last part of the analysis investigated any differences among the use of a particular 
type of financial instrument or the frequency of funding an organizational need and the legal 
structure of the PhVCs fund in terms of Organizational form of PhVCs and its location, namely 
Location of PhVCs. Results, presented through Table 5.5.27 to Table 5.5.30 show no differences 
either with respect to Organizational form of PhVCs or to Location of PhVCs. The only difference, 
which is significant at 10 percent level, concerns the Location of PhVCs and the use of multiples 
as valuation method (cfr. Table 5.5.30): a cross-tab analysis indicates that European PhVCs use 
multiples more than expected (7 out of an expected count of 4.9). 
 
 121  
 
Table 5.5.27: Difference between the financial instrument and the 
organizational form of PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test. 





Subordinated loan 87.500 
Underwriting 100.500 
Unsecured loan below market rate 94.000 













Unsecured loan at market rate 94.500 
Table 5.5.28: Relationship of the use of valuation methods with the 
organizational form of PhVCs - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 








coefficient value  




coefficient approx. sig. 
No valuation - 0.166 0.624 0.348 
Multiples - 0.058 1.000 0.746 
DCF valuation - 0.007 1.000 0.968 
Other - 0.166 1.000 0.347 
Table 5.5.29: Difference between the financial instrument and the location of 
PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test. 




Subordinated loan 143.500 
Underwriting 135.000 
Unsecured loan below market rate 133.000 













Unsecured loan at market rate 142.500 
Table 5.5.30: Relationship of the use of valuation methods and the location of 
PhVCs - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 










coefficient value  
Fisher exact 
test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 
No valuation - 0.717 0.087 0.625 
Multiples - 0.302 0.108 0.077 
DCF valuation - 0.216 0.363 0.217 
Other - 0.272 0.276 0.110 
Moving now to Proposition 5 and Proposition 6, a positive relationship between the use 
of entrepreneurs’ binding provisions as well as renegotiation, liquidation, and transfer clauses 
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and moral hazard risk was expected. Findings on PhVCs show that 11.4 percent of respondents 
declared to include vesting provisions in their deals. Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.5.31, 
vesting provisions significantly correlate with PhVCs financing SEs through equity (ρ = 0.39, 
p<0.05). Renegotiation as well as liquidation clauses are marginally used (all provisions are 
used by less than 20 percent of PhVCs). As a confirmation of this, a vast majority of respondents 
declared not to consider transfer clauses at all in their deals, signalling again the perception of 
low risk for moral hazard behaviour on the side of the social entrepreneur as well as a different 
behaviour than that characterizing VC deals. 
Table 5.5.31: Percentage of PhVCs using Entrepreneur’ binding provisions and 
Renegotiation and liquidation clauses.  
Contractual provisions % of use 
Anti-dilution 20.0% 




Pre-emption rights 10.0% 
No transfer rights 46.7% 
The sum of the categories in column % of use does not amount to 100 percent as respondents 
were allowed to choose multiple options (cfr. Question 30 in Appendix 4). 
Interestingly, significant positive correlation is found with respect to all the above 
mentioned contractual provisions and the use of equity as financing instrument, indicating that 
moral hazard risk is perceived higher in the case of an equity-financing . However, a significant 
positive correlation is also found with respect to the use of liquidation preferences and anti-
dilution provisions and the use of subordinated loan as financing instrument.  
Table 5.5.32: Entrepreneur’ binding provisions, renegotiation and liquidation 
clauses, financial instrument – Correlation coefficient. 












Tag-along No transfer 
rights 
Grant -0.194 -0.248 -0.365 -0.044 -0.457*** -0.457*** 0.292 
Equity 0.385*** 0.488** 0.764** 0.595** 0.462*** 0.595** -0.260 
Quasi-equity 0.178 0.106 0.406* 0.088 0.019 0.088 0.000 
Subord. loan 0.196 0.447*** 0.667** -0.104 0.277 0.348 0.289 

















































** Correlation is significant at the 5% level; *** Correlation is significant at the 1% level. 
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Since with subordinated loan debt providers (the PhVCs) have subordinate status in 
relationship to the normal debt, in the case of a liquidation event like bankruptcy, the PhVCs 
would be paid just before stockholders, assuming there are assets to distribute after all other 
liabilities and debts have been paid. To control for this, liquidation preferences can be set up 
such that investors have a “first right” to any cash available to shareholders in a liquidity event.  
For what concerns the positive correlation of anti-dilution provisions with subordinated 
debt, these two variables show a high significant correlation with both equity and quasi-equity 
(cfr. Table 5.5.33). As a result, this may cause the correlation between anti-dilution provisions 
and subordinated debt. The spurious correlation can be explained with the fact that, being 
subordinated debt is junior debts and entails debt-holders to be paid only after all senior debt 
has been repaid, this makes it similar to equity. Hence, the high correlation with it.  
The significant negative correlation between grant as financing instrument and drag-
along (ρ = -0.46, p<0.05) as well as tag-along provisions (ρ = -0.46, p<0.05) is not surprising, 
given that by nature grants do not entail donors to be shareholder’s of the grantee organization. 
Furthermore, the same value of the correlation coefficient results to be due to the positive 
correlation between drag-along and tag-along provisions (ρ = 0.88, p<0.01). 
Additionally, two other significant positive correlations are identified: the association of 
underwriting as financing instrument and the use of no transfer rights (ρ = 0.43, p<0.05) as well 
as that concerning unsecured loan at market rate and pre-emption rights (ρ = 0.8, p<0.01). 
Last, differences in the use of contractual provisions and PhVCs clusters, the location of 
the PhVCs as well as their legal form in terms of the variable Location of PhVCs and 
Organizational form of PhVCs were investigated. Results in Table 5.5.34 and Table 5.5.35 indicate 
that the null hypothesis of no differences is failed to be rejected except for location and drag-
along (cfr. Table 5.5.35) which results to be significant at 10 percent level. A cross-tab analysis of 
this difference shows that it is more used by European PhVCs with a count of 5 out of an 



















at market rate 
Anti-dilution  
  
1.000         
Grant -0365 1.000        
Equity 0.764*** -0.298 1.000       
Quasi-equity 0.406** -0.545*** 0.343** 1.000      
Subordinated 
loan 
0.667*** -0.309 0.424** 0.484*** 1.000     




0.084 -0.043 -0.006 0.258 0.271 0.853*** 1.000   




0.348 0.194 0.209 0.262 -0.094 -0.103 -0.091 -0.091 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 5% level; *** Correlation is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.5.34: Relationship between contractual provisions and organizational 
form of PhVCs - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 











test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 





0.203 0.561 0.221 
Anti-dilution - 0.222 0.311 0.178 
Pre-emption 
rights 
- 0.164 1.000 0.361 
Drag-along - 0.218 0.553 0.221 
Tag-along - 0.192 0.557 0.283 
No transfer rights - 0.197 0.378 0.272 
Table 5.5.35: Relationship of contractual provisions with location of PhVCs - 
Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 











test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
coefficient approx. sig. 





0.062 1.000 0.714 
Anti-dilution - 0.254 0.203 0.121 
Pre-emption 
rights 
- 0.246 0.279 0.165 
Drag-along - 0.322 0.129 0.062 
Tag-along - 0.286 0.268 0.102 
No transfer rights - 0.466 0.155 0.389 
 
Proposition 13 formulated based on content analysis results was investigated asking 
PhVCs the level of importance of trust vs. formal control rights rating it using a 1-7 Likert scale 
with 1 indicating “Never used”, 4 “Sometimes used”, and 7 “Always used”. Results indicate that 
43.2 percent rate trust much more important than formal control rights (rating = 7), with a mean 
score of 5.81 (median = 6) and a minimum of 4 (indicating that trust is as important as formal 
control rights) attributed by 22 percent of PhVCs. Thus, support is found. However, if analyzing 
the relationship between the level of trust and the typology of financial instrument used to back 
SEs, results indicate a maximum negative coefficient in the case of the use of equity (cfr. Table 
5.5.36) which is also significant at 10 percent level. Also, negative coefficients are obtained in the 
case debt financing (in its various forms) is used. As such, results suggest that trust is indeed 
much more important than formal control rights, however its importance decreases when 
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traditional marketable instruments are used.  
Table 5.5.36: Association between the importance of trust vs. formal control 
rights and the use of financing instrument - Correlation coefficient. 




Subordinated loan -0.089 
Underwriting 0.238 
Unsecured loan below market rate 0.159 













Unsecured loan at market rate -0.164 
* Significant at 10% level. 
 
5.5.4. Post-Investment Activities 
5.5.4.a. Monitoring 
Proposition 7 expects a positive relationship between the stewardship services offered by 
PhVCs to backed SEs and the importance of informal monitoring as opposed to formal 
monitoring. Formal monitoring was measured using the three variables identified through 
content analysis: board seat, stage financing, and formal reports; informal monitoring was 
measured using informal meetings with the social entrepreneur and the management team. 
Findings show that, differently from results obtained by content analyzing the sample of 
interviewees PhVCs, formal control rights are retained by 38.5 percent of PhVCs, whereas 
informal rights by 41 percent. Among formal rights, 42.1 percent of PhVCs use board seat as 
monitoring device and 37 percent retain the right to establish the SE’s board composition. 
PhVCs did not mention other monitoring criteria than those proposed in the survey. 
Table 5.5.37 presents the level of importance attributed by PhVCs to each monitoring 
variable. Amongst those proposed, results confirm precedent results: the variable informal 
meetings is also that characterized by the highest importance (Mean = 6.67; Median = 7) and the 
lowest SD (0.89) followed by formal monitoring through participation to formal board meetings 
(Mean = 6.16; Median = 7; SD = 1.08). Results are further on confirmed by 65.8 percent and 52.6 
percent of PhVCs rating these two monitoring criteria as Very important. Stage financing is not 
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Board seat 52.6% 6.16 7.00 1.08 4.00 7.00 Formal 
monitoring Reports 47.4% 6.03 6.00 1.19 2.00 7.00 
 Stage financing 27.8% 5.03 5.50 1.89 1.00 7.00 
Informal 
monitoring 
Informal meetings 65.8% 6.47 7.00 0.89 4.00 7.00 
1-7 scale, 1 = “Never used”, 4 = “Sometimes used”, 7 = “Always used”.  
No significant differences were found with respect to the rating attributed to each 
monitoring criterion and Profile or respondents as well as PhVCs clusters (cfr. Table 5.5.38).  
Table 5.5.38: Difference between monitoring and profile of respondents as well 
as PhVCs clusters - Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Dimensions Variable Profile of respondents PhVCs clusters 
Board seat 3.061 4.402 Formal monitoring 
Reports 1.893 1.071 
 Stage financing 2.610 4.541 
Informal monitoring Informal meetings 1.322 4.567 
 
Results on importance were also corroborated in terms of frequency of use of formal and 
informal monitoring criteria throughout the year using a 1-12 scale, with 1 = “once a year”, 2 = 
“Semi-annually”, 3 = “Quarterly”, 6 = “Bi-monthly”, and 12 = “Monthly”. However, stage 
financing was not included in the options as the technique implies the provision of additional 
funds to backed organizations depending on the attainment of milestones that generally are 
fixed over a longer span time than the year. In addition, the temporal frequency of use of formal 
monitoring through board seat was addressed asking about formal meetings with the SE’s 
social entrepreneur or management. Table 5.5.39 shows that informal monitoring, besides being 
the most important monitoring variable, is also characterized by the highest frequency of use 
with 69 percent of PhVCs having informal meetings with backed social entrepreneurs monthly, 
and on average, having one informal meeting every month and a half. On the contrary, formal 
meetings happen once every four months, and reports are required twice a year.  
Table 5.5.39: Frequency of formal and informal monitoring by PhVCs. 
Type of monitoring Variable % of Monthly Mean Median SD Min Max 
Formal Formal meetings 17.6% 4.38 3.00 3.73 1.00 12.00 
 Reports - 2.12 3.00 0.96 1.00 3.00 
Informal Informal meetings 69.0% 9.34 12.00 4.10 2.00 12.00 
1-12 scale, with 1 = “Once a year”, 2 = “Semi-annually”, 3 = “Quarterly”, 6 = “Bi-monthly”, and 12 = “Monthly”. 
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Again, no significant difference was found in terms of frequency of use of formal and 
informal monitoring and Profile of respondents as well as PhVCs clusters (cfr. Table 5.5.40). 
Table 5.5.40: Difference between the frequency of monitoring and profile of 
respondents as well as PhVCs clusters - Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Type of monitoring Variable Profile of respondents PhVCs clusters 
Formal Formal meetings 2.457 3.353 
 Reports 3.369 1.681 
Informal Informal meetings 0.460 0.187 
 
Findings on monitoring hence suggest that PhVCs behave as stewards of organizations 
they back and that the fulfilment of the social aim of their activity does not force them to retain 
strong monitoring activities as done in VCs as their interest is aligned with that of the social 
entrepreneur. Formal monitoring is seen as a tool to exert control over their environment by co-
opting the resources needed to survive. Based on stewardship theory, the participation to the 
board is seen as a mechanism to form links with the external environment and to manage 
environmental contingencies. Also, PhVCs’ director’s assistance is believed to raise 
organizational performance, and increase returns to shareholders.  
The last part of the analysis of monitoring activity investigated any difference with 
respect to the Location of PhVCs and the Organizational form of PhVCs: Table 5.5.41 and Table 
5.5.42 indicate no significant differences.  
Table 5.5.41: Difference between formal and informal monitoring and the 
organizational form of PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test. 
Formal monitoring Organizational form of PhVCs 
Formal meetings 74.500 
Reports 100.500 
Stage financing 83.500 
Informal monitoring  
Informal meetings 97.000 
Table 5.5.42: Difference between formal and informal monitoring and the 
location of PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test. 
Formal monitoring Location of PhVCs 
Formal meetings 124.500 
Reports 151.500 
Stage financing 151.500 
Informal monitoring  
Informal meetings 171.000 
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5.5.4.b. Cooperation 
Proposition 8 through Proposition 10 expected a positive relationship between the 
typology of cooperative behaviour by PhVCs and the level of stewardship offered to backed 
SEs. The most important cooperative activity results to be the provision of strategic advice to 
backed SEs (cfr. Table 5.5.43) supporting Timmon’s (1987) suggestion that one of the most 
important contributions of a VC is to act as an advisor. The comparison of Table 5.5.43 with 
Table 2.3.4 indicate that PhVCs tend to behave as prescribed by MacMillan et al. (1989), with 
strategic roles followed by networking roles and last by supportive roles. Whereas both survey 
and content analysis findings indicate that strategic cooperation is the most important post-
investment activity implemented by PhVCs, contrasting results are obtained with respect to 
supportive and networking roles.  

















Strategic  50.23% 6.09 6.67 1.11 - - 
 Strategic advice 69.2% 6.36 7.00 1.16 2.00 7.00 
 Board seat 52.6% 6.16 7.00 1.08 4.00 7.00 
 Governance advice 28.9% 5.76 6.00 1.10 3.00 7.00 
Networking  30.6% 4.56 4.67 1.32 - - 
 Access to future 
investors 
57.9% 6.29 7.00 0.98 4.00 7.00 
 Syndication 28.9% 5.66 6.00 1.28 2.00 7.00 
 Other 5.0% 1.74 1.00 1.69 1.00 7.00 
Supportive  19.00% 5.04 5.00 1.38 - - 















 Human resource 
advice 
23.1% 5.56 6.00 1.19 1.00 7.00 
 Marketing and 
communication 
28.2% 5.36 5.00 1.39 2.00 7.00 
 Legal services 12.8% 4.41 4.00 1.76 1.00 7.00 
 IT consultation 5.3% 4.08 4.00 1.57 1.00 7.00 
1-7 scale, 1 = “Never used”, 4 = “Sometimes used”, 7 = “Always used”.  
Concerning the networking dimension, syndication practices appear to be very 
important to a marginal percentage of PhVCs, while the PhVCs support as a way for backed SEs 
to access their social network of future funders seems to be of primary importance, showed by 
the high rating, the high percentage of PhVCs rating it as a very important post-investment 
activity, and by the lowest SD. As such, PhVCs appear to be stewards of the SEs they back in 
terms of providing business and strategic guidance.  
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The analysis of difference with respect to the ranking of cooperative post-investment 
activities and Profile of respondents, Organizational form of PhVCs, Location of PhVCs, and PhVCs 
clusters follows. Table 5.5.44 indicates a significant difference between Profile of respondent and 
Strategic advice as well as the networking variable Access to future Investors.  
Table 5.5.44: Difference between the rating of cooperative post-investment activities 
and profile of respondents as well as PhVCs clusters - Kruskal-Wallis test. 




Strategic  - - 
 Strategic advice 8.453** 2.041 
 Board seat 3.061 4.402 
 Governance advice 5.667 2.845 
Networking    
 Access to future investors 10.645** 2.228 
 Syndication 0.976 6.627** 
 Other 4.292 5.753** 
Supportive    
 Financial and accounting 
management 
1.455 1.523 
 Human resource advice 3.120 2.426 
 Marketing and communication 4.573 4.289 
 Legal services 4.674 2.954 
 IT consultation 5.399 6.775* 
** Significant at 5% level. 
An in depth analysis of significant differences was conducted through a boxplot analysis. 
Figure 5.5.7 shows that respondents who are investment director or one of the professional 
positions categorized as other tend to consider strategic advice less important than respondents 
with other professional positions. Furthermore, communications directors and other 
respondents rate access to future funders lower than other types of respondents (cfr. Figure 
5.5.8). 
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Figure 5.5.7: Boxplot – Rating of strategic advice and profile of respondent. 
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Figure 5.5.9 shows that pure highly-engaged philanthropists tend to rate IT consultation 
higher than social VCs and hybrid philanthropists, whereas Figure 5.5.10 indicated that hybrid 
philanthropists tend to rate syndication lower than the other two PhVCs clusters. 
Figure 5.5.9: Boxplot – Rating of IT consultation and PhVCs clusters. 
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The null hypothesis of no differences is found with respect to Organizational form of 
PhVCs and Location of PhVCs (cfr. Table 5.5.45 and Table 5.5.46). 
Table 5.5.45: Difference between cooperative post-investment activities and the 
organizational form of PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test. 
Dimension Variable Organizational form of PhVCs 
Strategic   
 Strategic advice 90.000 
 Board seat 74.500 
 Governance advice 96.500 
Networking   
 Access to future investors 98.000 
 Syndication 104.500 
 Other 99.000 
Supportive   
 Financial and accounting management 99.500 
 Human resource advice 110.500 
 Marketing and communication 99.000 
 Legal services 109.500 
 IT consultation 87.500 
Table 5.5.46: Difference between cooperative post-investment activities and the 
location of PhVCs - Mann-Whitney U test. 
Dimension Variable Location of PhVCs 
Strategic   
 Strategic advice 167.500 
 Board seat 124.500 
 Governance advice 162.000 
Networking   
 Access to future investors 144.000 
 Syndication 169.500 
 Other 145.000 
Supportive   
 Financial and accounting management 148.00 
 Human resource advice 176.000 
 Marketing and communication 126.00 
 Legal services 173.000 
 IT consultation 147.500 
As a confirmation of the stewardship services provided to backed SEs, PhVCs use their 
social network to provide non-financial services to backed organizations through strategic 
partners or pro-bono partnerships. Results presented in Table 5.5.47 show that both strategic 
and networking roles are mainly provided internally by PhVCs. More particularly, new 
partners for syndication purposes as well as new potential investors are sought by the PhVCs in 
more than 94 and 78 percent of the cases, supporting the idea that PhVCs’ main activity consists 
of allowing backed SEs in benefiting from the network of contacts.  
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Marketing and communication, IT consultation, and particularly legal services are 
mainly provided as outsourced services, indicating the need for the PhVCs to develop a 
network with external specialized service providers. 
Table 5.5.47: Internal provision of cooperative post-investment activities. 
Dimension Variable Only internally Only externally Both 
Strategic     
 Strategic advice 89.5% 7.9% 2.6% 
 Governance advice 81.3% 15.6% 3.1% 
Networking     
 Access to future investors 94.3% 2.9% 2.9% 
 Syndication 78.8% 18.2% 3.0% 
 Marketing and communication 43.8% 56.3% - 
Supportive     
 Financial and accounting management 60.0% 37.1% 2.9% 
 Human resource advice 58.3% 38.9% 2.8% 
 IT consultation 14.3% 56.3% -  
 Legal services 6.7% 93.3% - 
 
 
5.6. RESULTS: EXITING 
The exit phase of the VC and PhVC investment process enable investors to realize returns 
(either social, financial, or environmental) and signal their quality. Elaborating on adverse 
selection risks involved in PhVC financing, Proposition 11 expected a positive relationship 
between the duration of the investment and the level of the perceived risk for adverse selection. 
As such, a longer investment period better enables the PhVC investor to manage adverse 
selection risks, increasing thus the quality of backed SEs in terms of social impact. At the same 
time, the need for a longer investment period might be due to the difficulties of the backed SEs 
to become economically viable, and thus sustainable. Of the 44.4 percent of PhVCs that declared 
to have exited at least one investment, 43.2 percent declare to have an investment period 
ranging between 3-5 years, with none backing SEs less than a year. If comparing the percentage 
of PhVCs whose minimum investment period is one year with the one whose minimum is three 
years, the pattern is 32.4 percent vs. 43.2. Proposition 11 is thus supported as the majority of 
PhVCs tend to back SEs for a minimum of three years.  
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The sum of the categories does not amount to 100 percent as respondents were allowed 
to choose multiple options (cfr. Question 40 in Appendix 4). 
 
In terms of exit strategies, Figure 5.6.2 shows that the most used one is exiting after 
finding a new funding partner for the SE (also called secondary sale) which is used by 32 
percent thus confirming the expectation of Proposition 12. This is followed by exiting after the 
SE has become sustainable, used by 28 percent of PhVCs. However, following VC scholars, 
secondary sales are characterized by a high degree of adverse selection, ranking third according 
to Table 2.4.1. Buybacks and IPOs, which according to VC scholars are characterized by the 
lowest and highest degree of asymmetric information, are used only by 5 percent of 
respondents.  









Finding new financial partners for 
obtaining extra funds
Enabling the social enterprise to become 
self-sustainable







Table 5.6.1 shows the Spearman correlation coefficient of the variables Typology of exit 
and Reason for exit. The analysis was run to understand whether to a particular type of exit is 
associated a specific reason and vice versa. Results are significant only in the case the SE has 
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become sustainable: in particular, the significant positive correlation between sustainability and 
follow-on investments suggests that PhVCs signal to other investors the quality of the SEs by 
enabling them to become sustainable.  
Table 5.6.1: Association between the typology of exit and the reason for exit - 
Correlation coefficient. 
 Reason for exit 
Typology of exit The SE is 
sustainable 
The SE has 
grown to scale 
The SE needs follow on 
investments 
Other 










Enable the SE to 
become sustainable 
 
     0.489*** 
 
    0.386** 
 
    0.459** 
 
-0.226 
Exit after repayment of 
debt 
-0.100 -0.048 -0.107 0.447 
Not to exit -0.094 -0.234 0.141 0.327 
Buyback -0.139 -0.145 -0.237 -0.120 
M&A -0.279 -0.005 -0.154 0.354 
IPO -0.347 -0.145 -0.237 0.080 
Other -0.236 -0.067 -0.201 0.181 
** Correlation is significant at the 5% level; ** Correlation is significant at the 1% level . 
Next, a correlation analysis of the Typology of exit and the Type of return sought by PhVCs, 
namely social or financial, is run. Accordingly, the Spearman correlation coefficient was used in 
the analysis. Given that 100 percent of PhVCs seek a social return on their investment (which 
implies no variance), the correlation coefficient was calculated only in the case a financial return 
is explicitly sought. Table 5.6.2 indicates the existence of a significant correlation with respect to 
exiting after repayment of debt (ρ = 0.4, p<0.01). 
Table 5.6.2: Association between the typology of exit and the type of return – 
Correlation coefficient. 
 Type of return 
Typology of exit Financial return 
Finding new financial partners 0.016 
Enable the SE to become sustainable -0.248 
Exit after repayment of debt    0.430** 
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Last, a test for difference in the use of the Typology of exit and PhVCs cluster, Location of 
PhVCs, and Organizational form of PhVCs was run. The contingency coefficient reported in Table 
5.6.3, Table 5.6.4, and Table 5.6.5 and the Fisher exact test in Table 5.6.4 and Table 5.6.5 indicate 
that the null hypothesis of no relationship is failed to be rejected in all cases but between PhVCs 
cluster and exit after repayment of debt, buyback, M&A or IPO as exit strategy. To this respect, 
a cross-tab analysis reveals that social VCs tend to use more than pure highly-engaged 
philanthropists and hybrid philanthropists exit after repayment of debt, buyback, M&A and 
IPO (expected count = 2.4, 1, 1.7, and 1 respectively vs. count = 5, 3, 4, and 3).  
Table 5.6.3: Association between the typology of exit and PhVCs cluster - 
Contingency coefficient.  
Typology of exit PhVCs cluster 
Finding new financial partners 0.159 
Enable the SE to become sustainable 0.295 
Exit after repayment of debt    0.391** 
Not to exit 0.154 
Buyback    0.417** 
M&A  0.371* 
IPO    0.417** 
Other 0.272 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level. 
 
Table 5.6.4: Relationship of the typology of exit with the organizational form of 
PhVCs - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 
Organizational form of PhVCs  
 








test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 
































Not to exit - 0.131 1.000 0.449 
Buyback - 0.034 1.000 0.843 
M&A - 0.093 0.623 0.592 
IPO -- 0.034 1.000 0.843 
Other - 0.034 1.000 0.843 
 
Also, the absence of any relationship between the typology of exit used by PhVCs with 
their location indicates that American and European PhVCs face the same challenges while 
trying to exit from investments. The use of the same exit strategies might also indicate that the 
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similar level of development of social markets and social investors. Investigating this issue 
could be an avenue for further research. 
Table 5.6.5: Relationship between the typology of exit with the location of 
PhVCs - Fisher exact test and contingency coefficient. 
Location of PhVCs  
 







test exact. sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s contingency 































Not to exit - 0.072 1.000 0.679 
Buyback - 0.105 0.610 0.545 
M&A - 0.084 1.000 0.629 
IPO -- 0.105 0.610 0.545 
Other - 0.286 0.125 0.087 
5.7. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented results based on a survey addressed to the entire population 
of European and US PhVCs. The analysis of respondents revealed that PhVCs are mainly pure 
highly-engaged philanthropists. This result is quite important as it contradicts the common 
belief that high engagement philanthropists are mainly active in the United States as opposed to 
Europe, where PhVCs are believed to be more sophisticated. Additionally, PhVCs receive 
money from private individuals and traditional foundations, with banks acting mainly in 
Europe and investing in social VCs and endowment funds inducing PhVCs in investing a larger 
percentage of their portfolio in projects.  
In terms of investment strategy of PhVC funds, they tend to invest in non-profit SEs and 
investments in non-profits are more pronounced in the US than in Europe. Sector speaking, the 
PhVCs portfolio is composed of SEs active in the education, health care, and employment 
segment of social needs and these tend to be located in the PhVCs’ own country. However, a 
significant portion of PhVCs do not have a specific geographic focus and those who were 
identified as outliers with respect to the number of held SEs result to be particularly active in 
supporting SEs in Africa or Asia. Last, SEs in their early and expansion stage are the most 
present in PhVCs portfolio. 
For what concerns the research question and the analysis of the PhVCs investment 
process survey results confirm findings obtained through content analysis. More specifically, 
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the use of proactive methods of deal origination and the evaluation of the venture focusing on 
the human capital dimension imply a confirmation of the respective propositions and, thus, of a 
problem for adverse selection. Findings also suggest that in their proactive search, PhVCs 
receive investment proposals from their investors/donors: this might imply a non-independent 
decision of which SEs to consider for the investment decision. Future research could dig more 
into this issue and on the dependence of PhVCs investment decision, understanding which 
variables play a significant role. Also, in the screening and evaluation phase of PhVCs 
investments, the variable identified through the VC literature, i.e., deal terms, results to be 
particularly important in the process of social VCs and hybrid philanthropists: because of their 
double- or triple-bottom line outcome, they must pay higher attention to the terms of the deal to 
accomplish their financial sub-value proposition. 
For what concerns the structuring of the deal, on a global level PhVCs mainly use grants 
to back SEs. Since grants do not entail donors to receive back any cash flow or repayment as 
they lack a link of funds with performance, on a formal level they do not incorporate any 
incentive for grantees to perform well and repay donors. As such, because of this lack of 
incentive, the high use of grant financing by PhVCs signals a low perception of moral hazard. 
However, if digging into the different clusters of PhVCs, social VCs and hybrid philanthropists 
tend also to use more sophisticated financial instruments, such as equity and debt, which entails 
for a claim on the SEs’ future cash flows. This finding is compatible with the double- or triple-
bottom line value proposition these categories of PhVCs have.  
A low perception of moral hazard is also confirmed by the low use of formal valuation 
models as well as entrepreneur’s binding provisions or renegotiation clauses. However, if 
combining together the use of formal valuations and these contractual provisions with the 
typology of financial instrument used to back SEs, a positive relationship is found with respect 
to equity; also, valuation through multiples or DCF is associated with the financing of working 
capital needs, whereas the financing of fixed assets leads to a higher use of only DCF valuation 
and the financing of outsourced project support with other valuation methods. This suggest that 
stewardship rather than asymmetric information theories are better able to explain PhVCs 
investment behaviour already in the deal structuring phase further on confirming results 
obtained through content analysis. 
Stewardship theory also explains the post-investment activities implemented by PhVCs 
both on a monitoring and cooperation level. With respect to the former, PhVCs tend mainly to 
monitor backed SEs on an informal rather than formal level, and that formal monitoring tends 
to be more important for maturity stage SEs. The more use of informal monitoring devices 
suggests that trust might play a key role in shaping the PhVCs and backed SEs relationship. On 
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the other hand, among strategic, supportive, and networking cooperative activities, strategic 
ones, measured by the variables strategic advice and participation to board meetings, appear to 
be the most important towards the maximization of social impact. At the same time, among the 
supportive roles measured by IT consultation and legal services, and among the networking 
role measured by marketing and communication, PhVCs widely outsource the services. 
Strategic roles and networking roles, measured by access to present and future funders, are 
provided internally by the exploitation of the PhVCs’ reputational capital and its network of 
contacts.  
Last, the exit phase of PhVCs investment process was examined. Survey results confirm 
the expectation of a high level of adverse selection both in terms of duration of the investment 
period and of use of IPOs as exit strategy: the under-development of social capital markets 
requires PhVCs to hold longer SEs and to exit from their investment mainly by finding new 
financial partners for backed SEs. Surprisingly, while in the VC model exit is a must, in PhVCs 
exit can be also pursued by stopping funding SEs but continuing providing management and 
strategic support, signalling again that the PhVCs’ involvement is more shaped by stewardship. 
Table 5.7.1 summarizes survey findings with respect to the propositions presented in 
chapter 2.3 and 2.4.   
Table 5.7.1: Summary of survey results with respect to propositions and 
relationship with theoretical issues. 
Investment 
phase 







1 Proactive methods Adverse selection +   
Deal screening 
and evaluation 
2 Human capital Adverse selection +   
3 Grant financing Moral hazard -   




-   




+   
Deal 
structuring 
6 Renegotiation clauses Moral hazard +   
 13 Trust Stewardship  +   












+   











+   
11 Holding period of 
investment 
Adverse selection +   Exit 
12 Secondary sale Adverse selection -   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. CONCLUSIONS  
The research question underlying this piece of work has been formulated taking into 
account the degree to which asymmetric information issues, which are traditionally used by 
scholars to explain the VC investment process, shape the PhVC investment behaviour while 
backing SEs.   
Building on a formal model of VC investment activity, Amit et al. (1998) show that VCs 
are principals who become skilled at selecting good projects in environments with hidden 
information and are good at monitoring and advising agents, i.e., entrepreneurs, who might 
otherwise be vulnerable to agency problems. Thanks to their abilities in reducing informational 
asymmetries, VCs can solve the problems related to appropriability and reliability of the 
information provided by the entrepreneur in markets with imperfect information. This enables 
them to have a competitive advantage and, thus, to obtain superior financial returns.  
On the contrary, PhVCs are specialized investors in the social arena: their objective is to 
maximize the social impact of the SEs they back. As such, taking into account the clash arising 
from a divergent value proposition of VCs and PhVCs, recently PhVCs have been presented as 
stewards of the SEs they back (Van Slyke and Newman, 2006), having higher-order needs for 
self-esteem, self-actualization, growth, achievement and affiliation. Stewardship theory (Muth 
and Donaldson, 1998; Davis et al., 1997; Fox and Hamilton, 1994; Donaldson and Davis, 1991) 
suggests that managers make effective board members to the extent that their interests are 
aligned with those of the firm. This is in contrast to agency theory’s characterization of human 
beings as opportunistic, inherently untrustworthy, and focused on a narrow pursuit of financial 
gains. As a result, while adverse selection issues can characterize both VC and PhVC, agency 
theory and moral hazard appear to be less explicative of PhVC investment behavior in the deal-
structuring and post-investment phase. 
In order to understand how asymmetric information shapes the PhVCs investment 
model first a series of in-depth interviews with leading PhVCs active in the United States and in 
Europe was conducted. Interviewees were then content analyzed and a set of relevant variables 
taken into account in the investment process was identified. Second, interviewees were used to 
develop a survey which was addressed to the entire population of PhVCs active in the two 
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regions. The aggregation of data collected from these sources ensures triangulation, minimising 
bias from the author or from the methodology used, and construct validity (Saunders et al., 
2007). 
Results suggest that PhVC, like VC investments, is characterized by a high degree of 
asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection. More specifically, results from 
interviews and survey suggest a positive relationship between the perception for adverse 
selection problems and two of the investing as well as exiting phase of the PhVCs investment 
process. The lack of a well-developed social capital market, with transparent criteria for the 
allocation of funds and measurement of performance, makes potential investment very opaque 
for PhVCs whose budget constraint requires them to back only those SEs able to maximize the 
social impact of funds. As a result, the paucity of information on the side of the PhVC investor is 
managed by a proactive origination of new potential deals through a referral approach, 
assuming that the quality of the source (which is known by the PhVCs) is a good proxy for the 
quality of the deal (which is unknown to the PhVCs). Both content analysis and survey results 
confirm the high use of referrals which imply strong linkages between the PhVCs and the 
community they work with, particularly with their own investors who might guide the 
investment decision. As results show, VCs are one important source for PhVCs deals: it might 
be the case that both VCs and PhVCs play a cooperative game in which those deals that cannot 
receive VC financing due to the very early stage of development of the business idea or because 
of the high level of commercialization risk involving the project, are passed onto PhVCs 
investors, who thus play an important role in spurring social innovation, if the idea results to be 
successful.  
In addition, the screening phase of PhVCs investments strongly takes into account the 
human capital dimension which is considered of key importance in managing severe adverse 
selection issues. The ranking received by the human capital dimension is the highest in the 
selection variables and it is also the one receiving the highest percentage of “Very important” 
rating. This is followed by an examination of the potential for social impact that the SEs is 
expected to be able to create and of the market where the SEs is operating. Findings indicate 
that among the selection variables that consider the activity of the organization, PhVCs tend to 
consider SEs with a clear funding plan which is going to enable their sustainability.  
The lack of a well-developed social capital marketplace which is presented by Grossman 
(1999) as chaotic and not-self reinforcing makes investments in SEs more illiquid than VC ones. 
Liquidity here refers not to the ability of investors to buy-sell assets on the market, but rather on 
the ability of investors to price social impact. Existing stock exchanges trade assets based on the 
price of the company issuing them which, in turn, is based on the economic profitability of the 
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venture. On the contrary, social capital markets should price those assets issued by SEs based on 
their social profitability; metrics to evaluate organizational effectiveness, however, have not 
been developed for most fields of SEs service delivery. At the same time, although social impact 
assessment metrics do exists, a consensus on which metric to be used still is lacking: each 
PhVCs tend to evaluate social impact based on the evaluation of specific and case-contingent 
metrics which are difficult to be compared across sectors and across investors. As such, PhVCs’ 
assessment of social impact, although being implemented, does not apply uniform criteria, 
making results comparison hard. At the same time, the use of grants for SEs backing makes 
trading on traditional stock exchanges impossible. The inaccessibility of traditional capital 
markets for SEs and, consequently for social investors, requires PhVCs to follow exit strategies 
that are feasible and that signal the quality of the SEs to other players. Results show that the 
most used exit strategy is the accompaniment of backed SEs towards new sources of funds, 
which might be strongly influenced by the PhVCs’ reputational capital and network of contacts.  
However, if asymmetric information is able to explain the origination, screening, and 
exiting phase of PhVCs investments, it does not so in the structuring and post-investment 
phase. To this respect, findings suggest the high use of grant financing, which does not entail 
donors to have the right to be claimants of the SEs’ future cash flows. As such, differently than 
VCs, PhVCs have a different mindset which leads them to pay more attention to the strategic, 
supportive, and networking needs of backed social organization rather than to their own self-
interest. PhVCs thus structure their deals with a low use of the covenants typically included in 
VC contracts that aim at protecting the investment.  
The high use of informal monitoring as opposed to formal one, typically adopted by VCs, 
strengthens results and the idea of PhVCs being more stewards of backed SEs rather than self-
motivated investors. This suggests that the success of the PhVC investment model, on a social, 
financial, as well as environmental level (depending on the PhVC’s outcome), might be 
influenced by the degree to which its surroundings approximate the idea of a civic community, 
with a steady recognition and pursuit of the public good at the expenses of all purely individual 
private ends. The dichotomy between self-interest and altruism can easily be overdrawn, for no 
mortal and no successful society can renounce the powerful motivation of self-interest. Citizens 
in the civic community are not required to be altruist; in the civic community, however, citizens 
pursue what de Tocqueville (2009) termed “self-interest properly understood”, i.e., self-interest 
defined in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is “enlighted” rather than 
“myopic”, self-interest that is alive to the interests of others. Trust enables the civic community 
more easily to surmount what economists call “opportunism”, in which shared interest are 
unrealized because each individual, acting in wary isolation, has an incentive to defect from 
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collective action.  
 
6.2. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This study makes several contributions for both researchers and practitioners. From a 
scholar perspective, it answers to the call of research on SEs’ funding options made by Austin et 
al. (2006). By analyzing the investment practices of PhVC, it builds a theory on the investment 
model and shows that, while common belief is that PhVCs implicitly derives from VC sharing 
with it the same theoretical organizational model, this is partially not the case. More 
specifically, the ability of information asymmetries, and specifically adverse selection which VC 
is traditionally embedded in, are able to explain the origination and screening phases of the 
investing as well as exiting stage of both VC and PhVC. However, in the deal structuring phase 
of the investing, adverse selection appears to be superseded by stewardship theory, which also 
prevails in the PhVC’s post-investment activities. To this respect, the research makes an 
important contribution to the VC literature as it shows that, since the two investment models 
result to be strongly characterized by information asymmetries in the form of adverse selection 
in the pre-investment and exiting stages, it is possible to build contractual relationship based on 
trust rather than on self- and profit-motivated-interests.  
In addition, although recently VC scholars have started to analyze and explain post-
investment behaviors within a stewardship theory perspective, the bulk of VC research still 
focuses on agency theory and moral hazard on the entrepreneur side. As such, both monitoring 
and cooperative activities are implemented by VCs to protect their own investment, and thus 
interest, against harmful behaviors of the entrepreneur. Differently from VC, the PhVC model 
develops post-investment activities focusing on the SEs’ organizational needs and how the 
PhVCs’ involvement is able to benefit the organization by the provisions of tools to successfully 
respond to their organizational and financial needs, making them survive in the long-term and 
having the highest social impact.  
It also gains insights into the entrepreneurship, and more specifically, social 
entrepreneurship literature, as it presents a first exploratory study on the PhVC new financing 
option available for social entrepreneurs. It thus opens new research avenues on social 
entrepreneurial finance, especially considering that social entrepreneurs repeatedly identify 
resources as being one of their prime strategic concerns (Bloom and Chatterji, 2009; Harding, 
2007) and few studies up to date have addressed these issues. By focusing on sustainability, 
PhVCs aim at enabling backed SEs to grow and to maximize their social impact. As such, it is 
the first study that systematically analyzes the investment practices adopted by American and 
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European PhVCs, highlighting similar behaviors and investment practices in the two markets. 
This has been possible thanks to an extensive work of sources integration aiming at identifying 
those organizations that can be considered PhVCs.  
From a practitioner perspective, it provides a guideline on PhVC investments for social 
entrepreneurs seeking funds, placing emphasis on those variables mostly taken into account by 
PhVCs in their decision making process and in the post-investment management. To this 
respect, the analysis indicates that PhVCs provide a wide range of non-financial, advisory 
services that are generally valued by the social entrepreneurs whose organisations these funds 
invest in. Among the pool of services, strategic roles result to be the most important cooperative 
activity implemented by PhVCs; this finding can be of help for social entrepreneurs wanting to 
understand how PhVCs contribute to the organizational development of the SEs they back and 
the engagement level in the management of the organization. By understanding how PhVCs 
behave after an investment, the social entrepreneur increases his/her chances of selecting the 
right PhVC investor.  
The outsourcing activities of some of the non-financial services provided by PhVCs to 
backed SEs is particularly interesting for commercial companies providing such services which 
view PhVCs as a natural partnership for their own social responsibility agenda. Private equity 
firms and associated professional service are showing interest in PhVC as a vehicle for their 
own philanthropy, which can potentially bring significant new human resources into the social 
sector. The challenge is to adapt these business-orientated skills for the needs of social purpose 
organisations, ensuring relevancy as well as high quality. 
The research also shows that the PhVC investment model tends to back SEs using those 
financing instruments typically employed by traditional philanthropists, i.e., grants: as such, 
this study contributes to increasing awareness of how traditional philanthropists can move from 
the mere role of funds providers to that of fully engaged investors. It also helps those actors that 
are interested in entering the PhVC field to gain knowledge how other PhVCs operate.  
Nevertheless, four main limitations can be identified. The main limitation concerns the 
sample size of survey respondents. Despite having a 54 percent response rate, which makes the 
respondent sample very highly representative of the PhVC population and not subject to non-
response error, the absolute number of responses, i.e., 40, makes it hard to use statistical 
procedures such as regression analysis or factor analysis (which need a minimum number of 50 
observations). Undercoverage error has been sought to be minimized by consulting different 
databases during the population identification process; ineligible units have been identified by 
conducting a detailed screening of the activity of the identified units. However, the absence of a 
PhVC association in the US makes the identified US population subject to sampling error.  
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Second, the comparison between VC and PhVC is based on the VC practices identified 
through the literature. As such, it could be the case that some of these practices have changed 
over time; also the importance of the variables considered in each phase of the investment 
process may have changed too, making findings presented here subject to intertemporal error. 
Third, both interviews and survey take into account the perspective of the PhVC 
investor, without taking into account the social entrepreneur who received PhVC financing. It is 
too early to tell whether supply and demand of services are well balanced in a market which is 
supply-driven. It is highly likely that demand for PhVC by social entrepreneurs and others 
wishing to bring their organisations through a period of rapid growth or development is greater 
than supply. As such, further research might conduct a dyadic study involving both the PhVC 
investor and the backed social entrepreneur to gaining a better understanding on the dynamics 
of the financing model. 
The fourth limitation consists of the subjectivity of the responses involved in the 
questionnaire. In particular, the statistical relationships between subjectively assessed 
characteristics of deals and the PhVCs’ decision regarding them may reflect a post-hoc 
rationalization of the decision. However, the issue is common in every survey based research. 
 
6.3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study opens up a wide set of future research opportunities. On the one hand, two of 
the three main phases of the PhVC investment model were analyzed, i.e., investing and exiting. 
The motivation underlying the choice was to gain a better understanding of the relationship 
between the PhVC investor and the backed SE. Since PhVCs’ activity consists of maximizing the 
social impact of the SEs they back by the provision of capial and strategic guidance, a deeper 
knowledge of the investment model required a focus on those phases involving a relationship 
between investor and investee. Further research could move on to the first phase of the PhVC 
investment model, i.e., fundraising, investigating thus the relationship between PhVCs and 
investors. Digging more into the key drivers of the PhVC fundraising could help in 
understanding how demand and supply for capital in the philanthropic market are shaped and 
modelled. At the same time, an in depth analysis of the fundraising phase could provide a 
better understanding on the strategies and techniques adopted by investors of PhVC funds to 
manage adverse selection issues (while deciding which PhVCs to support) and moral hazard on 
the side of the PhVCs. Further research, currently in progress, analyzes the general and specific 
human capital that is present in the founders of PhVCs and compares findings with the work 
done on traditional VCs, identifying similarities and differences which could facilitate the 
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process of transferring VC expertise to the philanthropic environment. 
If focusing on the investment strategy adopted by PhVCs, further research could analyze 
how heterogeneous are PhVC firms in terms of SEs stage, skills necessary to manage such 
investments, and adaptation of the latter to the cultural environment where the backed SEs 
operate. An understanding of the differences among PhVCs can be helpful to social 
entrepreneurs in search of capital: by digging into what PhVCs are looking for in an investment 
the social entrepreneur might be able to increase the chances of finding capital. Furthermore, 
since PhVCs operate in mixed markets where non-profit and for-profit SEs compete, it could be 
interesting to conduct an analysis of the competitive advantage, disadvantages, and interactive 
dynamics that characterize the PhVC environment and contrast it with VC.  
In addition, there are other interesting areas that could be further analyzed. First, how 
philanthropic investors influence PhVC deals in the selection phase: if the PhVC fund is 
established by one main investor, as in the case of a private grant-making foundations adopting 
PhVC practices, this can have power not only in originating the deal, but also in actively 
participating in the decision making process, leaving PhVC fund manager little room for 
independent selection of investments.  
Second, an understanding of the conditions under which SEs are created by PhVCs, both 
at macro and micro level, and how investors are involved in the creation of the new social 
venture might be another avenue for research.  
Third, embedded in network theory, it can be investigated how PhVCs’ network with 
social sector players is structured while identifying potential investments; also, network plays a 
keyrole in the provision of non-financial services to backed SEs, which could be further 
analyzed to understand the linkages between PhVCs and service providers.  
Forth, while analyzing PhVC decision making, it can be analyzed the motivations that 
lead European PhVCs to rate deal terms higher and the social market served by the potentially 
baked SEs lower than American PhVCs. 
Fifth, concerning the deal structuring phase, an analysis of the contractual agreement 
characterizing PhVC investments could shed more light on the stewardship services provided 
to SEs. This could be integrated with an understanding of the mechanisms through which trust 
between the PhVCs and the backed social entrepreneur are build and how they impact the 
success of the financing program both in terms of improving sustainability and in creating 
social impact. 
Sixth, in terms of exit strategies it could be examined how the PhVC field is shaping the 
social capital market and pushing for the creation of a social stock exchange. The need of PhVCs 
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to exit investment, and the lack of a stock exchange suitable for investments in SEs, is currently 
limiting the PhVC activity.   
Last, by developing an indicator of social return that can be applied to PhVC 
investments, further research could explain how the PhVC investment process and, more 
particularly, its stages contribute toward the maximization of social impact. 
As such, the exploratory study conducted here has tried to build a theory on the PhVC 
investment model which, through the selection and management of investments in high 
potential social ventures, might contribute to envision and realize a world with a les degree of 
social inequalities and problems. 
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APPENDIX 1:  Sampling frame population. 
Table 1: Sampling frame of the target population of European PhVCs. 
Name of PhVC fund Source Nationality 
Adventure Capital Fund John (2006) UK 
Alfanar EVPA (2008) UK 
Andrews Charitable Trust John (2006) UK 
Ark EVPA (2008) UK 
Rianta Capital EVPA (2008) UK 
Bonventure EVPA (2008) Germany 
Bridges Community Ventures John (2006) UK 
CAN EVPA (2008) UK 
CANOPUS EVPA (2008) Germany 
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation John (2006) UK 
Clann Credo Social Investment Fund John (2006) Ireland 
Demeter Foundation EVPA (2008) France 
dob Foundation EVPA (2008) Holland 
Fondazione Dynamo John (2006) Italy 
Futurebuilders John (2006) UK 
George Avenue EVPA (2008) Holland 
Good Deed Foundation EVPA (2008) Estonia 
Impetus Trust EVPA (2008) UK 
Inspiring Scotland EVPA (2008) UK 
Invest for Children EVPA (2008) Spain 
LGT Venture Philanthropy Foundation EVPA (2008) Lichtenstein 
Media Development Loan Fund John (2006) Czech Republic 
Najeti EVPA (2008) France 
NESst EVPA (2008) Hungary 
Oliver Twist Foundation EVPA (2008) Italy 
Oltre Venture EVPA (2008) Italy 
Phi Trust Foundation EVPA (2008) France 
Schwab foundation Other (2008) Switzerland 
SHINE John (2006) UK 
SOVEC - Social Venture Capital John (2006) Holland 
Stiftung Charite EVPA (2008) Germany 
The Blue Link John (2006) Holland 
The One Foundation EVPA (2008) Ireland 
The Sutton Trust EVPA (2008) UK 
VSB Fonds EVPA (2008) Holland 
Venture Partnership Foundation EVPA (2008) UK 
Venturesome EVPA (2008) UK 
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Table 2: Sampling frame of the target population of US PhVCs. 
Name of PhVC fund Source 
Acumen Fund NVCA (2008) 
Ashoka NVCA (2008) 
Blue Ridge Foundation Morino (2000) 
Common Good Ventures Morino (2000) 
Community Development Venture Capital Alliance NVCA (2008) 
Criterion Ventures Board (2008) 
Draper Richards Foundation NVCA (2008) 
E+CO NVCA (2008) 
Echoing Green Foundation NVCA (2008) 
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation - Youth Development Fund Morino (2000) 
Entrepreneurs Foundation NVCA (2008) 
Full Circle Fund NVCA (2008) 
Good Capital Morino (2000) 
Initiative for a competitive inner city NVCA (2008) 
Institute for the Study of Aging NVCA (2008) 
Investors circle NVCA (2008) 
Jewish Venture Phialnthropy Fund Other (2008) 
Kirlin Foundation Morino (2000) 
Legacy Venture NVCA (2008) 
Los Angeles Social Venture Partners Morino (2000) 
New Profit NVCA (2008) 
New Schools NVCA (2008) 
New Ventures NVCA (2008) 
New York City Venture Philanthropy Fund Other (2008) 
Pacific Community Ventures NVCA (2008) 
Pittsburgh Social Venture Partners NVCA (2008) 
Project Redwood NVCA (2008) 
Rinconada Ventures Morino (2000) 
Robert Enterprise Development Fund NVCA (2008) 
Robin Hood Foundation NVCA (2008) 
Silicon Valley Community Foundation NVCA (2008) 
Social venture partners International NVCA (2008) 
Swan Ventures NVCA (2008) 
The Chicago Public Education Fund NVCA (2008) 
Three Guineas Fund NVCA (2008) 
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APPENDIX 2:  Example of survey email sent to PhVCs. 
Dear Mr. XXX, 
A team of academic researchers at ESADE Business School is leading a project 
investigating the model adopted to support social enterprises through philanthropic venture 
capital, also known as venture philanthropy. The project is based on a web survey addressed to 
all European and US funds. Your response would be greatly appreciated.  
The study aims at analyzing the approach adopted by philanthropic venture capitalists 
(also known as venture philanthropy funds) while supporting social enterprises. To this respect, 
please remember that the survey aims at analyzing the philanthropic venture capital approach. 
While answering to the survey, please consider only those cases for which you have adopted 
this model. 
The survey is confidential. It is being conducted by a team of researchers at ESADE 
Business School and individual responses will be viewed only by ESADE’s researchers in 
philanthropic venture capital. Only aggregated data will be published. Moreover, if you wish, a 
copy of the research will be emailed to you once the study is finished. 
The survey will take you maximum 20 minutes and is divided in 5 sections. You can exit 
and re-enter the survey at any time until you close it either by clicking on “Exit this survey” or 
by submitting it.  
If you wish, you can answer the survey by clicking here. In case you are not able to 
respond to the survey, we would appreciate if you could pass the link to someone in your team 
and have us receiving your response by November, 15th. 
We would like to stress that the research aims at identifying the practices used in the 
field both by European and US PhVC funds. As such, it is very important for the research to 
maximize the number of responses to the survey. In fact, due to the novelty of the field, this is 
one of the firsts study of its kind conducted so far.  
In case you experience any problem while completing the survey or would like to have 
more information about the research please let me know. 
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APPENDIX 3:  Survey. 
Philanthropic Venture Capital Survey 
Thank you for responding to this survey sponsored by the Institute for Social Innovation of 
ESADE Business School which since its foundation has been seeking to promote knowledge, 
based on both rigorous and relevant investigation and innovation.  
The survey is part of a PhD level study. Its objective is to understand the investment model 
adopted by philanthropic venture capitalists. To this respect the study seeks to determine a) 
which are the variables considered in the screening phase, b) which valuation methods are 
used, c) which kind of control rights are allocated, d) which value-added and monitoring 
activities are used, and last e) which exit strategies are adopted. In the survey the term social 
enterprise refers both to non-profits and to for -profit organizations (to this respect, the purpose 
of for-profit social enterprises must be the creation of social value). 
The survey is confidential. It is being conducted by a team of researchers at ESADE 
Business School and individual responses will be viewed only by ESADE’s team of researchers 
in philanthropic venture capital. Only aggregated data will be published. A copy of the results 
from the survey with aggregated data will be emailed to you once the study is completed. 
In order to progress through this survey, please use the following navigation links:  
- Click the Next button to continue to the next page.  
- Click the Previous button to return to the previous page.  
- Click the Exit the Survey button located at the right top of the web page if you need to exit the 
survey.  
- Click the Submit button to submit your survey.  
In any moment, you can leave the survey and re-open it from the last question you answered. 
If you have any questions, please contact us at mariarosa.scarlata@esade.edu 
A. General Information  
1. Which is the legal structure of your organization? (Please tick the most appropriate box) 
d Foundation 
d Public Charity 
d Donor Advised Fund 
d Trust 
d Other: Please specify 
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2. Which is the nationality of your organization?  
3. When was your organization founded?  
4. Who are your supporters/donors/investors? (More than one option is possible, please select 
the most appropriate one. In case other entities than those reported below provide money to your 




d Endowment funds 
d Banks 
d Pension funds 
d Venture capital and private equity firms 
d Private individuals 
d Fund of funds 
d Other, Please specify 
5. Which is the target percentage of for-profit and non-profit social enterprises as well as 
project/individuals in your portfolio? (please note that the two categories should sum up to 
100%) 





6. In which ways does your organization provide money to social enterprises? 
d Directly 
d Not directly, by providing money to other funds/entities 
which directly support social enterprises 
d No money provided 
d Other, please specify 
7. How much money do you currently manage?  
Amount in thousands 
8. Which is your range of investment per social enterprise in monetary terms?  
 








10. Which is the number of social enterprises belonging to the following sectors in your 
target portfolio? (Please insert a positive number) 
 # 
Disabled people  
Education  
Employment  




Other, please specify  
11. Where are the social enterprises that you support mainly located? (More than one option 
is possible) 
dIn the organization’s country 




dAll around the world 
12. How many social enterprises in your current portfolio belong to the following stages? 





13. Which is the financial instrument that you use to support early-stage enterprises? (More 
than one option is possible) 
 




d Senior loan  
d Unsecured loan below market rate 
d Unsecured loan at market rate 
d Subordinated loan  
d Quasy-Equity 
d Equity 
d No seed stage social enterprises supported 
d Do not know 
14. In case you support early-stage social enterprises by undertaking an equity 
participation, which is the average percentage of equity rights retained by your 
organization? (Please tick the most appropriate box) 
d Less than 20% 
d Between 21% and 50% 
d More than 51% 
d Not applicable 
d Do not know 
15. Which is the financial instrument that you use to support expansion stage enterprises? 
(More than one option is possible) 
d Grant 
d Underwriting 
d Senior loan  
d Unsecured loan below market rate 
d Unsecured loan at market rate 
d Subordinated loan  
d Quasy-Equity 
d Equity 
d No seed stage social enterprises supported 
d Do not know 
16. On average, which is the percentage of equity rights retained by your organization in 
expansion stage social enterprises? (Please tick the most appropriate box) 
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d Less than 20% 
d Between 21% and 50% 
d More than 51% 
d Not applicable 
d Do not know 
17. Which is the financial instrument that you use to support maturity stage enterprises? 
(More than one option is possible) 
d Grant 
d Underwriting 
d Senior loan  
d Unsecured loan below market rate 
d Unsecured loan at market rate 
d Subordinated loan  
d Quasy-Equity 
d Equity 
d No maturity stage social enterprises supported 
d Do not know 
18. On average, which is the percentage of equity rights retained by your organization in 
expansion stage social enterprises? (Please tick the most appropriate box) 
d Less than 20% 
d Between 21% and 50% 
d More than 51% 
d Not applicable 
d Do not know 
B. Deal Flow: Screening and Due Diligence 
This section asks questions concerning the way in which you screen and select social 
enterprises. In particular, the purpose is to understand which selection variables you explicitly 
consider.  
19. Which are the channels you use to proactive search for new social enterprises to 
support? (More than one option is possible) 
d Through 3rd parties 
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d Through network of philanthropic supporters 
d Through network of venture capitalists contacts 
d Through organizations in the existing portfolio 
d By proactively contacting other entities 
d By incubating social enterprises 
d By creating social enterprises in case no suitable candidate can be identified 
d Other, please specify 
20. How often do you use each one of the channels? (Please rank each variable. Besides, use the 
"Other" in case you consider other variables than those listed in the matrix. If so, please fill in 
the text box at the bottom of the matrix with the variable you consider.) 
 7 = 
Always 
4 = Sometimes 1 = Never 88 = Do 
not know 
 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 88 
Through 3rd parties         
Through network of philanthropic 
supporters 
        
Through network of venture capitalists 
contacts 
        
Through organizations in the existing 
portfolio 
        
By incubating social enterprises         
By creating social enterprises in case 
no suitable candidate can be identified 
        
Other, please specify         
21. Which one of the following methods do you adopt to receive unsolicited proposals? 
(More than one option is possible) 
d Specific section on our web pages 
d Social enterprises send proposal to our offices 
d Business network  
d Unsolicited proposals are not accepted 
d Do not know 




22. While selecting for new social enterprises to potentially support, how important are the following variables? (Please rank each variable. Besides, 
use the "Other" in case you consider other variables than those listed in the matrix. If so, please fill in the text box at the bottom of the matrix with the 
variable you consider.) 
 
 
7 = Very 
 important 
4 = Not important neither 
unimportant 
1 = Not important at 
all 
88 = Do not 
know 
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 88 
Entrepreneur and Management team         
Business Strategy          
Social market served         
The SE is achieving clear outcomes with 
significant numbers of people 
        
Deal terms         
Credible and sustainable revenue model and/or 
credible, sustainable funding plan 
        
Potential for financial sustainability         
Market size         
Potential significant social impact         
Potential to achieve scale         
Technology         
Good fit in the your portfolio         





23. While applying for funds, how important is for your organization to receive the following information/documents from a social enterprise in 
order to be eligible? (Please rank each information/document. Besides, use the "Other" in case you consider relevant to receive other information/documents 
than those listed in the matrix. If so, please fill in the text box at the bottom of the matrix with the information/document you consider.) 
24.  
Which of the following formal due diligence practices do you adopt? (More than one option is possible) 
d Social due diligence d Market due diligence 
d Environmental due diligence d Fiscal due diligence 
d Legal due diligence d Accounting due diligence 
d Technology due diligence d No formal due diligence process 
d Other, please specify d Do not know 
 
7 = Very 
 important 
4 = Not important neither 
unimportant 
1 = Not important at 
all 
88 = Do not 
know 
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 88 
Turnover          
Audited accounts          
Business plan         
Estimation of needed capital          
Explanation of what the funds will be used to 
accomplish 
        
Financial plan         
Other, please specify         
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C. Valuation, Equity Rights, Control Rights 
This section asks about the methods your organization adopt to value social enterprises, as well 
as the equity and control rights retained, if applicable. 




d No valuation of the enterprise, we only finance specific needs 
d Other, please specify 
d Do not know 
26. While supporting social enterprises, how often you financially back the following 
needs? (please rank each need. Besides, use the "Other" in case you financially support other 
needs than those listed in the matrix. If so, please fill in the text box at the bottom of the matrix 
with the need you support.) 
1 = Never 4 = Not important 
neither unimportant 
1 = Not 
important at 
all 
88 = Do 
not know 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 88 
Working capital         
Capex         
Cash         
Increase management 
capacity 
        
Outsourced project 
support 
        
Other, please specify         
27. Which kind of control rights do you retain? (More than one option is possible) 
d Formal 
d Informal 
d No control rights are retained 
d Depends 
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28. How much more important is “TRUST” than formal control rights in managing the 
relationship with the social enterprises you support? 
0 = Much more 
important                     
4 = As important as formal 
control rights 
7 = Not important 
at all 
Do Not know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 88 
29. Does your organization retain the right to actively participate in the board of directors 




30. Which kind of clauses do you include in the term sheet? (More than one option is possible) 
d Potential future exit strategy 
d Type of reports to be sent by the social enteprise 
d Liquidation preferences 
d Dividend rights 
d Anti-dilution clauses 
d Redemption rights 
d Lock-ups 
d Board composition 
d Warranties 
d Vesting 
d Option pool 
d Milestones 
d None of the above 
d No term sheet is signed 
d Do not know 
d Other, please specify 
31. Which transfer rights do you include in the term sheet? (More than one option is possible) 
d  Pre-emption rights 
d  Drag – along 
d  Tag – along 
d  Transfer rights are not considered 




D. Post Investment: Value-Added and Monitoring 
This section asks about the non-financial activities that your organization implement to add-value in the social enterprises it supports as well as the 
monitoring devices.  
32. How important are the following non-financial added-value activities in supporting social enterprises? (Please rank each value-added activity. 
Besides, use the "Other" in case you implement other value - added activities than those listed in the matrix. If so, please fill in the text box at the bottom of 
the matrix with the value - added activity you provide.) 
7 = Very 
 important 
4 = Not important neither 
unimportant 
1 = Not important at 
all 
88 = Do not 
know 
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 88 
Strategic advice         
Marketing and communication         
IT consultation         
Financial management and accounting          
Legal          
Human resourse recruiting         
Governance advice         
Access to a network of potential future 
investors/donors   
        
Syndication / co-partnership         




33. How does your organization provide value-added activities? (Please select the most appropriate column for each monitoring device that you use. 
Besides, use the "Other" in case you implement other monitoring activities than those listed in the matrix. If so, please fill in the text box at the bottom of the 
matrix with the monitoring device you use) 
 Directly Externally 
Strategic advice   
Marketing and communication   
IT consultation   
Financial management and accounting    
Legal    
Human resourse recruiting   
Governance advice   
Access to a network of potential future investors/donors     
Syndication / co-partnership   








34. How important are the following monitoring devices in your investment management approach? (please for each monitoring device that you use 
select the most appropriate column. Besides, in case you select the "Other" category, please fill in the text box at the bottom of the matrix.) 
7 = Very 
 important 
4 = Not important neither 
unimportant 
1 = Not important at 
all 
88 = Do not 
know 
 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 88 
Reports         
Formal meetings with the management         
Informal meetings with the management         
Implementation of the Balance Scorecard         
Staging the total amount of funds subject to the 
reaching of milestones 
        
Other, please specify         
35. How often do you perform monitoring activities? 
 Montlhy Bi-monthly Quarterly Semi-annually Once a year Do not know 
Reports       
Formal meetings with the management       
Informal meetings with the management       









E. Exit / Graduation: Typologies and Return 
This section asks about the exit strategies you adopt and the returns you have obtained so far. 
36. Have you exited / graduated any social enterprise? 
d Yes 
d No 
d Do not know 
37. How many investments have you exited/graduated so far?  
38. Why do you exit investments? 
d The social enterprise has become sustainable 
d The social enterprise has grown to scale 
d The social enterprise needs follow on investments 
d Other, please specify 
d Do not know/not applicable 
39. Which are the exit strategies you adopt or will adopt in the future? 
d Enabling the SE to become self-sustainable 
d Finding new financial partners for obtaining extra funds 
d Exit after repayment of debt  
d Buy back 
d M&A 
d IPO 
d Not to exit 
d Do not know  
d Other, please specify 
40. On average, how long does your organization support social enterprises? 
d Less than 1 year 
d Between 1 and 3 years 
d Between 3 and 5 years 








d Do not know 




42. How do you determine social returns? 
d REDF (Robert Enterprise Development Fund) Methodology 
d Growth rate of turnover 
d Growth rate of “lives touched” 
d Progress toward going to scale 
d Quality of the service provided by the SE 
d Other, please specify 
d We do not use any  
d Do not know 
43. How much social return have you obtained so far? 
0 = Very much less  
than expected                               10 = Much more than expected 
Do not know 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88 




45. Why do you seek a financial return? 
d To push the social enterprise in becoming sustainable 
d To cover the fund's management costs 
d To establish a revolving fund 
d To be more attractive for a wider audience of investors 
d Other, please specify 
46. Which is your target financial return measured by the indicator IRR? (Please insert a 








47. Could you please provide us with the email address of the person who answered the 
survey? (The email address will be used only for sending the results of the research) 
 
Thank you very much for participating in the survey.  








APPENDIX 4:  Code sheet. 
Investment strategy






















Sum of seven variables below
Sum of four variables below
Sum of three variables below
Sum of two variables below
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
0 = No       1 = Yes
Dimension Source Variable Type of variable Value
Passive
Social entrepreneur
Application Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Web page Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Referrals
Business network Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Proactive
Referrals
From business network Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
From donors Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
From organization in the portfolio Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
From VCs or PEs Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Creation of ad-hoc SE
Incubation of existing SE Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Other
Own research Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Deal origination
Sum of four variables below
Sum of two sources below
Sum of three sources below
Sum of two variables below
Sum of one variable below
Sum of one variable below









Dimension Variable Type of variable
Human capital Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Organization activity
Achievement of clear outcomes with 
a significant number of people Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Credible and sustainable revenue 
model Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Technology Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Business strategy Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Social mission Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
External environment
Market size Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Social market served Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Assessment of the deal
Deal terms Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Potential
Social impact Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Financial Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Deal selection and evaluation
Value
Sum of five variables below
Sum of two variables below
Sum of two variables below
Sum of one variable below
Deal structuring
Dimension Variable Type of variable
Financial instrument Grant Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Loan Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Equity Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Value
Monitoring
Dimension Variable Type of variable
Formal
Board seat Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Reports Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Stage financing Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Informal
Meetings Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Post-investment activities
Sum of one variable below
Sum of monitoring and cooperation dimensions
Sum of three variables below
Value
Cooperation
Dimension Variable Type of variable
Supportive
IT Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Legal advice Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Marekting and communication advice Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Human resources recruiting Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Financial management and accounting Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Strategic
Board seat Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Strategic advice Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Networking
Present funders - syndication Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Future funders Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Value
Sum of five variables below
Sum of five variables below
Sum of five variables below










Dimension Variable Type of variable
Duration
1-2 years Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
5-7 years Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
More than 7 years Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Typology
M&A Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Buy back Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Repayment of loan Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Continue with  the 
relationship on strategic level Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Follow on investment Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
New financial partners Count 0 = No       1 = Yes
Value
Sum of three variables below











APPENDIX 5:  Statistical Interactive Statistical Analysis - Output. 
  ***  Sample Confidence Intervals  *** 
Completed [1/N]: 0.5405 
95% CI: 0.427<1<0.654; Wilson: 0.421<1<0.656 
Compl+Part [A/N]: 0.5405 
95% CI: 0.427<A<0.654; Wilson: 0.421<A<0.656 
Refused [B/N]: 0.0405 
95% CI: -0.004<B<0.085; Wilson: 0.011<B<0.122 
Unknown [C/N]: 0.4189 
95% CI: 0.307<C<0.531; Wilson: 0.307<C<0.539 
ISER eligibility rate: 1 
95% CI: 1<ER<1; Wilson: 0.939<ER<0.999 
 
  ***  CASRO Response Rates  *** 
simple [unknowns eligible]: 0.5405 
simple [unknowns not eligible]: 0.9302 
CASRO [unknowns devided]: 0.5405 
e for CASRO [proportion eligible]: 1 
 
  ***  AAPO Response Rates  *** 
RR1 [1/(A+B+C)]: 0.5405 
RR2 [A/A+B+C]: 0.5405 
RR3 [1/(A+B+e*C)]: 0.5405 
RR4 [A/(A+B+e*C)]: 0.5405 
RR5 [1/(A+B)]: 0.9302 
RR6 [A/(A+B)]: 0.9302 
 
  ***  AAPO Cooperation Rates  *** 
CR1 [1/(A+4+5)]: 0.9302 
CR2 [A/(A+4+5)]: 0.9302 
CR3 [1/(A+4)]: 0.9302 
CR4 [A/(A+4)]: 0.9302 
 
  ***  AAPO Refusal Rates  *** 
RefR1 [4/(A+B+C)]: 0.0405 
RefR2 [4/(A+B+e*C)]: 0.0405 









  ***  AAPO Contact Rates  *** 
ConR1 [(A+4+5)/(A+B+C)]: 0.5811 
ConR2 [(A+4+5)/(A+B+e*C)]: 0.5811 
ConR3 [(A+4+5)/(A+B)]: 1 
 
  ***  ISER Rates  *** 
Response-o [A/(A+B+e*C)]: 0.5405 
Response-f [1/(A+B+e*C)]: 0.4595 
Co-operation [A/(A+4+5+e*6a)]: 0.5405 
Contact [(A+4+5+e*6a)/(A+B+e*C)]: 1 
Refusal [4/(A+B+e*C)]: 0.0405 
 
 
